GIFT  OF 


The 
Twenty-One   Demands 

JAPAN   FERSUS  CHINA 
G.  Zay  Wood 

Formerly  Editor  of  "The  Far  Eastern  Republic," 

Curtis  Fellow  in  International  Law  and  Diplomacy,  Columbia 

University,  President  of  the  Chinese  Political  Science 

Association,  Author  of  "  China,  the  United  States, - 

and  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance,"  etc.,  etc. 


New  York  Chicago 

Fleming  H.  Revell  Company 

London       and        Edinburgh 


Copyright,  1921,  by 
FLEMING  H.  REVELL  COMPANY 


Books  by 

G.  ZAY  WOOD 

1. 

Chhia,    the    United    States    and    the    Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance. 

2. 

The  Chino-Japanese  Treaties  of  May  25,  1915. 

3. 

The  Twenty-one  Demands. 

4. 

China,  Japan  and  the  Shantung  Question. 

Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


New    York:    158   Fifth   Avenue 

7n£qflfttteafeo!  to  North  Wabash  Ave. 

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Edinburgh :    75 '  Princes    Street 


TO 

MR.  LIANG-HUA  SHEN 

A  FRIEND.  COUNSELLOR,  AND  SYMPATHIZER 

THIS  BOOK  IS 

AFFECTIONATELY  DEDICATED 


464306 


FOREWORD 

What  are  the  Twenty-one  Demands?  The  ques- 
tion has  been  again  and  again  asked,  with  the  meet- 
ing in  Washington  of  nine  Powers — Great  Britain, 
France,  Italy,  Japan,  China,  Belgium,  Holland, 
Portugal,  and  the  United  States — to  discuss  ques- 
tions relating  to  limitation  of  armament  and  to  the 
tangled  issues  in  the  Pacific  and  in  the  Far  East. 
To  answer  this  simple  question,  concisely  and  yet 
fully,  is  the  purpose  of  the  book,  which  is  primarily 
a  non-partisan  and  impartial  discussion  of  the  sub- 
ject. 

The  Twenty-one  Demands  are  originally  divided 
into  Five  Groups,  and  it  is  in  accordance  with  the 
division  of  Groups  that  they  are  herein  analysed. 
These  analyses,  together  with  the  account  of  the 
immediate  circumstances  leading  to  the  p/esentation 
of  the  demands  and  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
negotiations  were  conducted  between  the  Chinese 
and  Japanese  Governments,  ought  to  serve  as  a  com- 
plete story  of  the  most  dramatic  and  most  significant 
incident,  if  it  be  an  incident,  of  the  whole  history  of 
the  Chino-Japanese  relations. 

The  facts  herein  presented  are  not  new.  They 
have  long  become  public  property.  They  are,  how- 
ever, so  arranged  as  to  present  a  consecutive  narra- 
tive, and  those  who  are  interested  to  know  the  com- 


8  FOREWORD 

plete  history  will  find  it  fairly  comprehensive.  The 
readers  are  invited  to  consult  the  appendices,  in 
which  may  be  found  the  official  statements  and 
original  texts,  and  the  companion  volume,  "The 
Chino- Japanese  Treaties  of  May  25,  1915,"  in  which 
the  voidance  of  the  said  treaties  is  urged  on  legal, 
political,  economic,  and  moral  grounds. 


CONTENTS 

HAPTER  •  PAGE 

I.  Introduction 11 

II.  The  Presentation  of  the  Demands    .  22 

III.  Attempt  at  Secrecy       .       .       .       .  31 

IV.  The  Twenty-one  Demands  Analysed 

— Group  I 39 

V.    The  Twenty-one  Demands  Analysed 

— Group  II 46 

VI.     The  Twenty-one  Demands  Analysed 

— Group  III  .       .       .       .       .       .       53 

VII.  The  Twenty-one  Demands  Analysed 

— Group  IV 62 

VIII.  The  Twenty-one  Demands  Analysed 

— Group  V 68 

IX.    A  Unilateral  Negotiation    ...       79 
X.     Conclusion .95 

Appendices  : 

A.  Instructions   Handed   at   Tokio, 

December  3,  1914,  by  Baron 
Kato,  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, to  Mr.  Hioki,  Japanese 
Minister  in  Peking,  in  Con- 
nection with  the  Twenty-One 
Demands 105 

B.  Japan's  Original  Demands,  Hand- 

ed to  President  Yuan  Shih- 
Kai  by  Mr.  Hioki,  January  18, 
1915 108 


10  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

C.  The    Incorrect  Version   of  the 

Twenty-one  Demands  Given 
Out  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment to  the  Other  Powers  in 
Response  to  their  Inquiries      .     113 

D.  Japan's  Revised  Demands,  Twen- 

ty-four in  all,  April  26,  1915  .     115 

E.  China's  Reply  to  the  Revised  De- 

mands, May  1,  1915      ...     123 

F.  Memorandum  Read  by  the  Chi- 

nese Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs to  Mr.  Hioki,  the  Japa- 
nese Minister,  at  a  Conference 

HELD  AT  WAI  ChIAO  Pu,  May  1, 

1915 .128 

G.  Japan's  Ultimatum  to  China,  De- 

livered by  the  Japanese  Min- 
ister to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, 3  p.  m.,  May  7, 1915  .  .  135 
H.  China's  Reply  to  the  Ultima- 
tum, May  8,  1915  .  .  .  .  142 
I.  Official  Statement  by  the  Chi- 
nese Government  Respecting 
the  chino-japanese  negotia- 
TIONS Brought  to  a  Conclusion 
by  China's  Compliance  with 
the  Terms  of  Japan's  Ultima- 
tum    144 

J.    Japan's  Communique,  Issued  at 

Tokio,  May  7,  1915      ...     165 


THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 


INTRODUCTION 

FOR  the  last  score  of  years,  Japanese  diplomacy 
in  China  seems  to  have  had  as  its  paramount 
object  the  control  of  the  rich  Chinese  re- 
sources which  are  necessary  to  a  very  large  extent 
to  Japan's  own  economic  existence.  The  means 
adopted  by  Japan  to  realise  the  end  she  has  in  view 
are  not  always  above  reproach,  and  the  methods 
which  she  employs  are  frequently  reprehensible. 
The  Chientao  dispute  of  1907,  the  Tatsu  Maru 
affair  of  the  following  year,  the  objection  by  the 
Japanese  Government  to  the  construction  of  the 
Hsinmintun-Fakuman  Railway  in  1908-9,  the  col- 
lapse of  the  neutralisation  scheme  of  the  Manchurian 
railways  in  1910,  the  conclusion  by  Japan  of  secret 
agreements  with  Russia  in  1907  and  then  in  1910 
for  the  division  of  their  respective  spheres  in  China, 
the  Nanking  affair  of  1913,  the  Chengchiatun  fracas 
of  1916,  the  Amoy  police  case  in  1918,  the  Hung- 
chun  outrage  in  1920,  and  many  other  cases  and 
"affairs"  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  enumerate  here, 
are  typical  examples  of  the  means  and  methods  which 
Japan  has  not  hesitated  to  employ  in  adjusting  her 

11 


12        THk  *'  tWEftT  Y^-ONE-'  DEMANDS 

relations  with  China.  They  are  certainly  not  happy 
'instances  of  fair  dealing,  which  should  characterise 
all  international  relations,  particularly  between  China 
and  Japan,  when  the  latter  has  much  to  depend  upon 
the  former,  even  if  for  economic  considerations  only. 
Japan's  economic  and  political  ambitions  in  China 
have  long  been  an  open  secret.  Because  of  the 
watchfulness  of  the  other  Powers  having  vital  in- 
terests in  China,  they  were  not,  however,  openly 
pursued.  The  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe  in  August, 
1914,  created  for  Japan  an  unprecedented  but  long 
desired  opportunity — "an  opportunity  that  never 
comes  back  again  in  a  life  time" — to  carry  out  her 
well-studied  economic  and  political  programmes  in 
China,  or,  to  use  the  official  language  of  the  Japanese 
Government,  "to  solve  those  various  questions  which 
are  detrimental  to  the  intimate  relations  of  China 
and  Japan  with  a  view  to  solidifying  the  foundation 
of  cordial  friendship  subsisting  between  the  two 
countries  to  the  end  that  the  peace  of  the  Far  East 
may  be  effectually  and  permanently  preserved." 
Thus,  without  waiting  for  the  call  from  her  ally, 
Japan  suggested  her  readiness  to  join  in  the  conflict. 
Apprehensive  of  the  serious  consequences  which 
would  flow  from  Japan's  intervention  in  the  strug- 
gle, and  yet  unwilling  to  state  openly  its  objection 
to  her  participation,  the  British  Government  merely 
suggested  that,  in  event  of  war  between  Japan  and 
Germany,  the  operations  of  the  Japanese  forces 
should  be  limited  to  the  Yellow  Sea  and  to  the  pro- 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  13 

tection  of  the  allied  shipping  in  the  northern  Pacific. 
Japan  wished,  however,  to  play  bigger  stakes.  So; 
on  August  15,  1914,  Japan  sent  the  ultimatum  to 
Germany,  calling  on  the  latter  "to  deliver  on  a 
date  not  later  than  September  15  to  the  Imperial 
Japanese  authorities,  without  condition  or  compen- 
sation, the  entire  leased  territory  of  Kiao-chow,  with 
a  view  to  the  eventual  restoration  of  the  same  to 
China."  The  ultimatum  was  ignored  by  Germany, 
and  war  was  declared  by  Japan  on  August  24.  The 
Chinese  Government,  realising  that  a  major  portion 
of  the  military  operations  against  the  German  leased 
territory  would  be  carried  on  in  the  Shantung  prov- 
ince, and  being  anxious  to  limit  these  operations  to 
the  smallest  area  commensurate  with  the  military 
necessity  so  that  her  people  would  be  subjected  to 
as  little  miseries  and  devastations  of  the  armed  con- 
flict as  possible,  established  a  special  war  zone  in 
which  the  belligerents  could  carry  on  their  hostile 
operations  against  each  other.  The  establishment 
of  this  special  military  area  in  Shantung  was  noti- 
fied to  Japan,  Germany,  and  the  allied  Powers,  in 
a  circular  note  under  the  date  of  September  3,  1914. 
It  is  very  important  to  remember  the  creation  of  this 
special  military  area,  for  its  abolition  later  was  seized 
upon  as  an  excuse  justifying  the  presentation  of  the 
Twenty-one  Demands.  It  is  also  important  to  add 
that  to  this  war  zone  Japan  vigorously  objected, 
for  she  thought  that  it  would  tend  to  hamper  and 
to  limit  her  military  operations. 


14        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

Japan's  real  object  in  entering  the  war,  it  has  been 
pointed  out,  was  "less  the  destruction  of  German 
Imperialism  than  the  creation  of  a  situation  enabling 
her  to  strengthen  her  own  position  in  Eastern  Asia 
by  all  means  within  her  power."  She  saw  in  her 
participation  in  the  war  the  opportunity  of  driving 
Germany  out  of  her  leased  possessions  in  Shantung, 
as  Japan  had  done  so  with  Russia  in  South  Man- 
churia. Dispossession  of  Germany  would  eventually 
mean  acquisition  by  Japan,  is  apparently  the  assump- 
tion upon  which  Japanese  statesmen  had  formulated 
their  Chinese  policy.  The  rich  coal,  iron,  and  gold 
mines  which  German  concerns  had  operated  in  Shan- 
tung, the  Tsinanfu-Kiaochow  Railway  that  had  been 
built  with  Chino-Japanese  capital  and  operated  by  a 
private  company,  and  other  fruits  of  German  enter- 
prise in  Shantung,  were  so  many  more  attractions 
for  Japan  to  make  use  of  the  opportunity  which  her 
participation  in  the  war  afforded  her.  Towards  the 
later  part  of  September,  Japan  began  her  military 
operations  against  Tsingtao,  in  co-operation  with  a 
contingent  of  British  forces.  On  November  7,  the 
Germans  capitulated,  and  on  November  16,  the 
Anglo-Japanese  forces  made  their  triumphant  entry. 
The  war  in  the  Far  East,  which  was  precipitated  by 
Japan's  ultimatum  of  August  15,  was  practically 
over  by  the  middle  of  November.  The  British  forces 
were  immediately  withdrawn ;  but  Japan,  for  obvious 
reasons,  not  only  refused  to  withdraw  her  troops 
already    in    Shantung,    but    increased    her    forces 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  15 

there  even  after  the  cessation  of  military  opera- 
tions. 

As  the  war  zone  was  created  by  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  meet  the  commencement  of  the  military 
operations  by  Japan  and  Great  Britain  against 
Tsingtao,  it  became  absolutely  useless  with  the  cap- 
ture of  the  territory  and  the  general  cessation  of 
military  activities  in  the  area.  The  Chinese  Govern- 
ment expressed,  therefore,  the  desire  to  abolish  this 
military  zone,  so  as  to  restore  the  normal  condition 
in  the  province  as  soon  as  possible.  The  Chinese 
Government  had,  at  first,  even  entertained  the  hope 
that  the  Japanese  Government  would  take  the  initia- 
tive in  suggesting  its  abolition.  It  is,  however,  very 
curious  to  say  that  the  Japanese  Government,  when 
approached  on  the  subject,  objected  to  the  abolition 
of  the  war  zone,  as  strongly  as  it  had  objected  to  its 
creation  at  the  beginning.  The  official  attitude  of  the 
Japanese  Government  seemed  to  be  that,  inasmuch 
as  China  had  already  established  the  zone  there  was 
no  need  for  its  immediate  abolition. 

The  Chinese  Government  became  all  the  more  de- 
termined to  abolish  the  special  military  area,  in  view 
of  the  persistent  disregard  shown  by  the  Japanese 
authorities  of  China's  territorial  sovereignty.  Re- 
gardless of  the  feelings  of  the  Chinese  people  in  gen- 
eral and  those  of  Shantung  in  particular,  and  quite 
unmindful  of  China's  sovereign  rights,  the  Japanese 
military  authorities  in  command  of  the  expeditionary 
forces  proceeded  systematically  to  establish  their 


16        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

jurisdiction  in  the  cities  which  they  had  already  oc- 
cupied, and  to  extend  it  to  the  other  cities,  which  are 
outside  of  the  military  zone.  In  other  words,  they 
proceeded  to  establish  their  jurisdiction  practically 
all  over  the  Shantung  province.  A  contemporary 
writer  recorded  the  encroachments  as  follows :  "Gar- 
risons were  stationed  along  the  Tsinanfu-Tsingtao 
Railway,  and  at  Tsinanfu,  the  capital  of  the  prov- 
ince; at  Lungkow,  Wei-hsien,  and  other  important 
points.  By  a  gradual  and  at  times  subtle  process, 
Chinese  police,  communication  and  other  local  ad- 
ministrative functions  were  negatived  and  usurped, 
after  the  system  which  had  been  employed  and  per- 
fected in  Korea  and  Manchuria.  An  influx  of  a  low 
class  of  Japanese  immigrants,  to  which  the  Chinese 
population  was  more  or  less  subordinated,  followed 
on  the  heels  of  the  Japanese  military  forces."  And 
the  special  war  zone,  the  creation  of  which  was 
strenuously  objected  to  by  Japan  as  she  thought  it 
would  limit  the  area  of  her  military  operations,  was 
now  secretly  welcomed  by  the  Japanese  authorities 
as  a  convenient  screen  to  cover  up  their  sinister 
activities. 

That  the  war  zone  could  be  made  use  of  by  Japan 
in  such  a  way  was  beyond  the  calculations  of  the 
Chinese  Government.  We  recall  that  when  Japan 
landed  her  troops  at  Lungkow  and  thus  violated 
China's  neutrality,  the  Council  of  State  (the  Tsang- 
chengyuen)  protested  to  the  Peking  Government  and 
urged  it  for  definite  action;  we  know  that  when 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  17 

Japanese  authorities  seized  the  Shantung  Railway 
under  the  pretext  of  "military  necessity/'  the  Coun- 
cil of  State,  jealous  of  China's  territorial  rights, 
again  protested   and  again   urged   that   something 
should  be  done  to  prevent  further  aggression;  and 
we  also  know  that  when  Japan  insisted  upon  the 
maintenance  of  the  special  war  zone  when  the  war 
operations  had  ceased,  the  Council  of  State  called 
upon  the  Peking  Government  to  abolish  it  without 
reference  to  the  wishes  of  the  Japanese  Government. 
The  public  opinion  in  China  was,  then,  so  decidedly 
against  the  continuance  of  the  special  military  area, 
and  the  Chinese  people  in  general  were  so  afraid  of 
its  being  made  use  of  by  Japan  as  an  easy  device 
with  which  to  carry  out  her  schemes  of  exploitation 
and  aggression  in  the  Shantung  province,  that  the 
Chinese  Government  was  bound  to  protest  against 
the  sinister  use  which  the  Japanese  military  author- 
ities were  making  of  the  zone,  and  to  request  the 
concurrence  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  its  im- 
mediate abolition.    In  the  last  of  a  series  of  six  notes 
exchanged    between    the    two    governments,    the 
Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  pointed  out 
that  two  full  months  "have  elapsed  since  the  capture 
of  Tsingtao ;  the  basis  of  German  military  prepara- 
tions has  been  destroyed ;  the  troops  of  Great  Britain 
have  already  been  and  those  of  your  country  are 
being  gradually  withdrawn.    This  shows  clearly  that 
there  is  no  more  military  action  in  the  special  area, 
and  that  the  said  area  ought  to  be  cancelled  admits 


18        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

of  no  doubt."  Japan,  for  apparent  reasons,  received 
China's  suggestion  with  displeasure,  and  considered 
it  as  a  sort  of  pin-prick  policy  on  the  part  of  the 
Chinese  Government.  And  in  the  Japanese  press — 
which  is  always  government  inspired — there  was  a 
great  outburst  of  indignation  over  the  Chinese  re- 
quest. All  the  newspapers  in  Japan  affected  to  re- 
gard it  as  an  "insult"  to  the  Japanese  Government, 
not  realising  the  fact  that  Japan's  concurrence  in 
the  abolition  was  not  necessary  and  was  asked  for 
by  the  Chinese  Government  purely  as  an  act  of  cour- 
tesy. 

The  hostile  spirit  with  which  China's  suggestion 
for  the  cancellation  of  the  special  war  area  in  Shan- 
tung was  received  by  the  Japanese  press,  and  the  re- 
peated refusal  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  act 
on  the  suggestion,  left  no  alternative  for  the  Chinese 
Government  but  to  proceed  to  abolish  the  zone. 
Proper  steps  were  taken,  and  the  special  military 
area  delimited  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  the 
emergency  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  attack  upon 
Tsingtao  was  cancelled.  On  January  7,  1915,  the 
Japanese  Government  was  officially  notified  of  the 
cancellation  through  its  Minister  in  Peking.  Mr. 
Hioki  Eki,  Japanese  Minister  in  Peking,  replied  two 
days  later  that  the  Japanese  Government  would  not 
recognise  the  cancellation.  In  a  note  dated  January 
16,  the  Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  pointed 
out  in  reply  that,  as  there  was  no  more  military  ac- 
tion in  the  special!  area  delimited  for  the  purpose,  the 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  19 

same  ought  to  be  cancelled.  "As  efforts  have  always 
been  made  to  effect  an  amicable  settlement  of  affairs 
between  your  country  and  ours,"  continued  the 
Chinese  Foreign  Minister,  "it  is  our  earnest  hope 
that  your  government  will  act  upon  the  principle  of 
preserving  peace  in  the  Far  East  and  maintaining 
international  confidence  and  friendship/ ' 

But  these  expressions  for  peace  and  friendship 
fell  on  deaf  ears.  The  Japanese  Government  was 
not  prepared  to  listen  to  them.  On  January  18, 
within  thirty-six  hours  of  the  expression  of  this 
earnest  hope  for  an  amicable  settlement  by  the 
Chinese  Foreign  Minister,  Mr.  Hioki,  Japanese  Min- 
ister in  Peking,  called  at  the  office  of  the  President 
and  presented  to  him  in  person,  not  a  reply  to  the 
note  of  the  Chinese  Government  of  January  16,  but 
the  Twenty-one  Demands,  which  had  absolutely 
nothing  to  do  with  the  question  of  the  military  zone 
at  issue,  but  for  the  presentation  of  which  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  zone  by  the  Chinese  Government  was 
made  a  timely  and  convenient  excuse.  The  diplo- 
matic procedure  that  Japan  has  adopted  in  her  deal- 
ings with  China  is  not  infrequently  out  of  the  usual 
rut,  and  this  presentation  of  the  Twenty-one  De- 
mands to  the  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic, 
without  going  through  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office, 
and  under  the  most  flimsy  pretext,  is  but  one  illus- 
tration. 

Now  in  order  to  understand  the  real  nature  and 
significance  of  these  demands  we  have  but  to  refer 


20        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

to  the  appendices,  in  which  both  the  original  and 
the  revised  texts  can  be  found.  Compare  them  with 
the  exacting  demands  which  Austria-Hungary  had 
made  upon  Serbia,  and  the  difference  is  rather  strik- 
ing. We  recall  that  Serbia  was  willing  and  ready  to 
accept  all  the  demands  except  the  ninth  and  the  tenth, 
for  which  arbitration  was  suggested  as  an  alterna- 
tive. The  ninth  demand  consisted  in  that  all  offi- 
cers and  officials  guilty  of  propaganda  against  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, which  resulted  in  the  assassination  of 
the  Austrian  Archduke,  were  to  be  dismissed,  the 
Government  of  Austria-Hungary  reserving  to  itself 
the  right  to  communicate  to  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment the  names  and  doings  of  such  officers  and  offi- 
cials. The  tenth  demand  was  that  the  representa- 
tives of  Austria-Hungary  should  assist  Serbia  in 
suppressing  the  movement  directed  against  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  and  take 
part  in  the  judicial  proceedings  on  Serbian  territory 
against  persons  accessory  to  the  Sarajevo  crime. 
These  two  demands  Serbia  refused  to  accept,  and 
her  refusal  was  the  immediate  cause  of  the  outbreak 
of  the  European  War  in  August,  1914.  Now  com- 
pare the  Austrian  demands  on  Serbia  and  the  Japan- 
ese demands  on  China,  the  former  being  made  on 
account  of  the  Sarajevo  crime  and  the  latter  because 
of  China's  refusal  to  violate  her  neutrality  in  the 
European  War.  If  the  Austrian  demands  to  Serbia 
were  drastic,  the  Twenty-one  Demands  on  China 
were  hundred  times  more  so;  if  the  former  were 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  21 

incompatible  with  the  sovereignty  of  Serbia,  the  lat- 
ter were  in  conflict  with  China's  very  right  of  self- 
preservation;  and  if  the  former  were  directly  re- 
sponsible for  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  latter  were 
certainly,  as  a  casus  belli,  infinitely  more  justifiable. 
It  is  rather  unfortunate,  however,  that  a  great 
deal  was  lost  in  the  rendering  of  the  list  of  demands 
from  its  original  text  in  Chinese  into  English,  and 
the  menace  which  was  revealed  in  the  Chinese  origi- 
nal was  made  to  appear  more  or  less  insignificant 
in  its  English  version.  "By  transferring  Eastern 
thoughts  into  Western  moulds,''  a  well-known  writer 
on  China  has  observed,  "things  that  are  like  nails  in 
the  hands  of  soft  sensitive  Oriental  beings  are  made 
to  appear  to  the  steel-clad  West  as  cool-blooded, 
evolutionary  necessities  which  may  be  repellent  but 
which  are  never  cruel."  While,  on  the  other  hand, 
"to  study  the  original  Chinese  text  is  to  pass  as  it 
were  into  the  secret  recesses  of  the  Japanese  brain, 
and  to  find  in  that  darkened  chamber  a  whole  world 
of  things  which  advertise  ambitions  mixed  with  limi- 
tations, hesitations  overwhelmed  by  audacities,  great- 
nesses succumbing  to  littlenesses,  and  vanities  hav- 
ing the  appearance  of  velleities." 


II 

THE  PRESENTATION  OF  THE  DEMANDS 

THAT  which  attracted  our  attention  first  was 
the  manner  in  which  these  demands  were  pre- 
sented to  China.  It  was  most  extraordinary, 
and  most  significant.  Instead  of  communicating 
them  to  the  Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
as  is  the  customary  diplomatic  procedure,  the  Japa- 
nese Minister  presented  them  to  the  President  of 
China  in  person.  The  Chinese  Foreign  Office  thus 
became  in  the  eyes  of  the  Japanese  diplomat  a 
useless  governmental  machinery,  of  which  he  re- 
fused even  to  make  the  ordinary  use. 

On  January  18,  1915,  Mr.  Hioki,  Japanese  Min- 
ister in  Peking,  sought  a  private  interview  with 
President  Yuan  Shih-k'ai.  The  alleged  purpose  for 
the  interview  was  "to  explain  the  attitude  of  his 
government  towards  China  and  to  bring  home  to 
the  President  the  fact  that  the  Japanese  Government 
was  anxious  to  settle  a  few  outstanding  questions 
with  China."  The  request  was,  of  course,  readily 
complied  with;  but  it  must  be  understood  that  in 
granting  the  interview  the  Chinese  President,  or 
any  one  else  in  the  Chinese  Government,  had  not 
the  slightest  idea  of  what  was  actually  in  the  Japan- 
ese Minister's  sleeve.    It  was  thought  that  some  ques- 

22 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  23 

tion  relating  to  the  special  war  zone  in  Shantung 
which  the  Chinese  Government  had  just  abolished, 
might  be  made  a  subject  of  discussion.  "Or,  per- 
haps the  Japanese  Minister  wished,"  as  an  American 
writer  has  sarcastically  put  it,  "to  convey  personally 
to  the  President  the  pleasant  assurances  of  Japan's 
consideration  and  friendship  which  Count  Okuma 
previously  had  conveyed  through  mutual  friends,  or 
perhaps  Mr.  Hioki's  call  was  socially  diplomatic/' 
To  the  utter  surprise  of  the  Chinese  Government, 
and  to  the  astonishment  of  the  President  himself  Mr. 
Hioki's  request  for  a  private  interview  was  made 
for  the  purpose  of  presenting  to  the  President  in 
person  the  Twenty-one  Demands.  It  has  since  be- 
come known  that  such  extraordinary  procedure  was 
resorted  to  by  the  Japanese  diplomat  so  that  the 
Chinese  Government  could  be  impressed  with  their 
unusual  importance. 

The  interview  took  place  in  the  evening.  Accord- 
ing to  the  details  recounted  by  one  who  was  present, 
the  interview  was  most  dramatic  and  yet  most  for- 
mal. After  the  usual  exchange  of  words  of  amen- 
ities, President  Yuan  Shih-k'ai  sat  down  and  listened 
to  what  the  Japanese  Minister  had  to  say.  "With  a 
mien  of  great  mystery  and  importance  the  Minister 
opened  the  discussion.  He  enjoined  absolute  secrecy, 
on  pain  of  serious  consequences,  before  handing 
Yuan  the  text  of  the  demands."  President  Yuan 
listened  quietly,  and  without  any  interruption,  to  the 
reading  of  the  demands.     The  Japanese  Minister, 


24        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

when  he  had  finished  with  the  reading,  explained 
to  the  President  that  the  Twenty-one  Demands  were 
submitted  for  immediate  acceptance  by  China,  with 
a  view  to  removing  the  antagonistic  feelings  which 
had  found  expression  in  a  large  section  of  the  Japa- 
nese people  against  President  Yuan  Shih-k'ai  himself, 
and  consequently  against  his  government.  The  ac- 
ceptance of  these  demands,  Mr.  Hioki,  in  a  rather 
naive  manner,  gave  it  as  his  opinion,  would  not  only 
disarm  the  personal  animosity  of  the  Japanese  people 
against  the  President,  but  would  also  strengthen  the 
relation  of  good  neighbourhood  between  the  two 
countries.  He  warned  President  Yuan  that  the 
Chinese  revolutionists  were  very  active  in  Japan  in 
fomenting  a  third  revolution  against  the  Peking 
Government.  While  the  Japanese  Government  had 
no  sympathy  with  the  Chinese  revolutionists,  he  said, 
it  would,  however,  find  itself  unable  to  restrain  their 
activities,  should  the  President  decline  to  accept 
these  demands  in  toto.  In  that  case,  nor  could  the 
Japanese  Government  tell  what  might  happen  to 
President  Yuan  himself  or  to  the  Peking  Govern- 
ment, if  the  Chinese  revolutionary  leaders  in  Japan 
should  be  permitted  to  go  unrestrained.  The  Japa- 
nese Minister  urged  that  it  was,  therefore,  in  the  best 
interest  of  the  President  himself  *  and  the  Govern- 


*  The  Japanese  Minister  was  said  to  have  also  dropped  a 
few  significant  hints  as  to  the  possibility  of  helping  make 
President  Yuan  the  Emperor  of  China, — a  line  of  argument 
which  was  intended  to  influence  the  President  personally. 
"Indeed,  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  Japanese  Envoy 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  25 

ment  of  China  that  the  Twenty-one  Demands  should 
be  accepted  without  delay  and  without  reservation, 
as  they  had  no  other  object  than  that  of  settling  the 
"outstanding  questions"  between  China  and  Japan. 
And  in  the  same  interview,  the  Japanese  Minister 
complained  of  China's  foreign  policy  which  he  char- 
acterised as  one  of  "befriending  the  distant  nations 
and  showing  hostility  to  her  immediate  neighbours." 
As  a  proof  of  this  policy,  he  pointed  to  the  fact  that 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  were  often  taken 
as  China's  friends  and  sponsors,  while  Japan,  who 
was  China's  next-door  neighbour  and  deserved  to 
be  the  leader  of  the  Far  East,  was  frequently  dis- 
regarded. He  expressed  the  hope,  therefore,  that 
the  willing  acceptance  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands 
would  put  China  and  Japan  in  better  and  more 
friendly  relations. 

A  long  lecture  it  was,  indeed,  and  one  which  was 
given  when  it  was  least  expected.  The  Japanese 
diplomat  could  not,  of  course,  finish  the  interview 
without  enjoining  absolute  secrecy  in  regard  to  the 
demands.  No  disclosure  of  them,  he  urged,  should 
be  made  to  any  Power;  and  he  went  even  so  far  as 
to  threat  that  should  the  demands  become  known  to 
the  public,  Japan  would  be  compelled  to  present 
harsher  and  more  severe  ones  to  China.  This  en- 
joinment  of  strictest  secrecy  was  given  by  the  Japan- 


actually  told  Yuan  Shih-k'ai  that  as  he  was  already  virtually 
Emperor  it  lay  within  his  power  to  settle  the  whole  business 
and  to  secure  his  position  at  one  blow." 


26        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

ese  Minister  as  "his  sincere  advice"  and  "in  the  best 
interests  of  both  countries." 

Throughout  this  interview,  President  Yuan  re- 
mained silent,  and  showed  no  sign  of  perturbation. 
"A  less  experienced,  strong,  and  astute  statesman 
than  Yuan  Shih-k'ai  might  well  have  been  stunned, 
and  cowed,  by  Japan's  demands  and  the  manner  of 
their  presentation."  At  the  conclusion  of  the  con- 
versation, he  merely  remarked  that  China  could  not 
be  expected  to  make  such  concessions  as  asked  for, 
and  that  until  he  had  the  opportunity  of  examining 
the  list  of  demands  carefully,  he  had  nothing  to 
say.  So,  with  the  usual  exchange  of  words  of  per- 
functory nature,  the  interview  ended. 

Now,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  history 
has  very  few  instances,  if  any,  which  can  be  parallel 
to  this  high-handed  manner  in  which  these  demands 
were  made.  Without  the  least  hint  of  premoni- 
tion from  the  Japanese  Government  or  its  representa- 
tive in  Peking,  and  without  going  through  the 
Chinese  Foreign  Office,  which  is  the  regular  inter- 
mediary between  the  Chinese  Government  and  the 
accredited  diplomatic  representatives  in  the  Chinese 
capital,  the  Japanese  Minister,  under  the  pretext  of 
a  private  interview,  served  the  demands  on  Presi- 
dent Yuan  in  person.  After  presentation,  the  Presi- 
dent was  then  cautioned  to  keep  them  absolutely 
secret.  This  deliberate  departure  from  the  custom- 
ary procedure  of  intercourse  was  justly  characterised 
as  contrary  to  diplomatic  decency  and  usage. 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  27 

In  the  previous  chapter,  it  has  been  stated  that 
Japan  seized  upon  the  abolition  by  China  of  the 
special  war  zone  in  Shantung  as  the  immediate  ex- 
cuse for  the  presentation  of  the  Twenty-one  De- 
mands. From  the  First  Instructions*  given  by 
Baron  Kato,  then  Japanese  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  Mr.  Hioki,  which  were  officially  pub- 
lished at  Tokio  on  June  9,  1915,  we  note  that  the 
presentation  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands  to  China 
had  been  decided  upon  for  a  long  time.  On  his 
leave  of  absence,f  Mr.  Hioki  was  given  on  Decem- 
ber 4,  1914,  the  text  of  Twenty-one  Demands — 
styled  as  "proposals"  in  the  Instructions — which  he 
was  to  present  to  the  Chinese  Government  at  a 
"suitable  opportunity."  "Believing  it  absolutely 
essential  for  strengthening  Japan's  position  in  East- 
ern Asia  as  well  as  for  preservation  of  the  general 
interests  of  that  region  to  secure  China's  adherence 
to  the  foregoing  proposals  (meaning  the  Twenty- 
one  Demands),  the  Imperial  Government  are  de- 
termined to  attain  this  end  by  all  means  within  their 
power.  You  are,  therefore,  requested  to  use  your 
best  endeavour  in  the  conduct  of  the  negotiations, 
which  are  hereby  placed  in  your  hands."  Upon  his 
return  to  Peking,  Mr.  Hioki  waited  for  the  "suitable 
opportunity."    It  was  decided  that  the  "suitable  op- 

*  Vide,  Appendix  A. 

t  It  was  assumed  in  some  quarters  that  Mr.  Hioki  was 
recalled  so  that  he  could  receive  the  instructions  about  the 
Twenty-one  Demands  from  Baron  Kato,  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister, in  person. 


28        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

portunity"  had  arrived  when  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment abolished  the  military  zone  in  Shantung.  On 
January  7,  1915,  the  Japanese  Minister  was  in- 
formed that  the  special  war  zone  was  cancelled  and 
the  original  status  of  the  area  was  restored.  The 
Japanese  Minister  was  requested  to  call  upon  his 
government  to  withdraw  all  Japanese  troops  in  the 
said  area  "in  order  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
China."  On  January  9,  the  Japanese  Minister  re- 
plied, upon  receipt  of  telegraphic  instruction  from 
Tokio,  that  the  abolition  of  the  war  zone  was  con- 
sidered as  "an  act,  improper,  arbitrary,  betraying,  in 
fact,  want  of  confidence  in  international  good  faith 
\  and  regardless  of  friendly  relations."  On  January 
16,  the  Chinese  Foreign  Minister  again  explained 
the  reasons  for  the  abolishment,  pointing  out  the 
fact  that,  inasmuch  as  military  operations  had  ceased, 
the  raison  d'etre  for  the  war  zone  had  also  ceased  to 
exist.  To  this  explanation,  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment did  not  reply.  The  only  reply  from  the  Japan- 
ese Government  came  in  the  form  of  the  Twenty-one 
Demands.* 

Those  who  have  carefully  watched  the  develop- 
ment of  the  poltical  situation  in  the  Far  East  have 
unanimously  agreed  that  the  Twenty-one  Demands 
were  as  drastic  as  the  time  of  their  presentation 
was  opportune.     Little  attempt  has  been  made  by 


*  It  is  interesting  to  state  that  the  demands  were  written 
on  Japanese  War  Office  papers,  "water-marked  with  dread- 
noughts and  machine-guns." 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  29 

Japan  for  years  past  to  conceal  her  ambitions  in 
China,  yet  no  such  a  bold  move  she  would  dare,  had 
it  not  been  for  the  war  in  Europe  which  absorbed 
all  the  attentions  of  the  belligerent  Powers.  The 
outbreak  of  the  armed  struggle  in  Europe  in  August, 
1914,  was  considered  by  Japan  as  an  opportunity, 
"that  never  comes  again  in  hundred  years,"  to  set- 
tle a  few  outstanding  questions  with  China.  The 
field  was  clear,  and  her  hands  were  free.  Gloom  in 
Europe  was  sunshine  for  Japan,  and  no  one  should 
be  surprised  that  she  would  make  hay  while  she 
could. 

Japan  found  it  still  necessary  to  go  under  covers, 
however.  Aside  from  the  desperate  attempts  which 
she  made  for  keeping  the  demands  absolutely  secret 
— attempts  which  we  shall  deal  in  extenso  in  the  fol- 
lowing chapter,  the  idea  was  industriously  propa- 
gated that  the  demands  were  nothing  more  than  "a 
counter-blast  to  German  pretensions  in  China." 
When  carefully  analysed,  they  appeared  to  be  more 
of  a  counter-blast  to  British,  rather  than  to  Ger- 
man, pretensions  in  China.  An  accurate  estimate  of 
the  demands  was  arrived  at  in  an  editorial  of  the 
North-China  Herald  of  February  9,  1915,  when  it 
said:  "Even  admitting,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
that  Japan  is  so  utterly  lost  to  all  sense  of  honour 
as  to  try  to  steal  a  march  on  her  partners  (in  the 
war),  self-interest  would  deter  her  from  taking  so 
hazardous  a  step.  Above  all,  she  is  bound  by  her 
alliance  with  Great  Britain;  and  looking  back  upon 


30        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

the  record  of  that  association,  we  cannot  believe  that 
after  so  many  years  of  unceasing  loyalty  to  it,  she 
would  deliberately  profit  by  the  present  time  of 
world  stress  to  undermine  her  Ally's  position  in 
China."  Whether  or  not  "JaPan  was  so  utterly  lost 
to  all  sense  of  honour"  we  do  not  care  to  inquire;  it 
is  quite  evident,  however,  that  she  had  stolen  "a 
march  on  her  partners  in  the  war."  It  might  be 
true  that  Japan  was  "bound  by  her  alliance  with 
Great  Britain"  and  that  she  had  shown  "unceasing 
loyalty  to  it"  in  the  past.  It  is  certainly  true  that 
she  deliberately  took  advantage  of  the  world  stress 
"to  undermine  her  Ally's  position  in  China."  For, 
to  quote  an  editorial  from  the  Japan  Mail,  "if  it  is 
Japan's  settled  policy  to  dominate  and  control  China 
and  to  achieve  the  hegemony  of  Eastern  Asia,  this 
appears  to  be  an  ideal  opportunity.  The  hands  of 
Europe  are  tied.  The  hands  of  the  United  States 
are  folded  in  peace.  China  herself  is  impotent. 
Europe  has  set  Japan  a  bad  example.  What  is  Japan 
that  she  should  rise  superior  to  the  common  level  and 
show  a  self-restraint,  an  unselfish  regard  for  the 
rights  of  the  other  nations  and  peoples,  when  the 
whole  civilised  world  is  in  a  debacle  of  conflicting 
national  ambitions  and  selfishness?" 


Ill 

ATTEMPT  AT  SECRECY 

THE  presentation  by  Japan,  and  later  the  un- 
willing acceptance  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment almost  forced  at  the  point  of  bayonet, 
of  the  Twenty-one  Demands,  could  easily  be  the 
most  important  event  in  the  history  of  the  Far  East, 
greater  in  consequences  than  the  Chino-Japanese 
War  or  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  Its  real  signifi- 
cance^— or,  more  correctly,  the  real  significance  of 
the  Twenty-one  Demands — was  dimly  clouded  by 
the  war  in  Europe  at  the  time,  and  for  that  reason, 
it  did  not  receive  the  full  attention  of  the  Western 
Powers  as  it  surely  merited.  It  was  no  wonder, 
therefore,  that  statesmen  like  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
should  have  frankly  admitted  in  the  Council  of  the 
Prime  Ministers  at  the  Versailles  Peace  Conference 
that  he  had  never  heard  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands 
before — that  is,  before  the  Chinese  delegates  brought 
them  up  for  consideration  at  the  Conference. 

We  have  pointed  out  that  the  Japanese  Minister 
threatened,  after  the  presentation  of  the  demands, 
to  take  more  drastic  measures,  should  they  become 
known  to  the  public,  or  were  they  communicated  to 
the  other  Powers.     It   was  highly  necessary,   of 

31 


32        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

course,  that  absolute  secrecy  should  be  observed,  in 
order  to  prevent  the  other  Powers,  including  Great 
Britain,  Japan's  ally,  from  knowing  what  was  going 
on  between  China  and  Japan.  In  view  of  the  fact 
that  Japan  chose  such  a  moment  to  settle  the  "out- 
standing questions"  with  China  when  the  European 
Powers  were  all  engaged  in  the  war,  it  was  believed 
that  the  Japanese  statesmen  who  were  responsible 
for  the  coup  had  really  thought  that  it  was  quite 
feasible  to  coerce  the  Chinese  Government  into  ac- 
ceptance, without  being  known  to  the  other  interested 
Powers  at  all.  "In  short,  Japan  put  the  sword  at 
China's  throat,  and  intended  to  impose  star-chamber 
proceedings  until  China's  assent  was  secured."  To 
accomplish  this,  Japan  used  her  wide-spread  con- 
trol and  influence  over  international  publicity  relat- 
ing to  Far  Eastern  affairs.  Thus  for  a  number  of 
weeks  after  the  presentation  of  these  demands  every- 
thing remained  clothed  in  impenetrable  mystery,  and 
despite  every  effort  on  the  part  of  the  foreign  cor- 
respondents and  native  journalists  in  Peking,  re- 
liable details  of  what  was  occuring  could  not  be  ascer- 
tained. The  Chinese  Government  did,  of  course, 
its  best  to  guard  the  secret,*  and  the  whole  affair 


*  In  the  Communique  which  the  Japanese  Government  is- 
sued, May  7,  this  assertion  was  made :  "The  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, in  disregard  of  the  understanding  which  was  made 
at  the  commencement  of  the  negotiations  to  keep  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  conferences  strictly  secret,  made  public  the 
Japanese  proposals,  in  various  exaggerated  forms  and  en- 
deavoured to  stir  up  the  feelings  of  the  Powers  against 
Japan." 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  33 

would  not  have  travelled  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
Japanese  Legation  or  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office, 
had  not  the  details  of  the  demands  been  published 
first  by  an  enterprising  Japanese  newspaper  in 
Osaka  in  an  extra  edition,  and  then  by  the  Japan 
Mail,  a  semi-official  paper  in  Tokio,  which  on  April 
1  issued  the  complete  text  of  the  demands  in  English. 
As  soon  as  the  news  leaked  out,  the  foreign  lega- 
tions in  Peking  began  to  inquire  unofficially  as  to 
what  were  the  real  demands  and  what  was  then 
actually  going  on  behind  the  scene.*  The  Japanese 
Government  used  all  the  means  at  its  disposal  to 
prevent  the  disclosure  of  these  demands.  Several 
leading  papers  in  Tokio  were  disciplined  for  pub- 
lishing reports  about  the  demands,  and  comment 
about  them  was  for  a  time  absolutely  forbidden  in 
Japanese  newspapers.  On  January  28,  1915,  Reu- 
ter's  agent  telegraphed  from  Tokio,  saying  that 
"the  information  originating  at  Peking  and  else- 
where purporting  to  outline  the  basis  of  negotiations 
between  Japan   and    China   is   absolutely   without 


♦The  demands  were  made  on  January  18.  Dr.  Paul  S. 
Reinsch,  then  American  in  Peking,  related  the  following  inci- 
dent, apropos  of  Japan's  desperate  attempt  of  keeping  the 
demands  secret:  "A  Japanese  newspaper  reporter  called  at 
the  (American)  Legation  on  January  19  and  related  his 
troubles  to  one  of  the  secretaries.  The  Japanese  Minister 
refused  absolutely,  he  said,  to  say  anything  about  what  had 
passed  between  him  and  the  President  night  before.  With 
his  assumed  naivete  the  man  possibly  hoped  to  get  a  hint  as 
to  whether  a  'leak'  had  occurred  between  the  Chinese  and 
the  American  Minister."  Dr.  Reinsch  admitted,  however, 
that  on  January  21,  he  first  learned  the  astonishing  nature  of 
the  Japanese  "proposals." 


34        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

foundation."  Similar  denials  were  given  out  by 
the  Japanese-controlled  news  agencies  in  Europe  and 
in  the  United  States.  What  was  still  more  appre- 
hensive was  the  fact  that  the  Japanese  Government, 
through  its  representatives  at  London,  Washington, 
Paris,  Petrograd,  et  al,  officially  denied  the  authen- 
ticity of  the  news.  We  recall  how  freely  the  Japa- 
nese Ambassador  at  London  had  issued  statements 
contradicting  the  newspaper  reports  and  characteris- 
ing them  as  insidious  inventions.  We  recall  also  how 
easily  the  Japanese  representative  at  Washington 
had  given  out  assurances  of  Japan's  anxiety  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  Open  Door  policy  in  China  and 
her  desire  for  the  preservation  of  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  the  Chinese  Republic.  In  the  face  of  such 
a  barrage  of  official  denials  and  contradictions,  it 
was  no  wonder  that  The  Associated  Press  of  the 
United  States  and  The  Wolff  Agency  in  Europe 
should  withhold  from  publication  the  text  of  the 
Twenty-one  Demands,  which  was  in  their  possession, 
being  telegraphed  to  them  from  their  correspondents 
in  Tokio.  The  Associated  Press,  in  view  of  the 
categorical  denial  by  the  Japanese  Ambassador  in 
Washington,  went  so  far  as  to  direct  its  representa- 
tives in  Peking  and  Tokio  to  send  "facts,  not 
rumours." 

But  unfortunately  for  Japan,  such  journalistic 
tactics  and  diplomatic  dementi  could  fool  some  of 
the  people  some  of  the  time,  not  all  the  people  all 
the  time.     Such  tactics  could  not  long  impede  the 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  35 

desire  of  the  world  at  large  to  know  just  what  was 
going  on  behind  the  closed  doors  of  Wai-chiao-pu, 
or  long  resist  the  search  for  information  by  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  foreign  Powers  in  Peking  who 
were  frankly  anxious  to  know  the  exact  nature  of 
the  demands.  Comprehending  the  immense  im- 
portance of  the  matter  and  greatly  stirred  up  by  the 
newspaper  reports  in  the  Far  East,  Sir  John  N. 
Jordan,  then  British  Minister  in  Peking,  directly  in- 
quired of  the  Japanese  Minister  there  about  the  de- 
mands. Mr.  Hioki  admitted  that  a  memorandum 
had  been  presented  to  the  Chinese  Government,  but 
assured  his  British  colleague  that  only  eleven  points, 
instead  of  twenty-one,  were  raised  and  that  they  did 
not  infringe  upon  China's  political  independence, 
territorial  integrity,  or  the  rights  of  other  foreign 
nations  in  China.  In  the  light  of  the  later  events, 
and  of  the  original  demands  now  known,  what  the 
Japanese  Minister  had  said  to  the  British  represen- 
tative bore  little  resemblance  to  truth.  But  this  was 
not  the  only  instance  where  Japan  failed  to  give  the 
true  story  of  the  matter.  The  idea  that  only  eleven 
demands  were  made  upon  China  was  sedulously 
propagated  through  the  Japanese  Embassies  in 
Paris,  London,  Washington,  and  Petrograd. 

In  this  connection,  it  may  add  that  the  Far  East- 
ern Review,  at  that  time  a  zealous  supporter  of  China 
and  her  sovereign  rights,  made  a  pertinent  comment 
apropos  of  Japan's  attempt  at  secrecy,  which  de- 
serves to  be  quoted : 


36        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

"Notwithstanding  all  the  efforts  to  keep  the  terms  of 
the  demands  secret  their  general  tenor  was  telegraphed 
to  Great  Britain  and  America  by  newspaper  cor- 
respondents in  Peking.  To  counteract  the  effect  of 
this  inconvenient  disclosure  of  its  designs  the  Japa- 
nese Government  took  the  extremely  risky  step  of 
denying  that  it  had  presented  twenty-one  demands  to 
China.  The  Japanese  embassies  abroad,  while  at  first 
denying  knowledge  of  the  demands,  ultimately  issued 
statements  that  all  reports  from  Peking  were  gross 
exaggerations  inspired  by  Germany  and  that  as  a 
matter  of  fact  only  eleven  demands  of  an  innocuous 
character  had  been  presented.  What  purported  to  be 
a  complete  list  of  the  demands  was  supplied  to  the 
Governments  of  Great  Britain,  America,  France  and 
Russia.  From  this  edition  of  demands  those  to  which 
the  Treaty  Powers  could  take  most  exception  were 
carefully  excluded.  Many  people  have  found  it  hard 
to  believe  that  Japan  should  be  so  foolish  as  to  en- 
deavour in  the  first  instance  to  prevent  the  demands 
from  being  divulged,  and  in  the  second  to  seek,  after 
they  had  become  known,  to  delude  the  other  nations 
interested  as  to  their  extent  and  character.  It  must 
be  admitted  that  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why 
statesmen  with  such  a  reputation  for  astuteness  as 
the  Japanese  should  adopt  measures  so  futile  and  so 
puerile,  but  there  is  no  escaping  from  the  facts. 
Japan  deliberately  took  a  course  which  reflects  upon 
her  trustworthiness  and  which  has  convinced  many 
that  her  most  solemn  assurances  must  be  received 
with  the  greatest  reserve." 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA 


37 


/ 


The  truth  of  the  matter,  however,  was  that  the 
demands  contained  in  the  Fifth  Group  in  particular 
were  so  many  infringements  upon  the  treaty  rights 
of  the  foreign  Powers  in  China,  so  many  violations 
of  China's  sovereignty,  and  so  many  breaches  of 
the  Open  Door  policy,  that,  if  known,  they  were  J  / 
bound  to  arouse  such  serious  objections  from  all 
the  Powers  as  to  spoil  the  transaction  altogether. 
This  the  Japanese  Government  did  not  like  to  see 
happening,  much  preferring  to  risk  its  own  honest 
reputation  and  its  own  moral  position  among  the 
family  of  nations.  When  it  became  officially  known 
that  the  demands  were  really  twenty-one  in  number, 
and  not  eleven,  the  Japanese  Government  was  re- 
sourceful enough  to  say  that  those  demands  in  the 
Fifth  Group  expressed  Japan's  wishes  only,  and  that 
they  were  not  presented  as  demands  at  all.  While 
such  an  official  explanation  might  be  deemed  as  suffi- 
cient to  cover  up  a  multitude  of  sins,  it  was  cer- 
tainly not  convincing  enough  to  leave  no  room  for 
doubt.  The  Chinese  Government  flatly  contradicted 
this  explanation,  when  it  pointed  out  that  "the  pro- 
posals in  this  Fifth  Group  were  presented  to  the 
Chinese  Government  as  demands  and  not  as 
'wishes.'  "  Even  granting  that  the  contention  of  the 
Japanese  Government  was  valid  that  the  seven 
"points"  in  the  Fifth  Group  were  merely  "wishes," 
then  the  other  Powers  should  have  been  informed 
of  thirteen,  instead  of  eleven,  demands,  inasmuch 


38        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

as  there  were  twenty-one  demands  altogether. 
Whether  it  was  due  to  bad  calculation  or  to  other 
reasons  that  only  "eleven  points"  were  officially  given 
out  by  the  Japanese  Government,  is  a  question  which 
answers  itself. 


IV 

THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS  ANALYSED 
—GROUP  I 

SO  much  for  the  procedure  in  the  presentation 
of  the  Twenty-one  Demands  and  the  oblique 
methods  which  the  Japanese  Government  had 
seen  fit  to  employ  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  them 
secret.  It  now  remains  for  us  to  review  seriatim 
the  demands  themselves  and  to  follow  the  tortuous 
course  of  diplomatic  negotiation. 

The  demands  of  the  First  Group  called  upon  the 
Chinese  Government  (i)  to  give  "full  consent" 
to  all  matters  which  the  Japanese  Government  might 
arrange  with  the  German  Government  in  regard  to 
the  disposition  of  German  rights,  interests,  and  con- 
cessions in  Shantung;  (2)  to  engage  not  to  alienate 
"to  a  third  Power"  any  territory  within  Shantung 
or  any  island  along  its  coast;  (3)  to  consent  to 
Japan's  building  a  railway  from  Chef 00  or  Lung- 
kow  to  join  the  Shantung  (from  Kiao-chow  to  Tsi- 
nan-fu)  Railway;  and  (4)  to  open  "important  cities 
and  towns  in  the  Province  of  Shantung  as  commer- 
cial ports." 

In  this  Group  of  demands,  quite  a  few  interesting 
points  were  involved.  Imprimis,  Japan  seemed  to 
have  completely  ignored  Great  Britain,  her  ally,  and 

39 


40        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

her  partner  in  the  Tsingtao  expedition.  The  cap- 
ture of  the  German  stronghold  in  Shantung  was  not 
due  to  one  man  or  one  nation's  work.  It  was  the 
accomplishment  of  the  joint  forces  of  the  two  coun- 
tries. How,  then,  could  the  Japanese  Government 
alone,  evidently  without  the  knowledge  of  the  British 
Government,  proceed  to  negotiate  with  the  Chinese 
Government  for  the  succession  to  the  German  rights 
and  properties  in  Shantung,  which  were  captured 
by  the  joint  forces  of  the  two  nations?  The  fact 
that  British  soldiers  had  co-operated  with  Japanese 
forces  in  the  reduction  of  Tsingtao  was  completely 
ignored  or  forgotten.  Secondly,  it  may  be  noted 
that,  in  making  these  demands  relating  to  Shan- 
tung, Japan  presumably  proceeded  on  the  theory  that 
she  succeeded,  after  the  expulsion  of  Germany  from 
the  said  province,  to  all  the  rights,  privileges,  and 
concessions  previously  enjoyed  by  Germany.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  however,  Japan  demanded  more  than 
what  Germany  had  enjoyed  before  the  war.  The 
request  for  the  right  to  build  a  railway  by  Japan 
from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow  to  connect  the  trans- 
Shantung  line,  for  instance,  testified  to  this  fact. 
And  in  the  third  place,  Japan  seemed  to  have  entirely 
ignored  the  fact  that  the  most  important  subject- 
matter  of  the  First  Group  of  demands — the  dispo- 
sition of  German  concessions  in  Shantung — related 
to  the  post-bellum  settlement,  and  as  such,  it  should 
be  left  over  for  negotiation  by  all  the  interested 
Powers  at  the  forthcoming  Peace  Conference.    Was 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  41 

Japan  at  all  sure  then  that  the  Allies  were  going 
to  win  the  war?  It  seemed  that  she  had  taken  for 
granted  that  Germany  was  as  good  as  vanquished. 
And  finally,  it  must  be  observed,  the  demand  requir- 
ing China  not  to  cede  or  lease  to  a  third  Power  any 
territory  in  the  Province  of  Shantung  or  any  island 
on  its  coast  was  most  derogatory  of  China's  sov- 
ereignty. It  brought  us  back  to  the  days  of  inter- 
national scramble  towards  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century  when  Japan  and  the  leading  European  na- 
tions vied  with  one  another  for  territorial  conces- 
sions from  China.  The  demand  was  made  worse 
for  the  reason  that  "a  third  Power"  meant  to  ex- 
clude Japan,  thus  leaving  herself  free  to  take  hold 
of  anything  in  Shantung  or  along  its  coast.* 

We  notice  that  the  demands  in  the  First  Group 
were  introduced  by  a  preamble  which  said  as  much 
as  that  the  demands  were  intended  for  "maintain- 
ing the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and  further 
strengthening  the  friendly  relations  and  good 
neighborhood  existing  between  the  two  nations." 
Studying  them  in  their  true  light,  we  have  failed  to 
see  how  they  could  contribute  to  the  maintenance 


*"One  of   Japan's   demands   in   this   Group  evidently  was 
.obliquely  aimed  at  the  United  States  of  America— the  article 
asking  that  China  will  not  cede  or  lease  to  a  third  Power 
;j!(  meaning  any  Power  except  Japan)   any  territory  or  island 
j  in  Shantung  or  on  its  coast.    For  many  years  the  American 
i* /Asiatic  squadron  has  used  Chefoo  as  a  base  for  summer  prac- 
tice, and  several  times  a  project  for  the  United  States  to  lease 
that   port   for   a    naval    base    and   coaling   station   has   been 
mooted."— T.  F.  Millard,  "Our  Eastern  Question." 


X 


42        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

of  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  or  to  the  improvement  of 
the  neighbourly  relations  of  the  two  countries.  On 
the  very  contrary,  we  perceive  that  they  were  des- 
tined to  disturb  the  political  tranquillity  in  the  Far 
East  and  the  friendly  relations  between  the  two 
governments.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  the  Japanese 
Government,  with  sugar-coated  words  of  peace  and 
friendship,  essayed  to  hide  the  grim  and  sinister 
realities.  The  Chinese  Government  was  called  upon 
>to  give  full  consent  to  whatever  Shantung  arrange- 
ment that  Japan  might  make  with  Germany;  to 
pledge  not  to  cede  or  lease  any  territory  in  Shan- 
tung to  a  third  Power;  to  grant  to  Japan  the  right 
■  of  constructing  a  railway  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow 
|  to  connect  the  Shantung  Railway;  and  to  open  im- 
portant cities  and  towns  in  the  province  for  foreign 
>  (which  means  for  Japanese)  trade  and  residence.* 
If  the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and  the  friend- 
ship between  China  and  Japan  depended  upon  the 
acceptance  by  the  Chinese  Government  of  these  de- 
mands, it  is  evident,  then,  that  Japan  was  to  be 
bought  for  her  willingness  to  maintain  peace  and 
to  continue  friendly  relations  with  her  neighbour. 
"It  was  palpable  that  the  whole  of  the  demands  were 
intended  to  extend  the  rights  and  interests  of  Japan 

*  The  Chinese  Official  Statement  says  on  this  point  r  "This 
was  a  demand  on  the  part  of  Japan  for  privileges  additional 
to  any  that  hitherto  had  been  enjoyed  by  Germany  and  was 
not  an  outcome  of  the  hostilities  between  Japan  and  Germany, 
nor,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Chinese  Government,  was  its 
acceptance  essential  to  the  preservation  of  peace  in  the  Far 
East" 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  43 

without  securing  a  quid  pro  quo  of  any  kind  for 
China."  It  was  equally  palpable  that  the  acceptance 
of  these  demands  was  a  necessary  part  of  the  price 
for  her  to  preserve  peace  in  the  Far  East. 

The  real  significance  of  the  First  Group  of  de-  \ 
mands  cannot  be  realised  until  one  takes  into  con-  | 
sideration  the  railway  situation  in  Northern  China.  \ 
In  the  first  place,  Japan  desired  to  succeed  to  the  \ 
German  rights  and  concessions  in  Shantung,  among 
which  was  included  the  trans- Shantung  Railway, 
known  as  the  Kiao-chow-Tsinanfu  Railway.  Ger- 
many had  also  the  right,  by  virtue  of  the  notes  ex- 
changed, December  31,  1913,  of  constructing  a  rail- 
way from  Kaomi,  and,  passing  through  I-chow-fu 
and  I-hsien,  terminating  at  Hanchuang,  there  con- 
necting with  the  Tien-tsin-Pukow  Railway;  and 
another  line  starting  from  Tsinanfu  to  connect  the 
Peking-Hankow  Railway  at  a  place  between  Shun- 
teh-fu  and  Hsin-hsiang-hsien.  To  both  lines  Japan 
claimed  to  succeed.  Now,  these  railways  together 
with  the  other  concessions  in  Shantung,  "were  the 
fruits  of  sixteen  years  of  German  aggression." 
"Their  transfer  to  Japan  means  that  the  Teutonic 
methods,  which  enabled  Germany  to  dominate  and 
exploit  the  province,  will  pass  into  the  hands  of  the 
Power  with  a  great  military  base  already  standing 
on  Chinese  soil  at  Port  Arthur." 

But  this  is  not  all.  Japan  also  claimed  the  right 
of  building  a  railway  from  Cheefoo  or  Lungkow  to 
join  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  Railway.     The  mean- 


j 


44        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

ing  of  this  demand,  considered  in  conjunction  with 
Japan's  right  to  succeed  to  the  Kaiochow-Tsinanfu 
Railway  and  to  the  other  two  lines  running  into  the 
provinces  of  Kiangsu  and  Chili,  is  that  Japan  would 
practically  dominate  North  China  through  her  con- 
trol of  the  railways  in  the  region.  The  situation 
becomes  all  the  worse  when  it  is  remembered  that 
Japan  has  been  in  control  over  the  South  Manchurian 
Railway  and  has  been  granted  the  right  of  con- 
structing a  number  of  railways  in  Inner  Mongolia. 
The  Chinese  delegates  at  the  Peace  Conference  at 
Versailles  described  the  situation  succinctly  and  ac- 
curately : 

"Through  the  trans-Shantung  railway,  with  its 
western  or  inland  terminus  at  the  provincial  capital  of 
Tsinanfu  where  it  flanks  the  northern  section  of  the 
Tientsin-Pukow  Railway — built  by  the  Germans — 
Japan  will  at  once  dominate  the  whole  of  Shantung 
as  well  as  the  northern  half  of  this  important  trunk 
line.  Then,  by  financing,  constructing  and  supplying 
the  material's  for  the  first  of  the  aforesaid  'two  lines 
of  railway/  i.e.,  a  line  from  the  city  of  Kaomi,  on  the 
trans-Shantung  railway,  to  a  point  strategically  domi- 
nating the  southern  or  British  constructed  section  of 
the  same  Tientsin-Pukow  Railway,  Japan  will  prac- 
tically master  the  great  railroad  linking  Tientsin  (the 
port  of  Peking)  and  North  China  with  the  Yangtze 
Valley  and  South  China. 

"Next,  by  financing,  etc.,  the  second  of  the  'two 
lines   of    railway/   i.e.,   a.   line   practically   extending 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  45 

the-  trans-Shantung  Railway  from  Tsinanfu,  where  it 
will  bisect  the  Tientsin-Pukow  trunk  line,  to  a  point 
westward  on  the  Peking-Hankow  Railway,  Japan  will 
flank  the  other  of  the  two  trunk  lines  connecting 
Peking  and  North  China  with  Central  and  Southern 
China. 

"And  when  it  is  borne  in  mind  that  Japan  also  con- 
trols the  railway  systems  in  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  the  extent  of  Japan's  railway 
domination  of  China  north  of  the  great  line  of  the 
Yangtze  will  be  realised. 

"This  fact  also  must  be  noted.    It  means  the  isola-  . 
tion  of  Peking  which  will  be  cut  off  from  Central  and       J 
Southern  China  not  only  by  land  but  by  the  sea-route,     ' 
owing  to  the  Gulf  of  Pechili — through  which  Peking 
can  be  reached  via  its  port  of  Tientsin — being  directly 
dominated  by  the  Japanese  at  Port  Arthur." 


THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS  ANALYSED 
—GROUP  II 

THE  seven  demands  in  Group  II  exact  in 
favour  of  Japan  and  her  nationals  a  series 
of  preferential  rights,  interests  and  privi- 
leges in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia calculated  at  once  to  increase  the  existing  diffi- 
culties which  seriously  hamper  effective  Chinese  ad- 
ministration in  these  two  areas  and  to  develop  a  sit- 
uation facilitating  the  extension  thereto  of  the  terri- 
torial system  which  has  transformed  Korea  into  a 
Japanese  province." 

This  is  the  language  which  the  Chinese  delegates 
at  the  Versailles  Peace  Conference  employed  in 
characterising  the  demands  of  the  Second  Group, 
which  affected,  one  and  all,  most  vitally  the  terri- 
torial integrity  and  administrative  independence  of 
China  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia. 

Furthermore,  the  demands  of  this  Group  were  in 
complete  contravention  of  the  Open  Door  principle, 
violating  a  number  of  treaties  existing  between 
Japan  and  China,  and  between  Japan  and  other  Pow- 
ers about  China.  This  Group  was  generally  in- 
terpreted, and  correctly  too,  as  an  attempt  by  Japan 

w 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  47 

to  consolidate  her  interests  in  South  Manchuria, 
obtained  as  a  result  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
and  to  extend  them  into  a  new  region,  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia,  which  is,  in  the  language  of  the  Chinese 
Government,  "  a  new  expression  in  Chinese  geo- 
graphical terminology." 

A  more  careful  examination  of  the  demands, 
however,  revealed  the  fact  that  it  was  not  consolida- 
tion, but  extension,  of  Japanese  interests  in  those 
regions  that  was  really  aimed  at  by  the  Japanese 
Government.  This  was  made  plain  by  the  desire  of 
the  Japanese  Government  to  extend  the  leases  of  the 
Kwantung  peninsula  and  of  the  Antung-Mukden 
and  the  South  Manchurian  Railways,  and  to  secure 
for  its  nationals  political  and  economic  rights  and 
privileges  never  before  enjoyed  by  them. 

The  demands  were  introduced  by  a  queer  pre- 
amble. It  alleged  that  "the  Chinese  Government 
has  always  acknowledged  the  special  position  en-  \J 
joyed  by  Japan  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia."  This  was  contrary  to  the  fact, 
for  the  Chinese  Government  had  never  acknowl- 
edged anything  of  the  kind.  The  furthest  that  the 
Chinese  Government  went  was  its  agreement  in 
1905  to  the  transfer  to  Japan  of  the  Russian  con- 
cessions in  South  Manchuria  after  the  Russo-Japa- 
nese War. 

As  has  been  pointed  out,  the  demands  were  in- 
compatible with  the  principle  of  the  Open  Door. 
And  the  incompatibility  becomes  apparent  when  we 


48        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

come  to  analyse  the  gredients  of  the  demands. 
Japan  demanded  for  her  nationals  the  right  to  lease 
or  own  land  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  In- 
ner Mongolia;  to  travel  and  reside  freely  in  those 
regions;  to  engage  in  business  and  manufacture  of 
any  kind  whatsoever;  to  open  mines,  build  railways, 
and  to  monopolise  loans  to  China  for  development 
purpose  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia. Aside  from  these  privileges  and  rights 
which  would  immediately  create  for  the  Japanese 
a  status  unwarranted  by  the  terms  of  the  existing 
treaties  between  China  and  Japan  and  would  thus 
give  them  a  freedom  of  action  which  would  be  a 
serious  restriction  of  the  sovereignty  of  China  and 
infringement  of  her  administrative  rights,  the  Chi- 
nese Government  was  called  upon  to  hand  over  to 
the  Japanese  Government  the  control  and  manage- 
ment of  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  for  a  term 
of  99  years,  and  to  employ  none  but  Japanese  for 
positions  of  financial  and  military  advisers  or  in- 
structors in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia.  That  these  demands  were  outrageous  to 
the  extreme  could  admit  of  no  doubt.  They  meant 
to  create  for  the  Japanese  such  a  privileged  status 
in  those  regions  that  it  would  neither  be  in  conso- 
nance with  the  Open  Door  policy  nor  in  harmony 
with  Japan's  professed  desire  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  territorial  integrity  and  political  independence 
of  the  Chinese  Republic. 

It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  the  extension  of  the 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  49 

term  of  the  leased  territory  had  long  been  broached 
among  the  political  circles  in  Tokio.  In  fact,  the 
visit  of  Baron  Fukushima,  one  time  Governor-Gen- 
eral of  Port  Arthur  and  Kwantung,  to  Peking  in 
January,  1914,  was  attributed  to  his  desire  for  the 
extension  of  the  lease.  His  mission  was  a  com- 
plete failure,  for  the  determination  of  the  Chinese 
Government  not  to  extend  the  existing  leases  could 
not  be  moved.  "Owing  to  the  bitter  experiences 
which  China  sustained  in  the  past  in  connection 
with  the  leased  portions  of  her  territory,  it  has 
become  her  settled  policy  not  to  grant  further  leases 
nor  to  extend  the  terms  of  those  now  in  existence." 
As  the  term  of  the  leases  would  soon  expire,  some- 
thing had  to  be  done,  and  done  quickly.  Diplo- 
macy is  a  tortuous  course,  which  may  not  be  able 
to  arrive  at  results  in  the  shortest  time  possible. 
The  only  alternative  was  that  Japan  tried  to  force 
an  extension  of  the  leases  from  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, which  she  could  not  secure  through  diplo- 
ic persuasion.  It  was,  therefore,  no  surprise 
th.it  Japan  should  have  preceded  all  other  demands 
in  the  Second  Group  that  of  extension  of  the  lease 
of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny,  and  that  of  the  South 
Manchurian  railways.  The  Chinese  Government 
was  forced  to  abandon  its  own  cherished  hopes  to 
regain  control  of  these  territories  and  properties  at 
the  expiration  of  their  respective  original  terms 
of  lease.  The  25-year  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  \ 
Dalny,  the  36-year  period  of  the  South  Manchurian 


\ 


t 


50        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

Railway,  and  the  15 -year  period  of  the  Antung- 
Mukden  Railway  were,  one  and  all,  extended  to  99 
years!  "The  extension  of  these  leaseholds  means 
the  perpetuation  of  an  alien  political  system  in  South 
Manchuria  that  immediately  menaces  the  territorial 
integrity  and  independence  of  China,"  observed  the 
Chinese  delegates  at  the  Versailles  Peace  Confer- 
ence. "Through  Port  Arthur — the  most  powerful 
citadel  in  continental  Asia — and  the  commercial 
base  of  Dalny  which  is  linked  with  the  South  Man- 
churia and  Antung-Mukden  lines,  Japan  politically 
and  commercially  dominates  a  region  through  which 
lies  the  'historic  road  of  invasions'  into  China.  In 
the  past,  Asiatic  invaders  have  entered  the  country 
from  the  North ;  and  it  was  through  the  Manchurian 
'gate'  that  the  last  invaders  crossed  into  the  great 
plains  of  Northern  China.  History  and  a  sense  of 
realities  seem  to  suggest  a  view  of  the  Japanese  sys- 
tem in  South  Manchuria  that  cannot  be  reconciled 
with  the  security  of  the  Chinese  Republic." 

When  all  is  said,  it  is  necessary  to  point  out 
once  more  the  serious  nature  of  the  right  which 
Japan  had  claimed  for  her  nationals  to  travel,  to 
reside,  to  lease  or  own  land,  and  to  engage  in  the 
business  and  manufacture  of  any  kind  whatsoever, 
in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia. 
In  the  first  place,  the  Chinese  Government,  inasmuch 
as  the  people  of  Mongolia  were  not  at  all  accustomed 
to  foreign  trade  and  residence,  could  not  suffer  the 
foreigners  to  travel  or  to  do  business  in  that  region 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  51 

without  feeling  great  anxiety  about  their  safety. 
Furthermore,  to  extend  these  privileges  to  the  Japa- 
nese subjects  would  entail  the  extension  of  the  rights 
of  extraterritoriality  to  a  large  alien  population, 
which  would  not  only  be  a  source  of  future  trouble, 
but  might  also  be  a  contributing  cause  whereby  China 
was  to  lose  jurisdiction  over  a  large  area  of  her 
territory.  "Should  Japanese  subjects  be  granted  the 
right  of  owning  land,  it  would  mean  that  all  the 
landed  property  in  the  region  might  fall  into  their 
hands  thereby  endangering  China's  territorial  integ- 
rity." Or,  as  an  American  writer  observes,  "it  is  J 
obvious  that  if  these  were  agreed  to,  Japanese  state-  j 
aided  enterprises  could  be  dotted  all  over  South 
Manchuria,  and  China  would  have  no  jurisdiction/ 
over  the  occupiers  of  the  land.  To  all  intents  and/ 
purposes  the  areas  occupied  by  the  Japanese  would! 
be  alienated  from  China,  as  with  the  growth  of \ 
the  Japanese  communities  it  is  certain  that  there 
would  come  a  demand  for  the  control  of  policing  and  : 
other  municipal  functions.  The  Chinese  authorities 
and  police  would  be  powerless  to  function,  as  extra- 
territoriality would  bar  them.  Right  of  entry  to 
land  and  premises  could  not  be  insisted  upon  by  the 
Chinese  police  and  other  authorities  and  conse- 
quently the  Chinese  Government  would  lose  juris- 
diction over  an  area  only  limited  by  the  extent 
to  which  the  Japanese  could  appeal  to  the  cupidity 
of  the  Chinese  landowners.  Moreover  it  would  ap- 
pear that  by  virtue  of  the  most- favoured-nation 


52        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

clause  other  nationalities  would  acquire  whatever 
rights  the  Japanese  secured.  Clearly  this  would 
tend  further  to  restrict  China's  jurisdiction  and  to 
increase  the  chance  of  complications. "  Indeed,  if 
these  rights  and  privileges  were  granted  to  the  Japa- 
nese, but  not  extended  to  the  nationals  of  the  other 
Powers,  then  the  Japanese  would  have  a  preferred 
position  which  would  enable  them  to  monopolise 
all  the  interests  in  the  above-mentioned  regions.  If 
the  same  and  similar  rights  and  privileges  were 
given  to  all  foreigners,  as  they  should  be  under  the 
rule  of  the  most  favoured  nation  treatment  and  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunity,  then  China's  adminis- 
trative autonomy  over  the  territory  would  become 
a  thing  of  the  past.  It  was  a  veritable  dilemma  con- 
fronting the  Chinese  Government  when  it  undertook 
to  negotiate  the  demands  of  the  Second  Group. 


VI 

THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS  ANALYSED 
—GROUP  III 

THE  demands  of  the  Third  Group,  relating  to 
the  Japanese  interests  in  the  Hanyehping 
Iron  and  Steel  Works,  betrayed  at  once  the 
desire  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  control  the 
biggest  iron  works  in  China  and  its  ambition  to 
monopolise  the  mineral  resources  of  practically  the 
entire  Yangtze  Valley. 

According  to  the  demands,  the  Hanyehping  Com- 
pany was  to  be  converted  into  a  Chino-Japanese 
joint  concern,  the  rights  and  properties  of  which 
were  not  to  be  disposed  of  without  the  previous 
consent  of  the  company,  or  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, which  meant  in  this  case  one  and  the  same 
thing.  The  Chinese  Government,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  asked  to  agree  that  the  mines  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  those  owned  by  the  company  were  not 
to  be  worked  by  other  persons  outside  of  the  com- 
pany, without  the  consent  of  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment. The  "blanket"  character  of  these  demands 
was  apparent.  It  is  easily  discernible  that  what 
Japan  had  really  wanted  was  not  a  Chino-Japanese 
joint  concern.  A  joint  company  could  serve  only 
as  a  means  to  the  end  which  she  had  in  view.    She 

53 


( 


A 


54        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

wanted  in  the  first  place  an  absolute  control  over 
the  largest  iron  works  in  China,  so  as  to  monopolise 
the  product  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  Powers  (in- 
cluding China,  perhaps).  She  wanted  then  an  ex- 
clusive right  to  operate  the  mines  in  the  Yangtze 
Valley,  conveniently  and  diplomatically  styled  as  the 
mines  "in  the  neighbourhood  of  those  owned  by 
the  Hanyehping  Company."  It  was  pointed  out  at 
the  time  that  these  demands  were  in  direct  con- 
flict with  the  recognised  interests  of  Great  Britain 
in  the  Yangtze  Valley.  "To  accept  joint  Japa- 
nese control  of  the  Yanyehping  Company,  the 
most  successful  enterprise  in  the  country,"  said 
a  British  diplomat,  "would  mean  establishing 
Japan  at  the  very  heart  of  the  British  sphere  of 
interest." 

In  a  highly  picturesque  language,  another  British 
writer  put  the   situation   thus:    "When   we   reach 

(Group  III  we  touch  matters  that  are  not  immediately 
vital  but  quite  new  in  their  type  of  audacity  and 
which  every  one  can  to-day  understand  since  they 
are  politico-industrial.  Group  III,  as  it  stands  in  the 
(  original  text,  is  simply  the  plan  for  the  conquest  of 

!the  mineral  wealth  of  the  Yangtze  Valley  which 
mainly  centres  round  Hankow  because  the  vast  allu- 
vial plains  of  the  lower  reaches  of  this  greatest  of 
rivers  were  once  on  the  floor  of  the  Yellow  Sea, 
the  upper  provinces  of  Hupeh,  Hunan,  Kiangsi  be- 
ing the  region  of  prehistoric  forests  clothing  the 
coasts,  which  once  looked  down  upon  the  slowly- 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  55 

receding  waste  of  waters,  and  which  to-day  contain 
all  the  coal  and  iron." 

The  attention  of  the  Japanese  Government  was  re- 
peatedly called  to  the  fact  that  the  Hanyang  Arsenal, 
the  Tayeh  Iron  Mines,  and  the  Ping-hsiang  collier- 
ies— called  the  Hanyehping  Company  generally  for 
the  sake  of  convenience — were  private  concerns. 
According  to  the  Provisional  Constitution  of  the 
Republic  of  China,  the  private  property  of  the  Chi- 
nese citizens  cannot  be  interfered  with  by  the  Gov- 
ernment. In  other  words,  Chinese  citizens  are  guar- 
anteed the  right  of  protection  of  their  property  and 
freedom  to  engage  in  any  lawful  occupation,  with 
which  the  Chinese  Government  are  precluded  from 
interfering.  It  was  declared,  therefore,  that  the 
Chinese  Government  could  not  negotiate  with  Japan 
to  make  any  disposal  of  the  company  without  doing 
violence  to  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land,  or  to 
convert  it  into  "a  joint  concern  of  the  two  nations." 

It  may  be  interesting  to  note  that,  in  the  preamble 
which  introduced  the  demands  of  this  Group,  the 
Japanese  Government  asserted  that  "Japanese  finan- 
ciers and  the  Hanyehping  Company  have  close  re- 
lations with  each  other  at  present."  It  also  inti- 
mated in  broad  terms  that  these  demands,  looking 
towards  the  joint  control  of  the  Company  and  a 
Japanese  monopoly  of  the  mineral  deposits  in  the 
heart  of  China,  were  made  with  no  other  purpose  in 
view  than  that  of  advancing  "the  common  interests 
of  the  two  nations."     Admittedly,  the  psychology 


i 


56        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

of  the  Japanese  Government  is  difficult  to  under- 
stand. How  could  a  Japanese  control  of  the  Han- 
yehping  Company  benefit  China?  And  how  could 
an  intended  monopoly  by  Japan  of  the  mineral 
wealth  of  central  China  be  made  to  serve  the  "com- 
mon interests"  of  the  two  countries?  In  order  to 
arrive  at  a  fairly  reasonable  answer  to  these  ques- 
tions, and  in  order  to  understand,  in  concise  lan- 
guage, the  way  in  which  the  "Japanese  financiers 
and  the  Hanyehping  Company  have  come  to  close 
relations  with  each  other,"  we  reproduce  here  in 
extenso  an  editorial  comment  from  the  Far  Eastern 
Review,  April,  1915,  apropos  of  the  subject.  It 
reads : 

"The  career  of  the  Hanyehping  Company,  which 
comprises  the  Hanyehping  iron  works,  the  Pinghsiang 
coal  mines,  and  the  Tayeh  iron  mines,  has  been  some- 
what chequered.  It  has  had  recurring  financial  trou- 
bles and,  influenced  by  Sheng  Kung-pao,  who  has 
always  been  amicably  disposed  towards  the  Japanese, 
it  has  largely  employed  Japanese  money  to  assist  it 
over  its  difficulties.  In  the  first  instance  a  sum  of 
Tls.  5,000,000  was  borrowed  from  a  German  firm,  but 
this  was  repaid  later  on  by  the  Chinese  Government. 
Japan  appears  to  have  first  come  upon  the  scene  in 
1902,  when  a  contract  was  entered  into  between  the 
Company  and  the  Japanese  Imperial  Steel  Foundry 
whereby  the  latter  was  to  be  supplied  with  iron  ore 
from  Tayeh  for  fifteen  years.  The  Company  was  at 
this  time  suffering  from  insufficiency  of  funds,  and 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  57 

two  years  after  making  the  contract  with  the  Steel 
Foundry  a  sum  of  Tls.  3,000,000  was  borrowed  from 
the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank.  Other  debts  to  Japanese 
concerns  were  contracted,  and  by  1912  the  total 
amount  outstanding  was  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Tls. 
9,000,000.  The  financial  condition  of  the  Company 
showed  no  sign  of  improvement  and  in  1913  the  sum 
of  $15,000,000  Mexican  currency  was  borrowed  from 
the  Japanese,  who  secured  the  right  to  appoint  ad- 
visers and  other  officials.  This  is  a  brief  history  of 
the  Company,  showing  how  the  Japanese  have  gradu- 
ally won  their  way  to  a  position  in  which  they  have 
some  voice  in  the  management.  It  is  said  that  the 
Japanese  have  largely  to  thank  Sheng  Kung-pao  for 
the  hold  they  have  gained  over  the  concern.  The 
shareholders,  or  a  large  section  of  them,  have  long 
been  desirous  of  releasing  the  Company  from  its  finan- 
cial shackles,  or  at  all  events  those  riveted  by  Japan, 
and  it  was  hoped  that  a  sum  sufficient  to  pay  off  the 
indebtedness  to  the  Japanese  could  be  borrowed  from 
America  or  Great  Britain.  Influence  was  brought  to 
bear,  however,  and  this  project  was  defeated.  There 
was  also  some  talk  of  nationalising  the  Company,  but 
this  also  fell  through. 

"The  preamble  of  the  Hanyehping  demands  recites 
that  the  proposed  arrangement  is  for  the  'common 
interests'  of  China  and  Japan.  It  is  difficult  to  con- 
ceive what  arguments  could  be  advanced  to  show  that 
China's  interests  would  be  served  by  admitting  Japan 
as  a  partner  in  an  enterprise  of  such  paramount  im- 
portance. If  it  were  necessary  for  China  to  secure 
the  assistance  of  another  nation  in  the  development 


58        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 
) 

o£  her  steel'  industry  it  would  be  clearly  advantageous 

for  her  to  select  a  nation  that  had  the  benefit  of  long 
experience  and  expert  knowledge.  Without  casting 
any  reflection  upon  the  Japanese  it  cannot  be  said 
that  they  possess  the  qualifications  that  would  justify 
China  in  admitting  them  to  partnership.  Moreover, 
it  is  evident  that  the  partnership  would  consist  of  the 
Japanese  Government  on  the  one  hand  and  a  Chinese 
Company  on  the  other.  The  control  of  an  industry 
upon  which  the  greatness  of  so  many  countries  is 
based,  would  assuredly  pass  into  the  hands  of  the 
Japanese  and  this  is  a  possibility  that  no  patriotic 
Chinese  would  contemplate  without  alarm.  The  in- 
terests of  Japan,  which,  as  is  generally  known,  is  badly 
in  need  of  iron  ore  owing  to  the  poverty  of  her  own 
resources  in  this  respect,  would  undoubtedly  be  served 
if  she  were  admitted  to  partnership — the  interests  of 
China  would  equally  as  assuredly  suffer. 

"When  attention  is  directed  to  the  second  article 
of  the  demand  it  is  seen  that  not  only  does  Japan 
want  to  gain  control  of  the  Hanyehping  Company, 
but  she  wishes  to  prevent  any  other  country  from 
working  mines  in  the  provinces  in  which  the  Hanyeh- 
ping properties  are  situated.  The  Tayeh  mine  is  in 
Hupeh  and  the  Pinghsiang  coal  mine  is  in  Hunan. 
The  expression  that  is  used,  'mines  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  those  owned  by  the  Hanyehping  Company*  is 
comprehensive  enough  to  enable  Japan  to  veto  any 
mining  operations  in  either  province.  It  may  be  re- 
called that  when  the  question  arose  as  to  the  meaning 
of  the  term  'parallel  to  the  South  Manchuria  Rail- 
way' Japan  insisted  upon  putting  her  own  interpreta- 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  59 

tion  upon  it,  and  it  may  safely  be  assumed  that  she 
would  act  similarly  if  any  question  arose  in  regard  to 
mines  in  Hupeh  and  Hunan.  It  has  to  be  borne  in 
mind  that  these  provinces,  Hunan  in  particular,  are 
immensely  rich  in  mineral  deposits  and,  with  accept- 
able mining  regulations,  would  present  a  splendid  field 
for  the  investment  of  foreign  capital.  Japan  now  pro- 
poses to  prevent  the  investment  of  foreign  capital  in 
this  part  of  China.  The  demand  is  the  more  extraordi- 
nary in  view  of  Japan's  relationship  with  Great  Britain. 
The  alliance  between  the  countries  was  contracted  in 
order  that  their  interests  in  the  Far  East  should  be  pro- 
tected. Great  Britain  has  admittedly  special  interests 
in  the  Yangtze  Valley,  yet  Japan  proposes  to  render 
it  impossible  for  British  capital  to  be  invested  in  a 
most  important  industry  in  this  region.  How  can 
Japan  reconcile  this  demand  with  her  engagements 
with  Great  Britain  and  her  often  reiterated  adherence 
to  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity?  It  must  be  con- 
fessed that  all  the  evidence  points  to  a  desire  on  the 
part  of  Japan  to  secure  for  herself  the  sole  right  to  de- 
velop the  mines  of  China.  She  has  already  secured  a 
monopoly  in  South  Manchuria  and  Shantung ;  she  is  de- 
manding a  monopoly  in  Hunan  and  Hupeh  and  Fukien. 
Even  were  this  not  directly  opposed  to  the  pledge  that 
Japan  has  given  to  maintain  the  principle  of  the  open 
door,  such  a  monopoly  would  be  most  disastrous  for 
China.  Japan  has  no  surplus  capital  of  her  own  for 
investment  in  mining  enterprises,  and  as  she  would 
scarcely  be  able  to  borrow  money  from  other  coun- 
tries to  work  mines  in  China  for  her  own  benefit,  the 
result  of  the  monopoly  would  be  that  China's  mining 


/ 


60        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

resources  would  remain  undeveloped.  It  seems  hardly- 
credible  that  Japan  should  seriously  have  presented 
demands  that  conflict  so  directly  with  the  interests  of 
the  other  Treaty  Powers,  but  the  fact  that  they  have 
been  presented  remains.  China  has  hitherto  declined 
to  take  the  Hanyehping  demands  into  serious  consid- 
eration, and  it  is  to  be  hoped  for  her  own  sake  as 
well  as  that  of  the  Treaty  Powers  that  she  will  be 
able  to  resist  the  endeavour  being  made  to  induce  her 
to  become  a  party  to  what  can  only  be  called  an  act 
of  political'  bad  faith." 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  Japan,  having  very 
little  coal  or  iron  of  her  own,  decided  that  the 
sooner  she  could  get  control  of  China's  almost  in- 
exhaustible resources  the  better.  Before  she  made 
the  demand,  Japan  had,  as  has  been  pointed  out  in 
the  passage  reproduced  in  the  above,  already  ac- 
quired considerable  influence  in  the  management  of 
the  Hanyehping  Company,  largely  through  the 
means  of  financial  assistance.  The  great  Tayeh 
iron  mines,  which  have  been  considered  as  one  of 
the  richest  in  the  country,  had  been  drawn  upon  for 
supplies  of  iron  ore  for  the  Japanese  Government 
Foundry  at  Wakamatsu  (on  the  island  of  Kiushiu), 
and  the  rich  coal  mines  at  Ping-hsiang  had  supplied 
a  good  portion  of  fuel  for  the  said  foundry.  Japan 
was,  however,  not  satisfied  with  tit-bits,  and  taking 
advantage  of  the  European  War  which  absorbed  the 
attention  of  the  British  Government,  she  decided 
that  it  would  be  best  to  seek  a  monopolistic  control 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  61 

of  China's  natural  resources.  Viscount  Uchida,  the 
present  Japanese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  de- 
clared at  the  opening  of  the  Diet  at  Tokio,  January, 
1919:  "We  have  to  rely,  in  a  large  measure,  upon 
the  rich  natural  resources  in  China  in  order  to  as- 
sure our  own  economic  existence."  This  same  point 
was  emphasised  by  Baron  Makino,  one  of  the  Japa- 
nese delegates  at  the  Versailles  Peace  Conference, 
when  he  declared:  "China  has  the  raw  material: 
we  have  need  for  raw  material  and  we  have  the 
capital  to  invest  with  China  in  its  development  for 
use  by  ourselves  as  well  as  by  China."  Taken  to- 
gether with  Japan's  demands  on  China,  particularly 
those  relating  the  Hanyehping  Company  now  under  ■ 
consideration,  these  two  statements  by  the  responsi- 
ble Japanese  tell  the  unmistakable  tale  of  Japan's  eco- 
nomic ambitions  in  China.  The  Chinese  delegates 
at  the  Peace  Conference  were,  however,  very  em- 
phatic in  their  reply,  when  they  said :  "China  does 
not  admit  that  her  natural  resources  are  necessary 
to  assure  the  economic  existence  of  Japan  any  more 
than  the  'natural  resources'  of  Alsace-Lorraine  were 
necessary  to  assure  the  economic  existence  of  Ger- 
many." China  is,  of  course,  incomparable  with  Al- 
sace-Lorraine; but  Japan  is  certainly  another  Ger- 
many. 


VII 

THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS  ANALYSED 
—GROUP  IV 

OF  all  the  demands  which  Japan  had  pressed 
upon  China  for  acceptance,  none  looks  at 
the  first  glance  so  innocuous,  and  yet  reveals, 
upon  close  examination,  so  intimately  the  working 
of  Japan's  political  mind,  as  the  single  demand  con- 
tained in  the  fourth  Group.  The  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, "with  the  object  of  effectively  preserving  the 
territorial  integrity  of  China,"  demanded  that  the 
Chinese  Government  should  engage  "not  to  cede  or 
lease  to  a  third  Power  any  harbour  or  bay  or  island 
along  the  coast  of  China." 

Made  under  the  pretext  of  preserving  China's 
territorial  integrity,  the  demand  appeared,  therefore, 
to  have  a  good  deal  of  plausibility,  which  might 
easily  be  mistaken  for  Japan's  honesty  of  purpose. 
The  plausible  character  soon  evaporates,  however, 
when  the  pretext  is  carefully  examined  and  found  to 
be  nothing  more  than  the  usual  hypocrisy  which  has 
distinguished  Japanese  diplomacy  in  China  in  the 
last  score  of  years.  The  innermost  recess  of  the  po- 
litical minds  of  Japanese  statesmen  and  diplomatists 
is  penetrated,  when  we  come  to  weigh  the  real  mean- 
ing   of   the   phrase    "a   third    Power," — a    phrase 

62 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  63 

as  vague  as  it  is  definite,  though  it  may  seem  para- 
doxical to  say.  It  is  vague  in  the  sense  that  it  does  | 
not  refer  to  any  particular  Power ;  it  is  very  definite, 
for  it  cannot  mean  Japan  herself.  The  phrase  refers 
to  any  Power  except  Japan  and  China.  In  other 
words,  while  pronouncing  her  solicitude  for  China's 
territorial  integrity,  Japan  was  at  the  very  same  time 
reserving  to  herself  the  right  to  despoil  it.  It  would 
be  highly  interesting  to  know,  therefore,  if  Japan 
would  consider  it  a  violation  of  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  China,  if  she  herself  should  one  day  force 
the  Chinese  Government  to  cede  or  to  lease  some 
harbour  or  bay  or  island  along  the  Chinese  coast. 
Japan's  sincerity  of  purpose  could  be  easily  proved1 
if  she  had  frankly  declared  that  no  Chinese  terri-; 
tory  should  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any  Power  what- 
soever, or  if  she  had  merely  demanded  that  China 
should  not  alienate  her  coast  line  to  any  Power  at 
all.  Such  a  declaration,  inasmuch  as  it  would  not  • 
be  consistent  with  the  sovereignty  of  China,  would 
not,  of  course,  be  very  agreeable  to  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment. It  would  nevertheless  serve  to  clear  away 
the  general  suspicion  as  to  the  territorial  ambitions 
which  Japan  has  apparently  entertained  in  China. 

This  was  not  the  undertaking  which  Japan  was 
anxious  to  obtain  from  China.  A  declaration  such 
as  along  the  lines  suggested  above  would  not  only 
prevent  any  "third  Power"  from  violating  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  China,  but  would  also  debar  Japan 
herself  from  the  execution  of  her  ambitious  designs 


/ 


64        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

in  Fukien,  in  Shantung,  and  in  Manchuria.  Japan 
would  not,  of  course,  allow  her  hands  tied  in  her 
dealings  with  China,  and  nothing  would  be  more 
opposed  to  her  set  purpose  and  policy  than  to  see 
herself  debarred  from  opportunities  of  expansion 
and  aggrandisement  at  the  expense  of  her  big  but 
feeble  neighbour.  Thus,  both  the  language  and  the 
manner  in  which  the  single  demand  of  the  fourth 
Group  was  made,  strongly  remind  us  of  the  Rus- 
sian tactics  of  1895.  The  three-Power  interven- 
tion which  Russia  had  engineered  after  the  Chino- 
Japanese  War  against  the  seizure  by  Japan  of  the 
Liaotung  peninsula  was  ostensibly  undertaken  for 
the  protection  of  the  integrity  and  independence  of 
China.  No  one,  however,  seriously  doubted  that 
the  real  purpose  of  the  intervention  was  to  keep  the 
Pacific  door  open  for  Russia  herself.  The  occupa- 
tion by  Japan  of  the  Liaotung  peninsula  would 
blight  all  the  roseate  hopes  that  the  Muscovite  states- 
men had  entertained  for  an  ice- free  port  in  the 
Far  East.  Three  years  later  the  fruit  of  the  inter- 
vention was  reaped  when  Port  Arthur  and  Talien- 
wan  were  leased  to  Russia  for  a  term  of  twenty-five 
years.  Following,  perhaps,  the  same  line  of  diplo- 
macy, now  Japan  tried  to  force  the  declaration  from 
the  Chinese  Government  that  it  would  not  lease  or 
cede  any  territory  along  the  coast  to  a  third  Power, 
only  to  make  the  field  clear  for  herself ! 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  Chinese  Government, 
the  demand  of  the  Fourth  Group  was  a  serious  limi- 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  65 

tation  of  its  sovereignty.  Mr.  Hector  C.  Bywater, 
the  brilliant  author  of  "Sea-Power  in  the  Pacific: 
A  Study  of  American- Japanese  Naval  Problem," 
observed  that  "the  presentation  of  such  a  demand 
presumed  a  Japanese  protectorship  over  Chinese  ter- 
ritory, and  was  therefore  open  to  objection  as  it 
stood."  In  the  official  statement  which  the  Chinese 
Government  gave  out  apropos  of  the  negotiation  of 
the  Twenty-one  Demands,  it  was  pointed  out  that, 
"as  regards  the  single  article  of  the  Fourth  Group 
and  the  preamble  thereto,  the  Chinese  Government 
held  that  they  were  inconsistent  with  Chinese  sov-l 
ereignty."  The  same  view  was  shared  by  all  those  f  V 
who  have  had  the  opportunity  of  examining  the 
Twenty-one  Demands  in  their  true  light. 

Aside  from  this  ill-concealed  attempt  on  the  part 
of  Japan  to  assume  a  protectorship  over  Chinese 
territory,  there  was  much  more  behind  it.  While 
it  was  difficult  at  the  first  glance  to  understand  why 
such  a  demand  should  be  made  upon  the  Chinese 
Government,  especially  at  the  time  when  the  whole 
world  was  engaged  in  war,  and  when  there  was  no 
one  Power  in  sight,  but  Japan  herself,  who  would 
ever  dare  ask  China  to  cede  or  to  lease  any  harbour, 
bay,  or  island  along  her  coast,  it  was  comparatively 
easy  to  see  the  real  motive  behind  it.  It  should  be 
recalled  that  throughout  the  year  1914  there  had 
been  rumours  in  the  Far  East  that  the  United  States 
was  invited  by  the  Chinese  Government  to  undertake 
the  reorganisation  of  the  Foochow  Arsenal  in  the 


/ 

V 


V 


66        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

Fukien  Province.  The  enterprise  was,  it  was  al- 
leged, finally  entrusted  to  Bethlehem  Steel  Company. 
For  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  said  scheme,  it 
was  deemed  necessary  that  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Com- 
pany should  be  granted  the  lease  of  a  harbour  ad- 
joining to  the  arsenal.  The  story  was  officially  de- 
nied, in  Peking;  Mr.  John  V.  A.  MacMurray,  who 
was  then  Secretary  of  the  American  Legation  in 
Peking,  asserted  that  the  story  was  entirely  without 
foundation.  But  the  Japanese  Government  was  very 
much  alarmed,  and  the  Japanese  people  were  equally 
excited — so  much  so  that  they  deemed  it  necessary 
to  extract  from  the  Chinese  Government  an  explicit 
assurance  that  such  a  scheme  was  not  to  be  under- 
taken. The  demand  was  the  natural  result.  Al- 
though phrased  in  a  general  language,  that  China 
should  not  lease  or  cede  any  harbour  or  bay  or  island 
along  her  coast,  the  demand  aimed  particularly  at  the 
Fukien  province. 

That  this  was  really  the  case  is  borne  out  by  the 
notes  exchanged  between  China  and  Japan  respecting 
the  Fukien  province.  "A  report  has  reached  me," 
said  Mr.  Hioki  Eki,  Japanese  Minister  in  Peking, 
"to  the  effect  that  the  Chinese  Government  has  the 
intention  of  permitting  foreign  nations  to  establish, 
on  the  coast  of  Fukien  province,  dock-yards,  coaling 
stations  for  military  use,  naval  bases,  or  to  set  up 
other  military  establishments;  and  also  of  borrow- 
ing foreign  capital  for  the  purpose  of  setting  up  the 
above-mentioned   establishments."      The  Japanese 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  67 

Minister  asked  a  categorical  assurance  from  the  Chi- 
nese Government.    In  reply,  the  Chinese  Government 
stated  that  it  had  no  intention  of  setting  up  military  / 
or  naval  establishment  on  the  coast  of  Fukien  prov- 
ince. 

Thus  analysed,  the  pretext  that  the  single  demand 
of  the  Fourth  Group  was  made  for  the  purpose  of 
maintaining  the  territorial  integrity  of  China  appears 
in  its  true  colour. 


is 


VIII 

THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS  ANALYSED 
—GROUP  V 

THE  most  drastic,  outrageous,  and  derogatory 
of  China's  sovereignty,  in  comparison  with 
which  the  Austrian  demands  to  Serbia  of 
1914  paled  almost  into  insignificance,  was  the  Fifth 
Group  of  the  demands,  which  were  not  admitted  by 
the  Japanese  Government  when  the  attention  of 
the  Western  Powers  was  first  drawn  to  them,  and 
which  were  not  included  in  the  official  communica- 
tion of  the  Japanese  Government,  replying  to  the  in- 
quiries of  the  great  Powers  regarding  the  nature  and 
the  terms  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands.  To  say  the 
least,  these  demands,  if  granted,  would  have  re- 
duced China  to  a  vassal  of  Japan,  by  making  the 
relations  between  the  two  countries  similar  to  the 
existing  relations  between  Great  Britain  and  Egypt, 
or  between  Korea  and  Japan  herself.  Although 
the  Chinese  Government  was  forced  to  give  way  in 
the  first  four  groups  of  demands,  it  stood  absolutely 
firm  on  the  fifth,  and  declined  to  consider  them  on 
the  ground  "that  they  were  not  proper  subjects  for 
international  negotiation,  conflicting  as  they  did  with 
the  sovereign  rights  of  China,  the  treaty  rights  of 
other  Powers,  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportun- 

68 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  69 

ity."  History  knows  of  no  combination  of  de- 
mands more  sinister  in  motive  and  more  outrageous 
in  character  than  this  Fifth  Group,  which  Japan, 
a  friendly  Power,  had  presented  on  China,  another 
friendly  Power.  And  it  may  also  be  said  that  the 
course  which  the  Japanese  Government  had  pur- 
sued in  concealing  the  demands  of  this  group  from 
the  knowledge  of  the  Western  Powers,  is  admittedly 
one  of  mendacity  and  duplicity,  for  which  history 
of  modern  diplomacy  has  but  few  parallels,  if  any. 
According  to  the  demands  in  the  Fifth  Group, 
the  Chinese  Government  was  to  employ  influential 
Japanese  advisers  in  political,  financial,  and  mili- 
tary affairs;  to  permit  Japanese  hospitals,  churches 
(Is  there  any  Japanese  church  in  China?)  and 
schools  to  lease  and  own  land;  to  employ  Japanese 
officers  for  the  administration  of  the  police  depart- ! 
ment  of  important  cities;  to  purchase  from  Japan 
a  fixed  amount  of  munitions  of  war,  aside  from 
establishing  an  arsenal  in  China  to  be  under  Japa- 
nese control  and  management;  "to  grant  to  Japan 
the  right  to  construct  a  railway  connecting  Wu- 
chang with  Kiukiang  and  Nanchang,  another  line 
between  Nanchang  and  Hankow,  and  another  line 
between  Nanchang  and  Chao-chow;"  to  pledge  not 
to  use  any  foreign  capital  other  than  Japanese  to 
work  mines,  build  railways,  and  construct  harbour 
works  in  the  Fukien  province;  and  finally  to  permit 
Japanese  subjects  to  carry  on  missionary  propaganda  . 
for  the  dissemination  of  Buddishm  in  China. 


70        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

A  formidable  set  of  demands,  indeed.  To  say 
that  they  constituted  a  sufficient  casus  belli  is  to  put 
the  case  very  mildly.  Those  who  are  at  all  ac- 
quainted with  the  nature  of  Austrian  demands  on 
Serbia,  whose  refusal  to  accept  them  in  toto  led  to 
the  outbreak  of  the  European  War  in  August, 
1914,  will  readily  agree  that  the  Japanese  demands 
on  China,  especially  those  of  the  Fifth  Group,  were 
hundred  times  more  drastic,  and  that  a  disastrous 
war  in  the  Far  East  was  averted  only  by  the  ex- 
tremely conciliatory  spirit  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment. 

A  well-known  writer  on  Chinese  questions  said : 

"The  real  purpose  of  the  Japanese  demands  be- 
comes unalterably  clear,  for  in  this  group  we  have 
seen  seven  sketches  of  things  designed  to  serve  as  the 
coup  de  grace.  Not  only  is  a  new  sphere — Fukien 
province — indicated;  not  only  is  the  mid- Yangtze, 
from  the  vicinity  of  Kiukiang,  to  serve  as  the  ter- 
minus for  a  system  of  Japanese  railways,  radiating 
from  the  great  river  to  the  coasts  of  South  China; 
i  but  the  gleaming  knife  of  the  Japanese  surgeon  is  to 
aid  the  Japanese  teacher  in  the  great  work  of  propa- 
ganda; the  Japanese  monk  and  the  Japanese  police- 
man are  to  be  dispersed  like  skirmishers  throughout 
the  land;  Japanese  arsenals  are  to  supply  all  the 
necessary  arms,  or  failing  that  a  special  Japanese 
arsenal  is  to  be  established;  Japanese  advisers  are  to 
give  the  necessary  advice  in  finance,  in  politics,  in 
every  department — foreshadowing  a  complete  and  all 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  71 


embracing  political  control.    Never  was  a  more  sweep 
ing  programme  of  supervision  presented,  and  small 
wonder  if  Chinese  when  they  learnt  of  this  climax 
exclaimed   that  the   fate  of  Korea  was  to  be   their 


;/ 


A  more  vicious  assault  upon  Chinese  sovereignty 
cannot  be  imagined! 

We  shall  not,  in  this  connection,  go  into  the  de- 
tails of  the  demands  which  are  in  direct  conflict 
with  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  in  China. 
This  aspect  of  the  question  is  dealt  with  at  some 
length  in  "The  Chino-Japanese  Treaties  of  1915/'  in 
which  an  attempt  is  made  to  bring  out  the  strongest 
reasons  why  the  1915  treaties  growing  out  of  the 
Twenty-one  Demands  should  be  null  and  void.  We 
need  only  to  point  out  here  that  the  proposal  of  joint 
administration  by  China  and  Japan  of  the  Chinese 
police  would  be  clearly  an  interference  with  the  do- 
mestic affairs  of  the  Republic,  and  consequently  an 
infringement  upon  China's  sovereignty.  Besides 
this,  the  demand  for  an  engagement  by  the  Chinese 
Government  to  purchase  a  fixed  amount  of  muni- 
tions from  Japan  or  to  establish  a  Chino-Japanese 
joint  arsenal  was  such  a  clear  encroachment  of 

*B.L.  Putnam  Weale,  "The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in 
China."  The  same  author  gave  this  as  his  opinion:  "Every 
Chinese  knew  that,  in  the  main,  Group  V.  was  simply  a 
repetition  of  the  measures  undertaken  in  Korea  after  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  of  1905  as  a  forerunner  to  annexation; 
and  although  obviously  in  the  case  of  China  no  such  rapid 
surgery  could  be  practised,  the  endorsement  of  these  measures 
would  have  meant  a  virtual  Japanese  protectorate." 


l/ 


V 


72        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

China's  sovereignty  that  it  was  really  difficult  to 
see  how  one  Power  could  without  cause  make  such 
a  demand  upon  another.*  In  respect  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  advisers  in  political,  financial,  and  military 
affairs,  the  policy  of  the  Chinese  Government,  it  may 
be  said,  has  always  been  similar  to  that  which  has 
apparently  guided  the  Japanese  Government,  appoint- 
ing to  positions  of  great  importance  the  best  quali- 
fied and  most  able  men  irrespective  of  their  nation- 
ality. As  a  sovereign  and  independent  nation,  China 
could  not  allow  her  national  policy  being  dictated 
to  by  an  alien  Power,  no  matter  how  desirous  that 
Power  might  be  of  "maintaining  the  general  peace 
in  Eastern  Asia  and  further  strengthening  the 
friendly  relations  and  good  neighbourhood  existing 
between  the  two  nations."  For  Japan  to  insist  upon 
the  Chinese  Government  employing  Japanese,  and 


v/l 


4 


♦The  true  significance  of  this  demand  can  be  best  under- 
stood if  we  quote  here  the  despatch  of  M.  Krupensky,  Rus- 
Isiah  Ambassador  at  Tokio,  to  his  Government,  under  the  date 
,  of  October  16,  1917.  The  Russian  diplomat  writes :  "In  reply 
I  to  my  question  as  to  the  credibility  of  the  rumours  alleging 
that  Japan  is  prepared  to  sell  to  the  Chinese  Government  a 
considerable  quantity  of  arms  and  munitions,  Viscount 
Motono  (then  Japanese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs),  con- 
firmed them,  and  added  that  the  Peking  Government  had 
promised  not  to  use  arms  against  the  Southerners.  It  was 
evident  from  the  Minister's  words,  however,  that  this  promise 
possessed  only  the  value  of  a  formal  justification  of  this  sale, 
infringing  as  the  latter  does  the  principle  of  non-intervention 
in  the  internal  Chinese  feuds,  proclaimed  by  Japan  herself. 
.  .  .  It  is  most  likely  that  the  Japanese  are  aiming  princi- 
pally at  obtaining  the  privilege  of  rearming  the  entire  Chinese 
army,  and  at  making  China  dependent  in  the  future  on 
Japanese  arsenals  and  the  supply  of  munitions  from  Japan. 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  73 

Japanese  alone,  as  political,  financial,  and  military 
advisers  was  to  disregard  the  practical  side  of  the  / 
question,  to  say  the  least.  In  spite  of  her  advanced  » 
position  in  the  family  of  nations,  Japan  has  not  yet 
found  it  possible  to  dispense  with  the  services  of  the 
foreign  advisers  herself.  She  has  a  number  of  for- 
eign advisers  in  her  government  service;  and  it  is, 
therefore,  questionable  whether  she  is  at  all  in  a 
position  to  advise  China. 

The  demand  that  Japan  should  be  first  consulted,  j 
if  China  were  to  borrow  foreign  capital  for  the 
purpose  of  working  mines,  building  railways,  and 
constructing  harbour  works  and  dock-yards  in  the 
Province  of  Fukien  is  easily  understandable.  It  was 
based  on  the  fear,  as  has  been  pointed  out  in  the 
previous  chapter,  that  the  Chinese  Government  might 
make  use  of  American  capital  in  setting  up  military 
and  naval  establishments  on  the  coast  of  the  said 
province.  Japan  has  claimed  special  interest  in  the 
province,  on  the  ground  of  its  geographical  prox- 
imity to  Formosa,  a  Chinese  island  ceded  to  Japan 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  Chino- Japanese  War  in 
1894-5.  "Geographical  propinquity"  might  in  cer- 
tain cases  create  a  special  interest,  but  the  position 
which  Japan  has  hitherto  enjoyed  in  the  Fukien 
province  is  that  of  a  neighbour,  not  of  a  protector. 
Her  demand,  however,  was  nothing  short  of  an 
absolute  right  of  vetoing  any  attempt  on  the  part  of 
China  to  utilise  the  foreign  capital  to  develop  the 
Fukien  province.     It  would  be,  therefore,  not  only 


/ 


'I 


I 


74        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

a  denial  of  equal  opportunity,  but  also  an  unwar- 
ranted limitation  on  China's  sovereign  rights. 

Regarding  the  two  articles  relating  to  the  ac- 
quisition of  land  for  Japanese  schools,  hospitals,  and 
churches,  as  well  as  the  right  of  missionary  propa- 
ganda, we  can  do  no  better  than  to  quote  the  Chinese 
Official  Statement,  which  defined  the  position  of  the 
Chinese  Government  in  a  language  at  once  concise 
and  comprehensive.    These  demands 

"would  have  presented  grave  obstacles  to  the  consoli- 
dation of  the  friendly  feeling  subsisting  between  the 
two  people.  The  religions  of  the  two  countries  are 
identical  and  therefore  the  need  for  a  missionary 
propaganda  to  be  carried  on  in  China  by  Japanese 
does  not  exist.  The  natural  rivalry  between  Chinese 
and  Japanese  followers  of  the  same  faith  would  tend 
to  create  incessant  disputes  and  friction.  Whereas 
Western  missionaries  live  apart  from  the  Chinese  com- 
munities among  which  they  labour,  Japanese  monks 
would  live  with  the  Chinese,  and  the  similarity  of 
their  physical  characteristics,  their  religious  garb,  and 
their  habits  of  life  would  render  it  impossible  to  dis- 
tinguish them  for  purposes  of  affording  the  protec- 
tion which  the  Japanese  Government  would  require  to 
be  extended  to  them  under  the  system  of  extraterri- 
toriality now  obtaining  in  China.  Moreover,  a  gen- 
eral apprehension  exists  among  the  Chinese  people 
that  these  peculiar  conditions  favouring  conspiracies 
for  political  purposes  might  be  taken  advantage  of  by 
some  unscrupulous  Chinese." 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  75 

The  most  significant  feature  of  the  demands  of  the 
Fifth  Group  remains  yet  to  be  considered.  This  is 
no  other  than  the  desire  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment to  invade  the  British  sphere  of  interest  by  de- 
manding railway  concessions  in  the  Yangtze  Valley. 
She  demanded  "the  right  of  constructing  a  railway 
connecting  Wuchang  with  Kiukiang  and  Nanchang, 
another  line  between  Nanchang  and  Hangchow,  and 
another  between  Nanchang  and  Chaochou."  Un- 
questionably, this  demand  for  railway  concessions 
in  the  Yangtze  Valley  conflicted  with  the  existing 
agreements  between  China  and  Great  Britain.  It 
would  come  into  conflict  first  with  the  Shanghai- 
Nanking-Ningpo  Railway  Agreement  of  March  6,  * 
1908,  Article  XIX  of  which  provided  that  if  for- 
eign capital  were  required  to  build  the  branch  lines 
of  the  said  railway,  preference  should  be  given  to 
Great  Britain  (British  and  Chinese  Corporation 
Limited).  It  would  then  conflict  with  the  Nanking 
Hunan  Railway  Loan  Agreement  of  March  31, 
1914.  Article  II  of  the  said  agreement  stipulated: 
"The  loan  is  designed  .  .  .  secondly  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  Government  line  of  railway  from 
Nanking  to  Nanchang  through  Ning-kwo-fu  and 
Hwei-chou-fu,  and  with  connection  to  Wu-hu  and 
Kuang-te-chow :  and  from  Nanchang  to  Pinghsiang 
to  connect  with  the  existing  Government  railway 
from  Pinghsiang  to  Chuchow."  And  thirdly,  it  may 
be  pointed  out,  the  demand  conflicted  with  certain 
engagement  which  the  Chinese   Government  had 


i 


n  to 
tion, 
:ing-  J 


76        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

made  on  August  24,  1914,  giving  preference  to  the 
British  and  Chinese  Corporation,  Limited,  for  the 
projected  line  from  Nanchang  to  Chaochowfu.  "For 
this  reason,"  the  Chinese  Official  Statement  empha- 
sised, "the  Chinese  Government  found  themselves 
unable  to  consider  the  demand,  though  the  Japa- 
nese Minister,  while  informed  of  China's  engage- 
ments with  Great  Britain,  repeatedly  pressed  for  its 
acceptance."  Is  Japan  an  ally  of  Great  Britain,  and 
according  to  the  terms  of  the  alliance,  is  she  not  re- 
quired to  defend  the  common  interests  of  both  coun- 
tries? The  Japanese  Minister  in  Peking  could 
not  have  pressed  upon  the  Chinese  Government  for 
acceptance  of  this  demand  without  instructions  from 
Tokio,  and  the  Tokio  Foreign  Office  could  not  have 
been  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  railway  lines  de- 
manded had  already  been  conceded  to  Great  Britain. 
The  Chinese  Government,  faithful  in  its  interna- 
tional engagements,  made  it  very  clear  that  the  de- 
mand conflicted  with  its  previous  engagements  with 
Great  Britain,  and  therefore  could  not  be  granted. 
After  all,  one  is  quite  justified,  with  this  fact  in 
view,  in  asking  if  Japan  is  really  such  a  loyal  ally 
as  she  has  claimed  to  be. 

In  this  matter  of  railway  concessions,  Japan's 
conscience  was  sorely  touched.  Realising  that  she 
could  not  after  all  ignore  the  engagements  which 
the  Chinese  Government  had  already  entered  into 
with  Great  Britain,  Japan  revised  the  language  of 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  77 

the  demand  so  as  to  make  it  inoffensive.  Thus,  in 
the  list  of  revised  demands,  presented  to  the  Chi- 
nese Government,  April  26,  1915,  Japan  suggested 
that  the  demand  for  the  railway  concessions  in  the 
Yangtze  Valley  should  be  made  the  subject  of  an 
exchange  of  notes  between  the  two  countries.  "If 
it  is  clearly  ascertained  that  other  Powers  have  no 
objection,  China  shall  grant  the  said  right  to  Japan." 
In  the  meantime,  however,  "the  Chinese  Government 
shall  not  grant  the  said  right  to  any  foreign  Power, 
before  Japan  comes  to  an  understanding  with  the 
other  Power  which  is  heretofore  interested  therein." 
The  right  referred  to  here  was  that  of  financing  the 
construction  of  those  railways  mentioned  in  the 
original  demand. 

In  the  ultimatum,  it  was  stated  that  the  Fifth 
Group  of  demands  was  detached  "from  the  present 
negotiation"  and  that  it  would  be  discussed  "sep- 
arately in  the  future."  The  ultimatum  was  delivered 
to  the  Chinese  Government,  at  3  p.  m.,  May  7,  and 
it  was  accepted  the  following  day.  The  Japanese 
Minister  in  Peking  objected  to  the  phraseology  of 
the  Chinese  note  of  acceptance  and  insisted  that  the 
demands  of  the  Fifth  Group,  except  the  one  relating 
to  Fukien,  which  was  to  be  made  into  an  exchange 
of  notes,  should  be  specifically  reserved  for  future 
negotiation.  The  Japanese  Minister  insisted  that, 
following  the  words  "Group  V"  there  should  be  in- 
serted the  qualifying  phrase  "postponed  for  later 


/ 


78        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

negotiation."  The  result  is  that  the  Fifth  Group 
of  demands  remains  to-day  as  "unfinished  business, 
to  be  taken  up  at  a  future  date." 

It  may  also  be  added  here  that  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment, in  answer  to  the  inquiries  from  the  west- 
ern Powers,  failed  to  make  public  the  demands  of 
the  Fifth  Group,  and  that  when  they  became  known, 
the  Japanese  Government  referred  to  them  merely 
as  "wishes,"  "requests  for  friendly  consideration" 
by  China.  In  the  statement  issued  by  the  Japanese 
Government,  May  7,  they  were  referred  to  as  "prop- 
ositions relating  to  the  solution  of  pending  questions 
and  others."  In  answer  to  this  tergiversation,  the 
Chinese  Government  in  its  official  statement,  made  it 
very  clear  that  these  demands  of  the  Fifth  Group 
were  presented  as  "demands,"  not  as  "wishes,"  "re- 
quests," or  "propositions."  "The  first  four  Groups 
were  each  introduced  by  a  preamble,  but  there  was 
no  preamble  or  explanation  to  the  Fifth  Group.  In 
respect  of  the  character  of  the  demands  in  this 
Group,  however,  no  difference  was  indicated  in  the 
document  between  them  and  those  embodied  in  the 
preceding  Groups." 


IX 

A  UNILATERAL  NEGOTIATION 

WHILE  these  demands  were  obviously  not 
proper  subjects  for  international  negotia- 
tion, the  Chinese  Government,  it  is  curi- 
ous to  say,  consented,  "in  deference  to  the  wishes  of 
the  Japanese  Government,"  to  open  negotiations  "on 
those  articles  which  it  was  possible  for  China  to 
consider."  The  Japanese  Minister  in  Peking,  ow- 
ing to  his  eagerness  to  bring  the  whole  matter  to  a 
successful  conclusion  before  the  world  at  large  could 
have  any  knowledge  of  it,  pressed  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  agree  to  a  daily  conference.  This  the 
Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  could  not  agree 
to,  as  it  would  not  give  him  sufficient  time  to  study 
the  demands  in  entirety.  And  it  was  later  mutually 
agreed  upon  that  two  conferences  were  to  be  held 
every  week.  "China  approached  the  pending  con- 
ferences in  a  spirit  of  utmost  friendliness,"  to  quote 
the  Chinese  official  statement,  "and  with  a  determi- 
nation to  deal  with  all  questions  frankly  and  sin- 
cerely. Before  negotiations  were  actually  com- 
menced, the  Japanese  Minister  raised  many  ques- 
tions with  regard  to  the  number  of  delegates  pro- 
posed to  represent  China,  and  the  number  of  con- 
ferences to  be  held  in  each  week,  and  the  method 

79 


80        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

of  discussion.  The  Chinese  Government,  though  its 
views  differed  from  those  of  the  Japanese  Minister, 
yielded  in  all  these  respects  to  his  contentions,  in 
the  hope  of  avoiding  any  delay  in  the  negotiations. 
The  objections  of  the  Japanese  Minister  to  the  cus- 
tomary recording  and  signing  of  the  minutes  of  each 
conference,  which  the  Chinese  Government  sug- 
gested as  a  necessary  and  advisable  precaution,  as 
well  as  one  calculated  to  facilitate  future  reference, 
were  also  accepted.  Nor  did  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment retaliate  in  any  way  when  in  the  course  of 
negotiations  the  Japanese  Minister  twice  suspended 
the  conferences,  obviously  with  the  object  of  com- 
pelling compliance  with  his  views  on  certain  points 
at  the  time  under  discussion." 

The  first  conference  was  held  in  the  Chinese  For- 
eign Office  in  the  afternoon  of  February  2,  1915, 
when  the  entire  affair  was  still  a  mystery  to  the 
outside  world.  The  Japanese  Minister  pressed  for 
immediate  acceptance,  in  principle,  of  the  Twenty- 
one  Demands  en  bloc.  For  this  he  advanced  many 
reasons,  one  of  which  was  that  if  the  demands  were 
accepted  in  principle  at  once,  Count  Okuma's  posi- 
tion, it  is  ridiculous  to  say,  would  be  endangered. 
That  was,  to  be  sure,  an  excellent  argument  for 
Count  Okuma,  then  Premier  of  Japan,  but  one  nat- 
urally fails  to  understand  why  China  should  sacri- 
fice her  sovereignty  by  acceding  to  these  demands  in 
order  merely  to  promote  the  worthy  Count's  politi- 
cal career.    Into  the  details  of  the  negotiations  we 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  81 

do  not  propose  to  go,  for  they  can  be  easily  found 
in  the  official  statement  given  out  by  the  Chinese 
Government  after  the  conclusion  of  the  negotia- 
tions (see  appendix  I).  We  only  wish  to  show 
the  manner  in  which  the  negotiations  had  been  con- 
ducted, or  more  accurately,  dictated  by  Japan.  We 
only  want  to  point  out  the  way  whereby  the  Japa- 
nese Government,  to  use  its  own  language,  was  de- 
termined to  attain  its  ends  by  all  means  within  its 
power. 

Beginning  from  February  2,  two  conferences  were 
regularly  held  each  week  between  the  Chinese  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Japanese  Minister 
in  Peking.  As  has  been  said,  the  Japanese  Minister 
demanded  the  acceptance  in  principle  of  the  entire 
Twenty-one  Demands.  This  was  absolutely  declined 
by  the  Chinese  Foreign  Minister,  who  only  ventured 
to  express  a  general  opinion  on  such  proposals  as 
were  possible  subjects  for  negotiation.  On  Febru- 
ary 18,  the  Japanese  Minister  became  more  peremp- 
tory in  manner  and  in  speech.  He  insisted  that  the 
negotiations  must  be  extended  to  cover  the  entire 
set  of  demands.*    Out  of  an  earnest  desire  to  bring 

♦In  this  connection,  it  may  be  interesting  to  refer  to  the 
fact  that  Dr.  Paul  S.  Reinsch,  at  that  time  American  Minister 
in  Peking,  exerted  his  best  effort  to  soften  the  demands." 
Upon  learning  that  the  Japanese  Minister  became  more  per- 
emptory at  the  conference  held  on  February  18,  he  sent  a 
cable,  inviting  President  Wilson's  personal  attention  to  the 
proposals,  "which  affected  the  rights  and  legitimate  prospects 
of  Americans  in  China."  President  Wilson,  in  a  personal 
letter  to  Dr.  Reinsch  under  the  date  of  February  8,  and  there- 
fore already  on  the  way  to  Peking,  before  Dr.  Reinsch  cabled, 


82        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

about  an  early  settlement  of  the  entire  affair, 
the  Chinese  Government,  while  declining  abso- 
lutely to  negotiate  on  the  demands  in  the  Fifth 
Group,  yielded  to  the  Japanese  wishes  wherever 
it  could  and  consented  to  negotiate  on  those  de- 
mands which  were  compatible  with  China's  sover- 
eignty and  her  territorial  integrity.  The  negotiations 
between  the  two  Governments  were  for  a  long  time 
going  on  apparently  very  smoothly.  But  at  the  con- 
ference held  on  March  9,  while  still  pressing  for  a 
speedy  acceptance  in  principle  of  the  whole  set  of 
demands,  Mr.  Hioki  verbally  notified  the  Chinese 
Foreign  Minister  that  unless  a  satisfactory  settle- 
ment were  soon  reached,  Japan  would  be  compelled 
"to  take  steps  that  will  surprise  China  and  be  un- 
pleasant to  Japan  herself."  This  was,  however,  only 
a  threat  made  by  the  Japanese  diplomat  on  his  own 
responsibility.  On  March  15,  however,  the  same 
diplomat,  apparently  under  instructions  from  his 
Government,  conveyed  to  the  Chinese  Government 
an  expression  of  appreciation  of  the  frankness  and 
sincerity  of  the  Chinese  representatives  in  the  con- 
duct of  the  negotiations.  In  the  morning  of  March 
17,  Mr.  Hioki  fell  down  from  his  horse,  and  was 

said  in  part:  "I  have  had  the  feeling  that  any  direct  advice 
in  China,  or  any  direct  intervention  on  her  behalf  in  the 
present  negotiations,  would  really  do  her  more  harm  than 
good,  inasmuch  as  it  would  very  likely  provoke  the  jealousy 
and  excite  the  hostility  of  Japan,  which  would  first  be  mani- 
fested against  China  herself."  For  this  reason,  therefore, 
President  Wilson  said:  ''For  the  present  I  am  watching  the 
situation  very  carefully  indeed,  ready  to  step  in  at  any  point 
where  it  is  wise  to  do  so." 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  83 

hurt.  As  a  result  he  was  confined  to  his  house  for 
several  days.  That  the  Chinese  Government  was 
willing  to  expedite  the  negotiation  and  to  meet  the 
desires  of  the  Japanese  Government  was  further  il- 
lustrated in  the  fact  that,  during  the  confinement 
of  the  Japanese  Minister,  the  negotiations  were  con- 
tinued at  the  Japanese  Legation  instead  of  at  the 
Chinese  Foreign  Office.  It  was  sincerely  hoped 
by  the  Chinese  Government  that,  in  view  of  the 
great  concessions  already  made  by  China,  the  Japa- 
nese Government  would  see  a  way  of  receding  from 
its  position  on  other  points.  But  this  hope  for  a 
change  of  heart  by  Japan  was  all  in  vain.  With  the 
conference  of  April  17,  further  negotiations  were 
suspended  by  the  Japanese  Minister,  and  they  were 
not  resumed  until  April  26,  when  he  surprised  the 
Chinese  Government  with  a  new  list  of  Twenty- 
four  Demands  (which  see  the  appendix  D).  This 
he  said,  was  the  final  proposal  of  his  Government, 
and  he  requested  the  Chinese  Government  to  accord 
its  acceptance  without  delay.  The  Japanese  diplo- 
dat  was  kind  enough  to  add,  however,  that  the  leased 
territory  of  Kiaochow  would  be  restored  to  China 
"at  an  opportune  time  in  the  future  and  under  proper 
conditions,"  if  the  Chinese  Government  would  agree 
to  the  new  list  of  Twenty- four  Demands  without 
modification. 

The  set  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands  was  already 
formidable  enough  and  far  more  than  the  Chinese 
Government  could  undertake  to  consider.     Now  to 


i\ 


84        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMAJNDS 

add  three  more  to  the  original  set  was  to  fill  China's 
cup  of  bitterness  to  overflow.  The  new  list  of  de- 
mands was  ostensibly  a  revision  of  the  original,  rep- 
resenting modifications  and  concessions.  But  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  "these  amended  demands  were  con- 
cessions more  in  phraseology  than  spirit,  by  making 
it  easier  for  China  to  accept  them."  The  pill  was 
sugarcoated  a  little,  but  that  it  was  still  the  same 
bitter  medicine  was  evident.  To  this  new  list  of 
Twenty-four  Demands,  the  Chinese  Government  re- 
plied on  May  1,  1915,  in  a  concise  memorandum 
read  to  Mr.  Hioki  by  the  Chinese  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs.  With  this  reply  Japan  was  not  at 
all  satisfied,  for  it  was  "contrary  to  the  expectations 
of  the  Imperial  Government."  As  an  indication  of 
dissatisfaction,  the  conditional  offer  of  restoring 
the  leased  territory  to  China  was  withdrawn.  The 
Japanese  Minister  intimated,  as  he  had  intimated 
once  before,  that  if  the  Chinese  Government  should 
further  refuse  to  accept  the  new  list  of  Twenty- 
four  Demands  without  modification,  Japan  would 
have  to  resort  to  the  most  drastic  measures.  "Upon 
receiving  this  intimation  the  Chinese  Government, 
inspired  by  the  conciliatory  spirit  which  had  been 
predominant  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  nego- 
tiations and  desirous  of  avoiding  any  possible  rup- 
ture in  the  relations  of  the  two  countries,  made  a 
supreme  effort  to  meet  the  situation,  and  represented 
to  the  Japanese  Government  that  it  would  recon- 
sider its  position  and  make  another  attempt  to  find 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  85 

a  solution  that  would  be  more  satisfactory  to  Japan, 
in  respect  to  those  articles  which  China  had  de- 
clared could  not  be  taken  up  for  consideration,  but 
to  which  Japan  attached  great  importance." 

At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  clearly  borne  in  mind, 
the  events  in  Peking  and  Tokyo  were  moving  with 
unusual  rapidity,  and  the  diplomatic  tension  in  the 
capital  of  the  Chinese  Republic  then  was  quite  com- 
parable to  the  famous  "twelve  days"  before  the  out- 
break of  the  War  in  Europe  in  August,  1914.  Those 
who  were  in  China  then  and  breathed  the  foul  at- 
mosphere of  Japan's  military  diplomacy  instinctively 
felt  that  something  terrible  was  to  come  about.  It 
is  easy  to  recall  that  at  an  early  stage  of  the  dis- 
cussions of  the  Twenty-one  Demands,  a  Japanese 
force  of  30,000  strong  was  send  to  China,  ostensi- 
bly for  the  relief  of  the  Tsingtao  and  Manchurian 
garrisons.  It  was  generally  conceded  that  the  move- 
ment was  intended  as  a  military  demonstration 
against  China,  although  the  Japanese  War  Depart- 
ment suavely  explained  that  the  strengthening  of 
Japan's  garrisons  at  different  parts  in  China  was 
"merely  a  matter  of  military  routine."  On  March 
22,  five  hundred  infantry,  some  artillery,  and  a 
squadron  of  cavalry,  arrived  at  Fangtze,  in  Shan- 
tung, from  Japan.  Three  thousand  fresh  troops  ar- 
rived at  Mukden,  about  the  same  time,  where  they 
were  supposedly  to  guard  the  railway  station,  and 
three  thousand  more  arrived  at  Dairen  from  Japan 
for  no  definite  purpose.    Tsi-nan-fu,  the  capital  of 


86        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

Shantung  province,  suddenly  became  a  scene  of 
Japan's  military  activity.  In  one  of  the  conferences 
the  Japanese  Minister  was  asked  for  an  explana- 
tion of  the  arrival  in  China  of  such  a  large  num- 
ber of  Japanese  troops.  The  Japanese  diplomat 
would  not  say  that  the  troops  were  reliefs,  but  he 
hoped  that  their  presence  would  influence  a  speedy 
and  satisfactory  conclusion  of  the  negotiations  of  the 
Twenty-one  Demands.  "The  Japanese  Minister 
stated  at  the  conference,  in  reply  to  a  direct  ques- 
tion as  to  when  the  retiring  troops  would  be  with- 
drawn, that  this  would  not  be  done  "until  the  nego- 
tiations could  be  brought  to  a  satisfactory  conclu- 
sion." On  March  23,  the  Chinese  Government  ad- 
dressed an  "amicably  expressed"  request  to  the 
Japanese  Government  for  an  explanation  for  this 
sudden  influx  of  Japanese  troops  in  China.  The 
Chinese  Government  was  told  that  "the  despatch  of 
troops  to  South  Manchuria  and  Shantung,"  to  use 
Baron  Kato's  own  words,  "is  really  for  the  relief  of 
the  Japanese  garrisons,  only  a  little  earlier  this  year 
(1915)  than  previously."  This  statement  might  be 
a  good  explanation  for  the  sudden  despatch  of  troops 
to  China  for  the  relief  of  the  Japanese  garrisons 
several  months  in  advance  of  the  usual  time,  but 
it  did  not  account  for  the  fact  that  the  retiring  gar- 
risons, for  whose  relief  the  new  troops  were  sent, 
did  not  withdraw.  Inasmuch  as  the  number  of 
Japanese  garrisons  in  Peking,  Tien-tsin  and  along 
the  South  Manchurian  Railway,  was  fixed  by  treaty 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  87 

terms  with  China,  Japan  had  certainly  no  right 
to  increase  them  at  her  sweet  will  without  previous 
consultation  with  the  Chinese  Government. 

That  this  sudden  increase  of  Japanese  troops  in 
China  was  a  minatory  step  taken  in  order  to  show 
the  Chinese  Government  what  might  be  expected 
in  case  of  its  further  refusal  to  accept  the  Japa- 
nese demands  was  understood  by  men  in  the  street. 
Its  meaning  could  not  be  mistaken.  The  Chinese 
Government,  on  the  one  hand,  protested  in  vain 
against  this  military  demonstration  which  caused 
much  excitement,  indignation  and  alarm  among  the 
Chinese  people,  and  on  the  other  hand,  it  had  to 
caution  the  people  to  remain  calm  and  patient,  so 
as  to  evert  a  rupture  with  Japan  and  to  proceed 
smoothly  with  the  negotiations  which  were  thus 
rendered  immensely  difficult  by  the  increase  and 
promiscuous  presence  of  Japanese  troops  in  Chinese 
cities.  It  must  be  admitted  that  diplomatic  negotia- 
tion under  such  circumstances  was  nothing  more 
than  a  unilaternal  affair.  It  was  not  at  all  negotia- 
tion; it  was  coercion,  dictation.  To  give  its  true 
character,  we  beg  to  quote  the  excellent  characteri- 
sation given  by  the  Chinese  delegates  at  the  Peace 
Conference  at  Paris : 

/ 

"It  was  a  negotiation  in  which  the  number  and  vir-  A. 
tually  the  personnel  of  China's  representatives  were 
dictated  to  her.    It  was  a  negotiation  in  which  Japan 
refused  to  have  official  minutes  of  the  proceedings 


88        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

kept  as  proposed  by  China,  with  the  result  that  the 
Chinese  and  Japanese  representatives  differed  in  their 
respective  records  of  important  declarations  made  by 
the  latter,  and,  on  basis  of  these  differences,  the  Japa- 
nese Government  in  its  ultimatum  accused  the  Chi- 
nese Government  of  'arbitrarily  nullifying'  statements 
alleged  to  have  been  made — but  in  fact  never  made — 
by  the  senior  Chinese  representative.  It  was  a  nego- 
tiation in  the  course  of  which — these  are  the  words 
of  the  Chinese  official  statement  issued  at  the  time — 
'the  Japanese  Minister  twice  suspended  the  confer- 
ences, obviously  with  the  object  of  compelling  compli- 
ance with  his  views  on  certain  points  at  the  time  under 
discussion!  In  a  word,  it  was  a  negotiation  in  which 
Japan  dominated  and  dictated  the  course  and  the 
terms  of  discussion." 

As  we  have  pointed  out  above,  events  in  Peking 
then  moved  with  unusual  speed.  Swiftly  following 
•the  Chinese  reply  of  May  1,  with  which  the  Japa- 
nese Government  was  not  satisfied,  "adequate  steps" 
were  taken  to  bring  China  to  accept  the  demands 
nolens  volens.  Naturally,  more  troops  were  des- 
patched to  China,  particularly  to  Manchuria,  Shan- 
tung, North  China,  and  Central  China;  and  more 
war  ships  were  ordered  to  Chinese  waters.  On  May 
3,  it  was  decided  in  a  cabinet  meeting  in  Tokyo  that 
an  ultimatum  should  be  issued.  On  May  4,  the 
Genro  sat  in  session  for  four  hours  to  pass  on  the 
ultimatum.  On  the  same  day,  the  Kokusai  News 
Agency,  the  semi-official  agency  of  the  Japanese 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  89 

Government,  reported  from  Tokyo  that  "further  dis- 
cussion or  even  the  suggestion  of  more  concessions 
to  China's  sensibilities  would  be  incompatible  with 
Japan's  national  dignity."  On  May  5,  martial  law 
was  proclaimed  in  Kwantung  peninsula,  and  the 
Japanese  consul  at  Chefoo  ordered  all  Japanese  resi- 
dents in  that  city  to  be  prepared  to  leave  in  two 
days.  On  May  6,  the  Mikado  sanctioned  the  ultima- 
tum, which  was  duly  cabled  to  the  Japanese  Minister 
in  Peking.  In  the  evening,  the  Japanese  diplomat 
informed  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  that  the  long 
heralded  ultimatum  had  arrived,  and  requested  the 
Chinese  Government  to  reconsider  its  position.  On 
May  7,  at  10 :  00  a.  m.  the  main  body  of  the  second 
Japanese  squadron  left  Sasebo  for  "an  unknown 
destination."  The  battleship  Ikoma  of  13,750  tons, 
with  Rear-Admiral  Yamaya  in  command,  left  Kure 
for  a  Chinese  port.  Four  Japanese  men-of-war  of 
small  tonnage  were  sent  to  Shanghai  from  Formosa. 
And  the  battleships  Kurama  and  Chikuma  and  four- 
teen destroyers  were  also  given  order  to  hold  them- 
selves in  readiness  to  act  at  an  hour's  notice.  With 
these  military  and  naval  forces  in  readiness  for  ac- 
tion, the  Japanese  Minister,  accompanied  by  his  staff, 
quietly  called  at  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  at  3 :  00 
p.  m.  on  the  same  day,  and  formally  presented  to 
the  Chinese  Foreign  Minister  the  ultimatum.  Con- 
trary to  the  diplomatic  usage,  it  was  written  in 
Japanese  and  not  accompanied  by  a  Chinese  text. 
On  May  8,  a  joint  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  of  the 


90        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

Chinese  Republic,  the  Council  of  State,  and  the 
Military  leaders  in  the  capital,  was  held  in  Presi- 
dent's Palace,  to  consider  the  Japanese  ultimatum 
which  declared  that  "if  no  satisfactory  reply  is  re- 
ceived before  or  at  the  designated  time  (6:00  p. 
m.,  May  9,  1915),  the  Japanese  Government  will 
take  steps  they  deem  necessary.,,  With  President 
Yuan  in  the  chair,  the  joint  meeting  lasted  more 
than  four  hours.  After  a  long  and  careful  consider- 
ation, it  was  finally  decided  to  accept  the  ultimatum 
"with  a  view  to  preserving  the  peace  in  the  Far 
East."  The  Japanese  Minister  was  asked  to  appoint 
a  day  to  call  at  the  Foreign  Office  "to  make  the 
literary  improvement  of  the  text  and  sign  the  agree- 
ment as  soon  as  possible.' '  This  was  done  on  May 
25,  1915. 

But  why  an  ultimatum?  it  may  be  asked.  The 
case  for  such  a  drastic  step  was  altogether  too  thin.* 

*  The  Japan  Chronicle,  in  an  editorial  entitled  "Domestic 
Politics  and  the  Twenty-one  Demands,"  published  in  its 
weekly  edition  of  June  9,  1921,  throws  a  flood  of  light  as  to 
the  reasons  for  which  the  ultimatum  was  conceived.  The  said 
editorial  was  based  on  another  published  in  the  Herald  of 
Asia  by  its  editor,  Mr.  Zumoto,  a  man  who  "has  the  courage 
of  his  opinions."     The  Japan  Chronicle  editorial  reads: 

"Mr.  Zumoto,  the  veteran  editor  of  the  Herald  of  Asia,  has 
more  than  once  shown  that  he  has  the  courage  of  his  opinions 
even  when  they  are  against  his  countrymen,  and  in  the  latest 
issue  of  his  journal  he  once  again  sets  forth  views  which  are 
not  likelv  to  increase  his  popularity  in  official  circles.  Dis- 
cussing the  Sino-Japanese  Treaty  of  1915  Mr.  Zumoto  notes 
that  when  Japan  sent  her  ultimatum  to  China  regarding  ac- 
ceptance of  the  Treaty  she  waived  Group  V.,  which  contained 
the  most  outrageous  claims  on  Chinese  sovereignty,  'a  pro- 
cedure which  at  the  moment  excited  much  surprise  and 
comment  in  diplomatic  circles  in  Peking  and  elsewhere,  for 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  91 

On  what  could  the  ultimatum  be  based?  Could  it 
be  on  the  fact  that  the  Chinese  Government  had  de- 
clined to  grant  proprietary  rights  in  Manchuria  and 
Mongolia  to  a  nation  which  had  no  shadow  of  reason 
in  asking  for  them,  or  that  the  Chinese  Government 
preferred  to  buy  its  own  munitions  of  war  and 
choose  its  own  advisers  on  the  strength  of  their 

since  the  principal  obstacles  had  been  removed  there  was  no 
necessity  to  resort  to  an  ultimatum  to  secure  China's  agree- 
ment.'   Mr.  Zumoto  continues:  . 

"  'The  truth  is  that  the  whole  negotiations  were  conducted 
by  the  Okuma  Government  with  a  view  to  their  possibly 
favourable  impressions  upon  the  domestic  opinion  in  connec- 
tion with  the  general  election  upon  the  issue  of  which  de- 
pended its  own  fate.  It  was  so  arranged  that  the  news  of 
the  presentation  of  the  ultimatum  was  spread  throughout  the  » 

length  and  breadth  of  the  country  only  a  few  days  before  the  I  \/ 
date  of  the  election,  the  obvious  purpose  being  to  create  an 
impression  that  the  Empire  was  confronted  with  a  grave  crisis 
in  its  international  relations  calling  for  a  united  support  of 
those  in  power.  To  strengthen  this  impression  the  Cabinet 
even  went  to  the  length  of  giving  out  orders  for  mobilising 
a  couple  of  army  divisions,  a  procedure  which  every  well- 
informed  observer  knew  what  not  at  all  necessary.  These 
skilful  manceuvrings  had  the  desired  effect  upon  the  popular 
imagination,  and  the  Cabinet  was  saved  by  a  large  majority 
at  the  polls.' 

"Mr.  Zumoto  is  not  quite  right  in  his  facts.  The  General 
Election  took  place  on  March  25th  and  the  ultimatum  was 
telegraphed  to  China  not  before  the  election  but  more  than 
a  month  after, — on  May  6th.  At  the  same  time,  Mr.  Zumoto's 
statement  that  the  demands  on  China  were  directed  by  political 
exigencies  in  Japan  is  of  interest.  It  is  a  view  which  was 
advanced  by  us  several  times  in  the  Chronicle  and  although 
resented  by  the  Japanese  papers,  it  also  found  expression 
among  Japanese  of  the  more  thoughtful  kind.  Now  that  such 
a  keen  observer  of  Japanese  politics  as  Mr.  Zumoto  confirms 
it,  there  remains  little  to  be  said  on  the  other  side.  At  the 
same  time,  it  throws  a  very  sinister  light  on  Japan's  foreign 
policy.  The  Japanese  place  great  stress  on  'sincerity.'  What 
amount  of  'sincerity'  is  to  be  found  among  statesmen  who 
enter  upon  an  aggressive  foreign  policy  merely  to  establish 
their  political  position  at  home?" 


J 


92        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

qualification  but  without  regard  to  their  nationality? 
Could  it  be  on  the  fact  that  the  Chinese  Government 
had  put  forward  legitimate  proposals  in  regard  to 
Shantung  or  that  it  had  failed  to  appreciate  Japan's 
conditional  offer  of  restoring  the  Kiao-chow  leased 
territory?  If  China  had  done  these  things,  or  even 
more,  who  could  accuse  her  of  acting  otherwise  than 
what  she  was  perfectly  entitled  to  ?  Just  a  few  days 
before  the  actual  presentation  of  the  ultimatum  by 
the  Japanese  Minister,  the  North-China  Daily  News, 
a  British  newspaper  in  Shanghai,  in  an  editorial  of 
May  4,  expressed  its  doubt  that  Japan  would  ever 
resort  to  such  a  step.  "We  have  never  shared  that 
view,  first  because  we  refuse  to  believe  that  Japan 
would  be  so  false  to  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  as  to  commit  an  open  act  of  piracy 
on  China;  secondly,  because  we  are  certain  that 
Japan  would  never  be  so  blind  to  her  own  interests 
as  to  quarrel  simultaneously  with  Great  Britain, 
France,  America,  and  Russia."  And  two  days  later, 
May  6,  in  another  editorial,  when  the  threatened 
ultimatum  was  already  in  the  hands  of  the  Japanese 
Minister  and  was  about  to  be  presented  to  the  Chi- 
nese Government,  the  belief  was  expressed  that 
Japan  would  not  take  such  a  drastic  step.  "We 
repeat,"  says  the  editorial,  "until  the  worst  is  indeed 
proved  to  have  happened,  we  decline  to  believe  that 
Japan  can  be  so  faithless  to  her  Ally,  Great  Britain, 
as  to  meditate  any  real  harm  to  the  integrity  of  the 
one  (China)  or  the  rights  of  the  other  (Great  Brit- 


JAiPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  93 

ain).  .  .  .  The  word  ultimatum  has  an  ugly  sound, 
and  at  the  worst  it  means  simply,  'Do  this  or  I  will 
force  you  to  do  so.'  But  this  is  altogether  too 
outrageous  to  suppose  Japan's  intention  is  so  brutal 
as  this.  .  .  .  Germany  might  act  thus,  it  is  felt 
nothing  else  would  be  expected  of  her:  but  not 
Japan."  We  greatly  admire  the  profound  faith 
which  the  leading  British  journal  in  the  Far  East 
then  had  in  the  Japanese  Government,  and  we  are 
sorry  that  it  was  sadly  disappointed.  It  was  never- 
theless good  time  to  learn  that  Prussianism  was  not 
indigeneous  in  Europe  nor  was  ultimatum  an  ex- 
clusively Germany  luxury. 

Throughout  the  negotiations  of  1915,  24  meetings 
were  held  at  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  and  lasting 
over  more  than  three  months — not  a  single  Euro- 
pean Power  raised  a  voice  of  protest.  This  might  be 
due  to  the  war  which  had  absorbed  all  the  necessary 
time  and  attention  of  the  European  chancelleries. 
The  question  in  regard  to  the  Twenty-one  Demands 
was  raised  in  the  British  Parliament  and  the  French 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  but  beyond  the  usual  parlia- 
mentary tergiversation  nothing  of  importance  took 
place.  The  United  States,  then  the  only  Power  not 
yet  involved  in  the  war,  and,  therefore,  more  or  less 
in  a  position  to  check  the  Japanese  encroachment 
upon  China,  did  nothing  more  than  making  an  in- 
nocuous declaration  at  Washington  and  filing  an 
official  note  to  both  the  Chinese  and  the  Japanese 
Governments.    The  note  was  despatched  on  May  15, 


94        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

a  week  after  the  acceptance  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment of  the  Japanese  ultimatum.  It  was,  however, 
said  at  the  time  that  the  declaration  of  the  United 
States  on  May  7,  was  in  some  way  responsible  for 
the  temporary  withdrawal  by  Japan  of  the  fifth 
group  of  the  demands  which  were  not  included  in 
the  ultimatum  but  which  were  postponed  for  later 
negotiation. 


/ 

CONCLUSION 

HERE  we  have  before  us  the  complete  story 
of  the  Twenty-one  Demands.     Thos*  who 
have  followed  the  above  analysis  and  the 
tortuous  course  of  negotiation,  and  those  who  pre- 
fer to  examine  the  original  demands,  which  can  be 
found  in  the  appendices,  can  judge  for  themselves 
as  to  their  character  and  significance.     It  is  nowj 
quite  plain  that  they  constitute  a  carefully  studied! 
and   analysed   economic   and   political   programme 
which  Japan,  in  her  guise  as  a  world  Power,  has! 
meant  to  carry  out  in  China  in  the  time  to  come. 
At  the  very  first  glance,  the  Twenty-one  Demands 
seem  to  be  so  many  outrageous  attacks  upon  the 
sovereignty  of  China,  unwarranted,  but  perhaps  not 
premeditated ;  for  no  one  Power  can,  with  any  sense 
of  due  regard  for  international  decency,  press  upon 
another  Power,  not  an  enemy  but  an  acknowledged  j 
friend,  demands  of  this  character.    A  more  careful 
examination  of  them  reveals,  however,  the  truth  that 
they  sum  up  Japan's  Chinese  policy,  not  unlike  in 
principle  to  the  one  adopted  by  her  in  Korea  during 
the  short  period  preceding  the  extinction  of  Korean  I 
independence.   Or,  as  one  English  writer  has  put  it,  \ 
the  Twenty-one  Demands  constitute  "a  list  designed   \ 

95 


* 


/ 


96        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

to  satisfy  every  present  and  future  need  of  Japanese 
policy  and  to  reduce  China  to  a  state  of  vassalage." 

When  we  go  behind  the  real  motives  which  has 
apparently  prompted  the  Japanese  Government,  not 
only  in  presenting  the  Twenty-one  Demands  on 
China,  but  also  in  many  other  attempts  at  the  domi- 
nation of  China,  we  can  readily  see  that  the  motives 
are  not  merely  political,  but  also  economic  in  nature. 
In  other  words,  the  Japanese  Government  has  been 
actuated  as  much  by  political  considerations  as  by 
economic  motives,  seeking,  under  the  influence  of 
the  iron  hand  of  military  men  at  home,  political 
fruits  in  China,  and  trying  at  the  same  time  to  ap- 
pease their  hankerings  by  material- benefits,  the  value 
of  which  can  be  instantly  realised,  even  by  men  who 
think  only  in  the  terms  of  empire-building,  conquest, 
and  expansion.  "The  realisation  that  she  was  fast 
/  approaching  the  limit  of  her  resources,  the  knowl- 
edge that  her  rapidly  growing  population  was  ever 
pressing  on  the  margin  of  her  surplus  resources, 
the  consciousness  that  the  heavy  burden  of  taxation 
on  her  people  could  be  lifted  only  by  the  increase  of 
her  wealth  elsewhere,  and  the  necessity  of  seeking 
new  fields  in  which  the  great  energy  of  her  people 
could  have  an  outlet  along  agricultural  and  economic 
lines,  all  combined  to  direct  her  policy  to  the  conti- 
nent.   And  the  continent  meant  China." 

And  because  of  the  immense  amount  of  natural  re- 
sources at  her  disposal,  China  or  the  domination  of 
China,  economically  and  politically,  becomes  the  na- 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  97 

tional  goal  of  sixty  millions  of  tax-burdened  Japa- 
nese. In  China  and  her  great  wealth,  Japan  has  seen 
the  opportunity  of  correcting  by  a  forced  agreement 
what  geography  and  nature  have  denied  her.  Japan 
has  done  that  in  Korea,  and  she  has  attempted  to 
repeat  it  in  China.  Whether  or  not  Japan  can  suc- 
ceed in  China  as  she  has  succeeded  in  Korea  is  an- 
other question.  But  this  domination  of  the  Chi-' 
nese  natural  resources  is  Japan's  paramount  object. 
As  we  have  already  referred  to  in  the  above,  both 
Baron  Makino  and  Viscount  Uchida  gave  it  as  their 
conviction  that  Japan's  economic  existence  would 
depend  largely  upon  the  rich  resources  of  China. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  more  reasonable  view  will 
be  this,  that  Japan  can  purchase,  and  very  easily  too, 
all  she  needs  from  China.  Being  the  richer  of  the 
two,  China  can  be  the  seller,  and  Japan,  being  the 
poorer,  ought  to  be  the  buyer.  This  arrangement 
seems  to  be  of  business  nature,  and  promises  to  be 
of  mutual  benefit.  But  for  Japan  to  force  conces- 
sions from  the  Chinese  Government  with  a  view  to 
controlling  and  monopolising  them,  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  others,  and  in  a  way  that  is  obviously 
beneficial  to  Japan  but  detrimental  to  China,  is  too 
much  like  the  proverbial  knight  in  the  Chinese  legend 
who  despoils  the  rich  only  to  help  himself. 

Now  to  return  once  more  to  the  Twenty-one  De- 
mands. Realising  as  we  have  realised  the  serious 
import  of  this  formidable  set  of  demands,  and  the 
multiple  complications  which  were  bound  to  arise 


98        THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

from  the  acceptance  of  them  by  China,  we  are  really 
at  a  loss  to  understand  how  the  Chinese  Government 
could  bring  itself  in  1915  to  negotiate  them  with  the 
Japanese  Minister.  A  great  majority  of  them,  if  \ 
not  all,  were  of  such  a  preposterous  nature  that  no 
nation,  which  is  in  a  position  to  defend  its  own  in- 
terests and  rights,  could  entertain  even  for  a  single 
moment.  China  was,  of  course,  not  in  a  position 
then,  and  is  not  now,  to  defend  her  own  rights  and 
interests.  But  this  is  not  a  strong  excuse  for  her 
yielding  to  force  majeure.  Our  wonder,  therefore, 
is  not  that  Japan  had  made  such  demands,  for, 
driven  somewhat  by  the  economic  necessities  con- 
fronting her  and  animated  by  the  desire  for  further- 
ing her  imperialistic  ambitions  born  in  three  vic- 
torious wars  (first  against  China,  second  against 
Russia  and  third  against  Germany),  Japan  would 
make  such  demands  later  if  she  had  not  made  them 
then.  Our  wonder  is  that  the  Chinese  Government, 
anxious  for  its  own  interests  and  jealous  of  its  own 
rights,  could  be  coerced  to  consider  and  negotiate 
such  demands  which  were  not  proper  subjects  for 
international  negotiations  at  all.  If  the  alternative 
to  refusal  to  negotiate  or  to  accept  was  war,  then  in 
that  case  China  would  go  into  the  war  not  without 
a  cause.  China's  defeat  would  be  predetermined; 
but  it  is  questionable  whether  she  could  be  called 
upon  to  accede  to  the  terms  of  peace  more  onerous 
than  the  Twenty-one  Demands. 

The  acceptance  by  the  Chinese  Government  of  the 


JAPAN  VERSUS  CHINA  99 

ultimatum  and  the  subsequent  conclusion  of  the  so- 
called  Chino-Japanese  treaties  of  1915  embodying 
the  majority  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands  seemed  to 
have  brought  to  an  end  the  most  unsavory  chapter  of 
the  history  of  diplomatic  relations  between  Japan 
and  China.  The  whole  transaction,  in  view  of  its 
serious  results  most  fruitful  of  difficulties  upon  the 
international  relations  in  the  Far  East  in  the  future, 
cannot  be  properly  regarded,  however,  as  a  closed 
business.  It  is  questionable  that  China's  compliance 
with  the  Japanese  ultimatum  served  upon  her  under 
the  threat  of  war,  and  her  subsequent  signature  to 
the  treaties  and  notes  of  May  25,  1915,  can  be  re- 
garded as  an  estoppel  which  prevents  her  from  re- 
opening the  question.  The  very  fact  that  the 
Japanese  Government  has  repeatedly  attempted  to 
persuade  the  Chinese  Government  to  negotiate  on 
the  Shantung  question,  which  is  presumed  to  have 
been  disposed  of  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
the  treaties  and  notes  of  1915  is  a  clear  indication 
that  even  Japan  herself  cannot  refuse  to  recognise 
them  in  the  nature  of  an  unclosed  business.  Admit- 
tedly, the  whole  question  apropos  of  the  Twenty- 
one  Demands  requires  judicial  reconsideration,  not 
only  in  the  interest  of  future  cordial  relations  be- 
tween Japan  and  China,  but  also  in  view  of  the 
rights  and  privileges  of  the  other  treaty  Powers  in 
China  which  have  been  vitally  affected  by  the  de- 
mands. China  brought  up  the  question  at  the  Peace 
Conference  at  Versailles,  but  it  was  disposed  of  as 


100      THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

most  questions  at  the  Conference  were  disposed  of 
according  to  preconceived  and  prearranged  ways 
and  understandings.  It  has  since  been  the  avowed 
intention  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  submit  the 
question  to  the  League  of  Nations,  although  there 
has  been  no  official  statement  on  the  subject.  The 
meeting  in  Washington  of  nine  Powers  to  consider 
questions  relating  to  armament  and  to  the  Pacific 
and  the  Far  East  may  furnish  an  excellent  occasion 
for  a  judicial  revision  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands. 
In  another  book,  "The  Chino- Japanese  Treaties  of 
May  25,  1915,"  are  given  the  reasons  for  which  the 
said  treaties  should  be  made  null  and  void.  Speak- 
ing metaphorically,  the  Twenty-one  Demands  were 
the  flowers,  while  the  Chino-Japanese  treaties  of 
1915  were  the  fruits.  Like  the  "forbidden  apple" 
of  Eden,  the  fruits  of  the  year  1915  cannot  be  en- 
joyed by  Japan  without  seriously  menacing  the 
peace  and  tranquillity  of  the  political  firmament  of 
the  Far  East. 


SUPPLEMENTARY  NOTES 

IN  considering  the  Twenty-one  Demands,  we  must 
not  lose  sight  of  two  most  interesting  and  sig- 
nificant incidents  of  Japan's  internal  politics: 
one  was  the  resolution  introduced  by  Mr.  Kei 
Hara,  formerly  leader  of  the  Opposition  Party,  and 
Premier  of  Japan,  and  the  other  was  the  resigna- 
tion from  the  Chuseikai  by  Mr.  Kiroku  Hayashi, 
professor  of  International  Politics  in  Keio  Univer- 
sity and  M.  P.  for  Kugawa  Prefecture.  Both  were 
events  of  significance  from  the  point  of  view  of 
Japan's  internal  politics,  and  both  arose  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Twenty-one  Demands. 

NOTE  I 

A  vote  of  want  of  confidence  was  introduced  in 
the  Japanese  House  of  Representatives  June  2,  1915, 
against  Baron  Kato,  then  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, in  connection  with  the  negotiations  with  China 
on  the  Twenty-one  Demands.  It  was  introduced  by 
Mr.  Kei  Hara,  president  of  the  Seiyukai;  Mr.  Ki 
Inukai,  leader  of  the  Kokuminto;  Mr.  Hajime  Ma- 
toda,  Mr.  Kunisuke  Okazaki,  Mr.  Takejiro  Toko- 
nami,  Mr.  Tsuneyemon  Murano,  Mr.  Heikiehi  Ogu- 
wai  of  the  Seiyukai;  Mr.  Naochiko  Seki,  of  the 
Kikuminto,  and  Mr.  Kinya  Sakomoto,  of  the  Inde- 

101 


102'    ':  ''SUPPLEMENTARY  NOTES 

pendents.    It  took  the  form  of  a  resolution  and  ran 
as  follows: 

"The  negotiations  conducted  by  the  present  cabinet 
with  China  were  always  conducted  wrongly,  injured 
the  friendly  relations  between  the  two  countries, 
brought  the  Powers'  suspicion  upon  us,  and  only 
served  to  disgrace  the  honour  of  the  Empire.  The 
undersigned  recognise  that  the  negotiations  not  only 
failed  to  insure  the  foundation  of  peace  in  the  Far 
East,  but  they  have  even  left  causes  of  future  trouble. 
The  cabinet  Ministers  in  charge  should  bear  the  re- 
sponsibility for  the  negotiations  and  resign." 

The  resolution  was  brought  up  at  the  regular  sit- 
ting of  the  House,  June  3,  and  was  upheld  by  the 
combined  forces  of  the  Seiyukai,  Kokuminto  and 
some  of  the  Pure  Independents,  against  the  three 
Government  parties,  the  Rikken  Doshikai,  and  the 
Independents. 

NOTE  II 

Mr.  Kiroku  Hayashi,  professor  of  International 
Politics  in  Keio  University  and  M.  P.,  for  Kugawa 
Prefecture,  left  the  Chuseikai  for  the  reasons  made 
public  in  an  interview  with  a  representative  of  the 
Japan  Advertiser.     Mr.  Hayashi  explained: 

"My  relations  with  the  party  were  somewhat 
strained  before  the  break  as  a  result  of  the  'two  divi- 
sion* question.     I  hesitated  to  leave  the  party  sooner 


SUPPLEMENTARY  NOTES  103 

on  account  of  my  personal  connections  with  Mr. 
Ozaki,  the  Minister  of  Justice,  but  upon  the  late  de- 
mands on  China,  I  deem  it  most  important,  not  be- 
cause I  am  a  lecturer  at  the  Keio  University  but  I 
owe  it  as  a  duty  to  the  nation  as  one  of  its  citizens. 
No  sacrifices  to  the  party  ideals  can  be  made  and 
since  I  cannot  refrain  from  setting  forth  my  views 
my  only  course  was  to  hand  in  my  resignation." 

] 
Asked  as  to  his  views  upon  the  demands,  Pro- 
fessor Hayashi  replied: 

"We  all  know  that  the  most  important  part  of  the 
demands  were  the  'fifth'  i.e.,  the  so-called  'desires.' 
All  questions  in  the  Diet  have  been,  Why  was  not  the 
fifth  group  included  when  the  ultimatum  was  sent? 
I  do  not  agree  with  the  questioners  or  with  Baron 
Kato.  I  want  to  ask,  Why  was  such  abominable  de- 
mands in  the  first  place  framed  by  the  Cabinet?  Any 
commonsense  man  can  see  that  China  will  never 
agree  to  such;  it  is  absolutely  an  insult  to  our  neigh- 
bour's sovereignty,  and  China's  only  course  was  to 
refuse,  in  order  to  'save  face.'  Those  desires  if  ac- 
cepted were,  in  other  words,  that  China  should  con- 
sent to  be  a  protectorate  of  Japan.  To  say  we  tried 
to  bind  the  two  nations  closer  is  as  absurd  as  to  say 
the  moon  is  green. 

"Another  question  I  wish  to  set  forth  is,  Why  was 
not  the  fifth  group  made  known  to  the  Power  when 
the  others  were  being  made?  If  the  Minister  thought 
that  China  would  keep  such  a  delicate  question  secret, 
he  must  be  considered  as  raw  in  the  art  of  diplomacy. 


104  SUPPLEMENTARY  NOTES 

Keeping  it  a  secret  was  only  to  be  found  out  and 
to  be  embarrassed.  If  such  were  the  desires  of  the 
Cabinet  and  if  they  were  to  open  up  China,  they 
ought  to  have  done  it  with  a  firm  determination  to 
have  her  consent  by  all  means  if  Japan  were  to  up- 
hold her  name  and  respect. 

"Such  is  my  view  of  the  demands ;  to  have  thought 
that  China  was  to  negotiate  secretly  is  a  grave  error; 
it  is  like  stealing  a  pair  of  bells  with  one's  ears  shut. 
As  to  the  other  demands  there  need  be  no  question 
since  those  are  natural  consequences  and  everybody 
foresaw  them.  Those  demands  do  not  infringe  the 
integrity  of  China  nor  the  'open  door'  policy." 

The  interviewer  further  questioned  him  as  to 
his  opinion  of  the  retrocession  of  Tsingtau. 

"Upon  this  case,  I  believe  it  only  reasonable  to  have 
it  returned  to  China  upon  certain  conditions." 


APPENDIX  A 

INSTRUCTIONS  HANDED  AT  TOKYO  ON  DECEMBER  3,  1914, 
BY  BARON  KATO,  MINISTER  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS,  TO 
MR.  HIOKI,  JAPANESE  MINISTER  IN  PEKING,  IN 
CONNECTION  WITH  THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS  AND 
OFFICIALLY  PUBLISHED  AT  TOKYO,   JUNE  9,    1915 

In  order  to  provide  for  the  readjustment  of  affairs 
consequent  on  the  Japan-German  War  and  for  the 
purpose  of  ensuring  a  lasting  peace  in  the  Far  East 
by  strengthening  the  position  of  the  Empire,  the 
Imperial  Government  have  resolved  to  approach  the 
Chinese  Government  with  a  view  to  conclude  treaties 
and  agreements  mainly  along  the  lines  laid  down 
in  the  first  four  Groups  of  the  appended  proposals 
(the  Twenty-one  Demands).  Of  these,  the  first 
Group  relates  to  the  settlement  of  the  Shantung  ques- 
tion, while  the  second  Group  has  for  its  chief  aim 
the  defining  of  Japan's  position  in  South  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  that  is  to  say,  securing 
at  this  time  from  the  Chinese  Government  full  recog- 
nition of  Japan's  natural  position  in  these  regions 
absence  of  which  has  hitherto  been  the  cause  of  vari- 
ous questions  tending  to  estrange  the  feelings  of  the 
two  peoples  towards  each  other.  The  object  of  the 
third  Group  is  to  safeguard  the  best  interest  of  the 
Han-Yeh-Ping  Company,  with  which  Japanese  capi- 
talists are  closely  identified.  It  will  thus  be  seen  that 
there  is  nothing  especially  new  in  our  proposals  em- 

105 


106  APPENDICES 

bodied  in  the  foregoing  three  Groups,  while  as  regards 
the  fourth  Group,  it  is  only  intended  to  emphasise  the 
principle  of  China's  territorial  integrity,  which  has 
been  so  often  declared  by  the  Imperial  Government. 

Believing  it  absolutely  essential,  for  strengthening 
Japan's  position  in  Eastern  Asia  as  well  as  for  pres- 
ervation of  the  general  interests  of  that  region,  to 
secure  China's  adherence  to  the  foregoing  proposals, 
the  Imperial  Government  are  determined  to  attain 
this  end  by  all  means  within  their  power.  You  «*t, 
therefore,  requested  to  use  your  best  endeavour  in 
the  conduct  of  the  negotiations,  which  are  hereby 
placed  in  your  hands. 

As  regards  the  proposals  contained  in  the  fifth 
Group,  they  are  presented  as  the  wishes  of  the  Im- 
perial Government.  The  matters  which  are  dealt  with 
under  this  category  are  entirely  different  in  character 
from  those  which  are  included  in  the  first  four 
Groups.  An  adjustment,  at  this  time,  of  these  mat- 
ters some  of  which  have  been  pending  between  the 
two  countries,  being  nevertheless  highly  desirable  for 
the  advancement  of  the  friendly  relations  between 
Japan  and  China  as  well  as  for  safeguarding  their 
common  interests,  you  are  also  requested  to  exercise 
your  best  efforts  to  have  our  wishes  carried  out. 

It  is  very  likely  that  in  the  course  of  these  negotia- 
tions the  Chinese  Government  desire  to  find  out  the 
attitude  of  the  Imperial  Government  on  the  question 
of  the  disposition  of  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow 
Bay.  If  the  Chinese  Government  will  accept  our  pro- 
posals as  above-stated,  the  Imperial  Government  may, 
with  due  regard  to  the  principle  of  China's  territorial 


APPENDICES  107 

integrity  and  in  the  interest  of  the  friendship  of  the 
two  countries,  consider  the  question  with  a  view  to 
restoring  the  said  territory  to  China,  in  the  event  of 
Japan's  being  given  free  hand  in  the  disposition 
thereof  as  the  result  of  the  coming  peace  conference 
between  Japan  and  Germany.  As,  however,  it  will  be 
absolutely  necessary,  in  restoring  the  said  territory  to 
China,  to  lay  certain  conditions  such  as  the  opening 
of  the  territory  for  foreign  trade,  establishment  of  a 
Japanese  settlement,  etc.,  you  will  ask  for  further  in- 
structions when  you  propose  to  declare  to  the  Chinese 
Government  the  willingness  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment to  consider  the  question. 


APPENDIX  B 

JAPAN'S  ORIGINAL  DEMANDS 

Translations  of  Documents  Handed  to  His  Excel- 
lency the  President,  Yuan-Shih-Kai}  by  His  Excel- 
lency Mr.  Hioki,  the  Japanese  Minister,  on  January 
18,  1915. 


The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment being  desirous  of  maintaining  the  general 
peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and  further  strengthening  the 
friendly  relations  and  good  neighbourhood  existing 
between  the  two  nations  agree  to  the  following 
articles : 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  to 
give  full  assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japa- 
nese Government  may  hereafter  agree  with  the  Ger- 
man Government  relating  to  the  disposition  of  all 
rights,  interests  and  concessions,  which  Germany,  by 
virtue  of  treaties  or  otherwise,  possesses  in  relation 
to  the  Province  of  Shantung. 

Article  2.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  that 
within  the  Province  of  Shantung  and  along  its  coast 
no  territory  or  island  will  be  ceded  or  leased  to  a  third 
Power  under  any  pretext. 

Article  3.  The  Chinese  Government  consents  to 
Japan's  building  a  railway  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow 
to  join  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  Railway. 

108 


APPENDICES  109 

Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  engages,  in  the 
interest  of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners, 
to  open  by  herself  as  soon  as  possible  certain  impor- 
tant cities  and  towns  in  the  Province  of  Shantung  as 
Commercial  Ports.  What  places  shall  be  opened  are 
to  be  jointly  decided  upon  in  a  separate  agreement. 


The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, since  the  Chinese  Government  has  always  ac- 
knowledged the  special  position  enjoyed  by  Japan  in 
South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  agree 
to  the  following  articles: 

Article  1.  The  two  Contracting  Parties  mutually 
agree  that  the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny  and  the  term  of  lease  of  the  South  Manchurian 
Railway  and  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway  shall  be 
extended  to  the  period  of  99  years. 

Article  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  shall  have  the  right  to 
lease  or  own  land  required  either  for  erecting  suitable 
buildings  for  trade  and  manufacture  or  for  farming. 

Article  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside 
and  travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia  and  to  engage  in  business  and  in  manufac- 
ture of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  grant 
to  Japanese  subjects  the  right  of  opening  the  mines 
in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia. 
As  regards  what  mines  are  to  be  opened,  they  shall 
be  decided  upon  jointly. 

Article  5.    The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  in 


110  APPENDICES 

respect  of  the  (two)  cases  mentioned  herein  below 
the  Japanese  Government's  consent  shall  be  first  ob- 
tained before  action  is  taken: 

(a)  Whenever  permission  is  granted  to  the  subject 
of  a  third  Power  to  build  a  railway  or  to  make  a  loan 
with  a  third  Power  for  the  purpose  of  building  a  rail- 
way in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia. 

(b)  Whenever  a  loan  is  to  be  made  with  a  third 
Power  pledging  the  local  taxes  of  South  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  as  security. 

Article  6.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  if 
the  Chinese  Government  employs  political,  financial 
or  military  advisers  or  instructors  in  South  Man- 
churia or  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment shall  first  be  consulted. 

Article  7.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  the 
control  and  management  of  the  Kirin- Changchun 
Railway  shall  be  handed  over  to  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment for  a  term  of  99  years  dating  from  the  sign- 
ing of  this  Agreement. 

in 

The  Japanese  Goyernment  and  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, seeing  that  Japanese  financiers  and  the  Hanyeh- 
ping  Company,  have  close  relations  with  each  other  at 
present  and. desiring  that  the  common  interests  of  the 
two  nations  shall  be  advanced,  agree  to  the  following 
articles : 

Article  1.  The  two  Contracting  Parties  mutually 
agree  that  when  the  opportune  moment  arrives  the 
Hanyehping  Company  shall  be  made  a  joint  concern 
of  the  two  nations  and  they  further  agree  that  with- 


APPENDICES  111 

out  the  previous  consent  of  Japan,  China  shall  not  by 
her  own  act  dispose  of  the  rights  and  property  of 
whatsoever  nature  of  the  said  Company  nor  cause  the 
said  Company  to  dispose  freely  of  the  same. 

Article  2.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  all 
mines  in  the  neighbourhood  of  those  owned  by  the 
Hanyehping  Company  shall  not  be  permitted,  without 
the  consent  of  the  said  Company,  to  be  worked  by 
other  persons  outside  of  the  said  Company;  and  fur- 
ther agrees  that  if  it  is  desired  to  carry  out  any  un- 
dertaking which,  it  is  apprehended,  may  directly  or 
indirectly  affect  the  interests  of  the  said  Company,  the 
consent  of  the  said  Company  shall  first  be  obtained. 

rv 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment with  the  object  of  effectively  preserving  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  China  agree  to  the  following  spe- 
cial article: 

The  Chinese  Government  engages  not  to  cede  or 
lease  to  a  third  Power  any  harbour  or  bay  or  island 
along  the  coast  of  China. 


Article  1.  The  Chinese  Central  Government  shall 
employ  influential  Japanese  as  advisers  in  political, 
financial  and  military  affairs. 

Article  2.  Japanese  hospitals,  churches  and  schools 
in  the  interior  of  China  shall  be  granted  the  right  of 
owning  land. 

Article  3.  Inasmuch  as  the  Japanese  Government 
and  the  Chinese  Government  have  had  many  cases  of 


112  APPENDICES 

dispute  between  Japanese  and  Chinese  police  to  settle 
cases  which  caused  no  little  misunderstanding,  it  is  for 
this  reason  necessary  that  the  police  departments  of 
important  places  (in  China)  shall  be  jointly  admin- 
istered by  Japanese  and  Chinese  or  that  the  police  de- 
partments of  these  places  shall  employ  numerous  Japa- 
nese, so  that  they  may  at  the  same  time  help  to  plan 
for  the  improvement  of  the  Chinese  Police  Service. 

Article  4.  China  shall  purchase  from  Japan  a  fixed 
amount  of  munitions  of  war  (say  50  per  cent  or 
more)  or  what  is  needed  by  the  Chinese  Government 
or  that  there  shall  be  established  in  China  a  Sino- 
Japanese  jointly  worked  arsenal.  Japanese  technical 
experts  are  to  be  employed  and  Japanese  material  to 
be  purchased. 

Article  5.  China  agrees  to  grant  to  Japan  the  right 
of  constructing  a  railway  connecting  Wuchang  with 
Kiukiang  and  Nanchang,  another  line  between  Nan- 
chang  and  Hangchow,  and  another  between  Nanchang 
and  Chaochou. 

Article  6.  If  China  needs  foreign  capital  to  work 
mines,  build  railways  and  construct  harbour-works 
(including  dock-yards)  in  the  Province  of  Fukien, 
Japan  shall  be  first  consulted. 

Article  7 .  China  agrees  that  Japanese  subjects  shall 
have  the  right  of  missionary  propaganda  *  in  China. 

*  Refers  to  preaching  Buddhism. 


APPENDIX  C 

THE  INCORRECT  VERSION  OF  JAPAN'S  DEMANDS  AS  COM- 
MUNICATED BY  THE  JAPANESE  GOVERNMENT  TO  THE 
OTHER    POWERS    IN    RESPONSE    TO   THEIR    INQUIRIES 

I.  In  relation  to  the  Province  of  Shantung: 

1.  Engagement  on  the  part  of  China  to  con- 
sent to  all  matters  that  may  be  agreed  upon 
between  Japan  and  Germany  with  regard 
to  the  disposition  of  all  rights,  interests  and 
concessions,  which  in  virtue  of  treaties  or 
otherwise  Germany  possesses  in  relation  to 
the  Province  of  Shantung. 

2.  Engagement  not  to  alienate  or  lease  upon 
any  pretext  the  Province  of  Shantung  or 
any  portion  thereof  and  any  island  lying 
near  the  coast  of  the  said  province. 

3.  Grant  to  Japan  the  right  of  construction  of 
a  railway  connecting  Chif  u  or  Lungkow  and 
the  Tsinan-Kiaochow  railway. 

4.  Addition  of  open  marts  in  the  Province  of 
Shantung. 

II.  In  relation  to  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia. 

1.  Extension  of  the  terms  of  the  lease  of 
Kwangtung,  the  South  Manchuria  Railway, 
and  the  •  Antung-Mukden  Railway. 

2.  (A)  Acquisition  by  the  Japanese  of  the 
right  of  residence  and  ownership  of  land. 

113 


114  APPENDICES 

(B)  Grant  to  Japan  of  the  mining  rights  of 
mines  specified  by  Japan. 

3.  Obligation  on  the  part  of  China  to  obtain  in 
advance  the  consent  of  Japan  if  she  grants 
railway  concessions  to  any  third  Power,  or 
procures  the  supply  of  capital  from  any 
Power  for  railway  construction  or  a  loan 
from  any  other  Power  on  the  security  of 
any  duties  or  taxes. 

4.  Obligation  on  the  part  of  China  to  consult 
Japan  before  employing  advisers  or  tutors 
regarding  political,  financial  or  military 
matters. 

5.  Transfer  of  the  management  and  control  of 
the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  to  Japan. 

III.  Agreement  in  principle  that,  at  an  opportune 
moment  in  the  future,  the  Hanyehping  Com- 
pany should  be  placed  under  Japanese  and 
Chinese  co-operation. 

IV.  Engagement  in  accordance  with  the  principle 
of  the  maintenance  of  the  territorial  integrity 
of  China,  not  to  alienate  or  lease  any  ports  and 
bays  on,  or  any  island  near,  the  coast  of  China. 


APPENDIX  D 

japan's  revised  demands 

Japan's  Revised  Demands  on  China,  twenty-four  in 
all,  presented  April  26,  1915. 

GROUP  I 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, being  desirous  of  maintaining  the  general  peace 
in  Eastern  Asia  and  further  strengthening  the  friendly 
relations  and  good  neighbourhood  existing  between  the 
two  nations,  agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  to  give 
full  assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese 
Government  may  hereafter  agree  with  the  German 
Government,  relating  to  the  disposition  of  all  rights, 
interests  and  concessions,  which  Germany,  by  virtue 
of  treaties  or  otherwise,  possesses  in  relation  to  the 
Province  of  Shantung. 

Article  2.     (Changed  into  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  within  the 
Province  of  Shantung  and  along  its  coast  no  territory 
or  island  will  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any  Power  under 
any  pretext. 

Article  3.  The  Chinese  Government  consents  that 
as  regards  the  railway  to  be  built  by  China  herself 
from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow  to  connect  with  the 
Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  Railway,  if  Germany  is  willing 
to   abandon  the  privilege   of   financing  the   Chefoo- 

115 


116  APPENDICES 

Weihsien  line,  China  will  approach  Japanese  capital- 
ists to  negotiate  for  a  loan. 

Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  engages,  in  the 
interest  of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners, 
to  open  by  China  herself  as  soon  as  possible  certain 
suitable  places  in  the  Province  of  Shantung  as  Com- 
mercial Ports. 

(Supplementary  Exchange  of  Notes.) 

The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to  be 
chosen,  and  the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted,  by  the 
Chinese  Government,  but  the  Japanese  Minister  must 
be  consulted  before  making  a  decision. 

GROUP  II 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, with  a  view  to  developing  their  economic  rela- 
tions in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia, agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  1.  The  two  contracting  Powers  mutually 
agree  that  the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny 
and  the  terms  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  and 
the  Antung-Mukden  Railway,  shall  be  extended  to 
99  years. 

(Supplementary  Exchange  of  Notes.) 

The  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  shall 
expire  in  the  86th  year  of  the  Republic  or  1997.  The 
date  for  restoring  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  to 
China  shall  fall  due  in  the  91st  year  of  the  Republic 
or  2002.  Article  12  in  the  original  South  Manchurian 
Railway  Agreement  that  it  may  be  redeemed  by  China 
after  36  years  after  the  traffic  is  opened  is  hereby 
cancelled.    The  term  of  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway 


APPENDICES  117 

shall  expire  in  the  96th  year  of  the  Republic  or  2007. 

Article  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria 
may  lease  or  purchase  the  necessary  land  for  erecting 
suitable  buildings  for  trade  and  manufacture  or  for 
prosecuting  agricultural  enterprises. 

Article  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside 
and  travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in  busi- 
ness and  manufacture  of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Article  3a.  The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to  in 
the  preceding  two  articles,  besides  being  required  to 
register  with  the  local  authorities  pass-ports  which 
they  must  procure  under  the  existing  regulations,  shall 
also  submit  to  police  laws  and  ordinances  and  tax 
regulations,  which  are  approved  by  the  Japanese 
consul.  Civil  and  criminal  cases  in  which  the  defend- 
ants are  Japanese  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by 
the  Japanese  consul;  those  in  which  the  defendants 
are  Chinese  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  Chinese 
Authorities.  In  either  case  an  officer  can  be  deputed 
to  the  court  to  attend  the  proceedings.  But  mixed 
civil  cases  between  Chinese  and  Japanese  relating  to 
land  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  delegates  of 
both  nations  conjointly  in  accordance  with  Chinese 
law  and  local  usage.  When  the  judicial  system  in 
the  said  region  is  completely  reformed,  all  civil  and 
criminal  cases  concerning  Japanese  subjects  shall  be 
tried  entirely  by  Chinese  law  courts. 

Article  4.    (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  Japanese  sub- 
jects shall  be  permitted  forthwith  to  investigate,  se- 
lect, and  then  prospect  for  and  open  mines  at  the  fol- 
lowing places  in  South  Manchuria,  apart  from  those 


118  APPENDICES 

mining  areas  in  which  mines  are  being  prospected  foi 
or  worked;  until  the  Mining  Ordinance  is  definitely 
settled  methods  at  present  in  force  shall  be  followed. 


PROVINCE  OF  FENG-TIEN 

Locality                      District 

Mineral 

Niu  Hsin  T'ai 

Pen-hsi 

Coal 

Tien  Shih  Fu  Kou 

Pen-hsi 

u 

Sha  Sung  Kang 

Hai-lung 

M 

T'ieh  Ch'ang 

T'ung-hua 

a 

Nuan  Ti  Tang 

Chin 

tt 

An  Shan  Chan  region 

From  Liao-yang 

to  Pen-hsi 

Iron 

PROVINCE    OF    KIRIN 

(Southern  portion) 

Sha  Sung  Kang 

Ho-lung 

C.&I. 

Kang  Yao 

Chi-lin  (Kirin) 

Coal 

Chia  P'i  Kou 

Hua-tien 

Gold 

Article  5.  (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 
The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  China  will 
hereafter  provide  funds  for  building  railways  in 
South  Manchuria;  if  foreign  capital  is  required,  the 
Chinese  Government  agrees  to  negotiate  for  the  loan 
with  Japanese  capitalists  first. 

Article  5a.  (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 
The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  hereafter, 
when  a  foreign  loan  is  to  be  made  on  the  security  of 
the  taxes  of  South  Manchuria  (not  including  customs 
and  salt  revenue  on  the  security  of  which  loans  have 
already  been  made  by  the  Central  Government),  it 


APPENDICES  119 

will  negotiate  for  the  loan  with  Japanese  capitalists 
first. 

Article  6.     (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  hereafter  if 
foreign  advisers  or  instructors  on  political,  financial, 
military  or  police  matters,  are  to  be  employed  in  South 
Manchuria,  Japanese  will  be  employed  first. 

Article  7 .  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  speedily 
to  make  a  fundamental  revision  of  the  Kirin-Chang- 
chun  Railway  Loan  Agreement,  taking  as  a  standard 
the  provisions  in  railway  loan  agreements  made  here- 
tofore between  China  and  foreign  financiers.  If,  in 
future,  more  advantageous  terms  than  those  in  exist- 
ing railway  loan  agreements  are  granted  to  foreign 
financiers,  in  connection  with  railway  loans,  the  above 
agreement  shall  again  be  revised  in  accordance  with 
Japan's  wishes. 

All  existing  treaties  between  China  and  Japan  re- 
lating to  Manchuria  shall,  except  where  otherwise  pro- 
vided for  by  this  Convention,  remain  in  force. 

1.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  hereafter 
when  a  foreign  loan  is  to  be  made  on  the  security  of 
the  taxes  of  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  China  must  ne- 
gotiate with  the  Japanese  Government  first. 

2.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  China  will 
herself  provide  funds  for  building  the  railways  in 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia ;  if  foreign  capital  is  required, 
she  must  negotiate  with  Japanese  Government  first. 

3.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees,  in  the  interest 
of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open 
by  China  herself,  as  soon  as  possible,  certain  suitable 
places    in    Eastern    Inner    Mongolia   as    Commercial 


120  APPENDICES 

Ports.  The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to 
be  chosen,  and  the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted,  by 
the  Chinese  Government,  but  the  Japanese  Minister 
must  be  consulted  before  making  a  decision. 

4.  In  the  event  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  desiring 
jointly  to  undertake  agricultural  enterprises  and  indus- 
tries incidental  thereto,  the  Chinese  Government  shall 
give  its  permission. 

GROUP   III 

The  relations  between  Japan  and  the  Hanyehping 
Company  being  very  intimate,  if  those  interested  in 
the  said  Company  come  to  an  agreement  with  the 
Japanese  capitalists  for  co-operation,  the  Chinese 
Government  shall  forthwith  give  its  consent  thereto. 
The  Chinese  Government  further  agrees  that,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  Japanese  capitalists  China  will 
not  convert  the  Company  into  a  state  enterprise,  nor 
confiscate  it,  nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign 
capital  other  than  Japanese. 

GROUP  IV 

China  to  give  a  pronouncement  by  herself  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  following  principle : 

No  bay,  harbour,  or  island  along  the  coast  of  China 
may  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any  Power. 

NOTES  TO  BE  EXCHANGED 


As  regards  the  right  of  financing  a  railway  from 
Wuchang   to    connect   with   the   Kiukiang-Nanchang 


APPENDICES  121 

line,  the  Nanchang-Hangchow  railway,  and  the  Nan- 
chang-Chaochow  railway,  if  it  is  clearly  ascertained 
that  other  Powers  have  no  objection,  China  shall  grant 
the  said  right  to  Japan. 


As  regards  the  right  of  financing  a  railway  from 
Wuchang  to  connect  with  the  Kiukiang-Nanchang 
railway,  a  railway  from  Nanchang  to  Hangchow  and 
another  from  Nanchang  to  Chaochow,  the  Chinese 
Government  shall  not  grant  the  said  right,  to  any 
foreign  Power  before  Japan  comes  to  an  understand- 
ing with  the  other  Power  which  is  heretofore  inter- 
ested therein. 

NOTES  TO  BE  EXCHANGED 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  no  nation 
whatever  is  to  be  permitted  to  construct,  on  the  coast 
of  Fukien  Province,  a  dock-yard,  a  coaling  station  for 
military  use,  or  a  naval  base;  not  to  be  authorised  to 
set  up  any  other  military  establishment.  The  Chinese 
Chinese  Government  further  agrees  not  to  use  foreign 
capital  for  setting  up  the  above  mentioned  construc- 
tion or  establishment. 

Mr.  Lu,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  affairs,  stated  as 
follows : 

1.  The  Chinese  Government  shall,  whenever,  in  fu- 
ture, it  considers  this  step  necessary,  engage  numerous 
Japanese  advisers. 

2.  Whenever,  in  future,  Japanese  subjects  desire 
to  lease  or  purchase  land  in  the  interior  of  China  for 
establishing  schools   or  hospitals,   the  Chinese  Gov- 


122  APPENDICES 

ernment    shall    forthwith    give    its    consent    thereto. 
3.    When  a  suitable  opportunity  arises  in  future,  the 

Chinese    Government    will    send    military    officers    to 

Japan  to  negotiate  with  Japanese  military  authorities 

the  matter  of  purchasing  arms  or  that  of  establishing 

a  joint  arsenal. 

Mr.  Hioki,  the  Japanese  Minister,  stated  as  follows : 
As  relates  to  the  question  of  the  right  of  missionary 

propaganda,  the   same  shall   be  taken  up  again   for 

negotiation  in  future. 


APPENDIX  E 

CHINA'S  REPLY  TO  REVISED  DEMANDS 

China's  Reply  of  May  1,  1915,  to  the  Japanese  Re- 
used Demands  of  April  26,  1915. 

GROUP   I 

The  Chinese  Government  and  the  Japanese  Govern- 
nent,  being  desirous  of  maintaining  the  general  peace 
n  Eastern  Asia  and  further  strengthening  the  friendly 
elations  and  good  neighbourhood  existing  between 
he  two  nations  agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Government  declare  that 
hey  will  give  full  assent  to  all  matters  upon  which 
he  Japanese  and  German  Governments  may  hereafter 
autually  agree,  relating  to  the  disposition  of  all  in- 
erests,  which  Germany,  by  virtue  of  treaties  or  re- 
orded  cases,  possesses  in  relation  to  the  Province  of 
>hantung. 

The  Japanese  Government  declare  that  when  the 
Chinese  Government  give  their  assent  to  the  disposi- 
ion  of  interests  above  referred  to,  Japan  will  restore 
he  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow  to  China;  and  fur- 
rier recognise  the  right  of  the  Chinese  Government  to 
»articipate  in  the  negotiations  referred  to  above  be- 
ween  Japan  and  Germany. 

Article  2.  The  Japanese  Government  consent  to  be 
esponsible  for  the  indemnification  of  all  losses  occa- 
ioned  by  Japan's  military  operation  around  the  leased 
erritory  of  Kiaochow.     The  customs,  telegraphs  and 

123 


124  APPENDICES 

post  offices  within  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow 
shall,  prior  to  the  restoration  of  the  said  leased  terri- 
tory to  China,  be  administered  as  heretofore  for  the 
time  being.  The  railways  and  telegraph  lines  erected 
by  Japan  for  military  purposes  are  to  be  removed 
forthwith.  The  Japanese  troops  now  stationed  out- 
side the  original  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow  are  now 
to  be  withdrawn  first,  those  within  the  original  leased 
territory  are  to  be  withdrawn  on  the  restoration  of 
the  said  leased  territory  to  China; 

Article  3.     (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declare  that  within  the 
Province  of  Shantung  and  along  its  coast  no  territory 
or  island  will  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any  Power  under 
any  pretext. 

Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  consent  that  as 
regards  the  railway  to  be  built  by  China  herself  from 
Chefoo  or  Lungkow  to  connect  with  the  Kiaochow- 
Tsinanfu  railway,  if  Germany  is  willing  to  abandon 
the  privilege  of  financing  the  Chefoo-Weihsien  line, 
China  will  approach  Japanese  capitalists  for  a  loan. 

Article  5.  The  Chinese  Government  engage,  in  the 
interest  of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners, 
to  open  by  herself  as  soon  as  possible  certain  suitable 
places  in  the  Province  of  Shantung  as  Commercial 
Ports. 

(Supplementary  Exchange  of  Notes.) 

The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to  be 
chosen,  and  the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted  by  the 
Chinese  Government,  but  the  Japanese  Minister  must 
be  consulted  before  making  a  decision. 

Article  6.  If  the  Japanese  and  German  Govern- 
ments are  not  able  to  come  to  a  definite  agreement  in 


APPENDICES  125 

iture  in  their  negotiations  respecting  transfer,  etc., 
lis  provisional  agreement  contained  in  the  foregoing 
rticles  shall  be  void. 

GROUP  II  * 

The  Chinese  Government  and  the  Japanese  Govern- 
lent,  with  a  view  to  developing  their  economic  rela- 
ons  in  South  Manchuria  agree  to  the  following 
rticles : 

Article  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria 
lay,  by  arrangement  with  the  owners,  lease  land  re- 
uired  for  erecting  suitable  buildings  for  trade  and 
lanufacture  or  agriculture  enterprises. 

Article  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside 
rid  travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in  busi- 
ess  and  manufacture  of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Article  3  a.  The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to  in 
le  preceding  two  articles,  besides  being  required  to 
sgister  with  the  local  authorities  pass-ports  which 
ley  must  procure  under  the  existing  regulations,  shall 
lso  observe  police  rules  and  regulations  and  pay  taxes 
l  the  same  manner  as  Chinese.  Civil  and  criminal 
ases  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  the  authorities 
f  the  defendant  nationality  and  an  officer  can  be 
eputed  to  attend  the  proceedings.  But  all  cases 
urely  between  Japanese  subjects  and  mixed  cases 
etween  Japanese  and  Chinese,  relating  to  land  or 
lisputes  arising  from  lease  contracts,  shall  be  tried 
nd  adjudicated  by  Chinese  Authorities  and  the  Japa- 

*  The  six  articles  which  are  found  in  Japan's  Revised  De- 
lands  of  April  26,  1915,  but  omitted  herein,  are  those  already 
litialled  by  the  Chinese  Foreign  Minister  and  the  Japanese 
linister. 


126  APPENDICES 

nese  Consul  may  also  depute  an  officer  to  attend  the 
proceedings.  When  the  judicial  system  in  the  said 
Province  is  completely  reformed,  all  the  civil  and 
criminal  cases  concerning  Japanese  subjects  shall  be 
tried  entirely  by  Chinese  law  courts. 

RELATING  TO  EASTERN  INNER   MONGOLIA 

(To  be  Exchanged  by  Notes) 

1.  The  Chinese  Government  declare  that  China  will 
not  in  future  pledge  the  taxes,  other  than  customs  and 
salt  revenue  of  that  part  of  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  South  Manchuria  and  Jehol 
Intendency,  as  security  for  raising  a  foreign  loan. 

2.  The  Chinese  Government  declare  that  China  will 
herself  provide  funds  for  building  the  railways  in  that 
part  of  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  South  Manchuria  and  the  Jehol  Intendency ;  if  for- 
eign capital  is  required,  China  will  negotiate  with 
Japanese  capitalists  first,  provided  this  does  not  conflict 
with  agreements  already  concluded  with  other  Powers. 

The  Chinese  Government  agree,  in  the  interest  of 
trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by 
China  herself  certain  suitable  places  in  that  part  of 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
South  Manchuria  and  the  Jehol  Intendency,  as  Com- 
mercial Marts. 

The  regulations  for  the  said  Commercial  Marts  will 
be  made  in  accordance  with  those  of  other  Commer- 
cial Marts  opened  by  China  herself. 

GROUP  III 

The  relations  between  Japan  and  the  Hanyehping 
Company  being  very  intimate,  if  the  said  Company 


APPENDICES  127 

comes  to  an  agreement  with  the  Japanese  capitalists 
for  co-operation,  the  Chinese  Government  shall  forth- 
with give  their  consent  thereto.  The  Chinese  Govern- 
ment further  declare  that  China  will  not  convert  the 
company  into  a  state  enterprise,  nor  confiscate  it,  nor 
cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign  capital  other  than 
Japanese. 

Letter  to  be  addressed  by  the  Japanese  Minister  to 
the  Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Excellency :  I  have  the  honour  to  state  that  a  report 
has  reached  me  that  the  Chinese  Government  have 
given  permission  to  foreign  nation  to  construct,  on 
the  coast  of  Fukien  Province,  dock  yards,  coaling  sta- 
tions for  military  use,  naval  bases  and  other  establish- 
ments for  military  purposes;  and  further,  that  the 
Chinese  Government  are  borrowing  foreign  capital  for 
putting  up  the  above-mentioned  constructions  or  estab- 
lishments. I  shall  be  much  obliged  if  the  Chinese 
Government  will  inform  me  whether  or  not  these  re- 
ports are  well  founded  in  fact. 

Reply  to  be  addressed  by  the  Chinese  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  to  the  Japanese  Minister. 

Excellency:  I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the 

receipt  of  your  Excellency's  Note  of  .     In  reply 

I  beg  to  state  that  the  Chinese  Government  have  not 
given  permission  to  foreign  Powers  to  construct,  on 
the  coast  of  Fukien  Province,  dock  yards,  coaling  sta- 
tions for  military  use,  naval'  bases  or  other  establish- 
ments for  military  purposes ;  nor  do  they  contemplate 
to  borrow  foreign  capital  for  putting  up  such  con- 
structions or  establishments. 


APPENDIX  F 

MEMORANDUM 

Read  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  Mr. 
Hioki,  the  Japanese  Minister,  at  a  Conference  held  at 
Wai  Chiao  Pu,  May  1,  1915. 

The  list  of  demands  which  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment first  presented  to  the  Chinese  Government  con- 
sists of  five  groups,  the  first  relating  to  Shantung,  the 
second  relating  to  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia,  the  third  relating  to  Hanyehping 
Company,  the  fourth  asking  for  non  alienation  of  the 
coast  of  the  country,  and  the  fifth  relating  to  the  ques- 
tions of  national  advisers,  national  police,  national 
arms,  missionary  propaganda,  Yangtse  Valley  rail- 
ways, and  Fukien  Province.  Out  of  profound  regard 
for  the  intentions  entertained  by  Japan,  the  Chinese 
Government  took  these  momentous  demands  into 
grave  and  careful  consideration  and  decided  to  nego- 
tiate with  the  Japanese  Government  frankly  and  sin- 
cerely what  were  possible  to  negotiate.  This  is  a  mani- 
festation to  Japan  of  the  most  profound  regard  which 
the  Chinese  Government  entertains  for  the  relations 
between  the  two  nations. 

Ever  since  the  opening  of  the  negotiations  China  has 
been  doing  her  best  to  hasten  their  progress,  holding 
as  many  as  three  conferences  a  week.  As  regards  the 
articles  in  the  second  group,  the  Chinese  Government, 
being  disposed  to  allow  the  Japanese  Government  to 

128 


APPENDICES  129 

develop  the  economic  relations  of  the  two  countries 
in  South  Manchuria,  realising  that  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment attaches  importance  to  its  interests  in  that 
region,  and  wishing  to  meet  the  hope  of  Japan,  made 
a  painful  effort,  without  hesitation,  to  agree  to  the 
extension  of  the  25-year  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny,  the  36-year  period  of  the  South  Manchuria 
railway  and  the  15-year  period  of  the  Antung-Mukden 
railway,  all  to  99  years ;  and  to  abandon  its  own  cher- 
ished hopes  to  regain  control  of  these  places  and 
properties  at  the  expiration  of  their  respective  original 
terms  of  lease.  It  cannot  but  be  admitted  that  this 
is  a  most  genuine  proof  of  China's  friendship  for 
Japan. 

As  to  the  right  of  opening  mines  in  South  Man- 
churia, the  Chinese  Government  has  already  agreed  to 
permit  Japanese  to  work  mines  within  the  mining  area 
designated  by  Japan.  China  has  further  agreed  to 
give  Japan  a  right  of  preference  in  the  event  of  bor- 
rowing foreign  capital  for  building  railways  or  of 
making  a  loan  on  the  security  of  the  local  taxes  in 
South  Manchuria.  The  question  of  revising  the  ar- 
rangement for  the  Kirin-Changchun  railway  has  been 
settled  in  accordance  with  the  proposal  made  by  Japan. 
The  Chinese  Government  has  further  agreed  to  em- 
ploy Japanese  first  in  the  event  of  employing  foreign 
advisers  on  political,  military,  financial  and  police 
matters. 

Furthermore,  the  provision  about  the  repurchase 
period  in  the  South  Manchurian  railway  was  not  men- 
tioned in  Japan's  original  proposal.  Subsequently, 
the  Japanese  Government  alleging  that  its  meaning 


130  APPENDICES 

was  not  clear,  asked  China  to  cancel  the  provision 
altogether.  Again,  Japan  at  first  demanded  the  right 
of  Japanese  to  carry  on  farming  in  South  Manchuria, 
but  subsequently  she  considered  the  word  "farming" 
was  not  broad  enough  and  asked  to  replace  it  with 
the  phrase  "agricultural  enterprises."  To  these  re- 
quests the  Chinese  Government,  though  well  aware 
that  the  proposed  changes  could  only  benefit  Japan, 
still  acceded  without  delay.  This,  too,  is  a  proof  of 
China's  frankness  and  sincerity  towards  Japan. 

As  regards  matters  relating  to  Shantung  the  Chi- 
nese Government  has  agreed  to  a  majority  of  the  de- 
mands. 

The  question  of  inland  residence  in  South  Man- 
churia is,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Chinese  Government, 
incompatible  with  the  treaties  China  had  entered  into 
with  Japan  and  other  Powers,  still  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment did  its  best  to  consider  how  it  was  possible 
to  avoid  that  incompatibility.  At  first,  China  sug- 
gested that  the  Chinese  Authorities  should  have  full 
rights  of  jurisdiction  over  Japanese  settlers.  Japan 
declined  to  agree  to  it.  Thereupon  China  reconsidered 
the  question  and  revised  her  counter-proposal  five  or 
six  times,  each  time  making  some  definite  concession, 
and  went  so  far  as  to  agree  that  all  civil'  and  criminal 
cases  between  Chinese  and  Japanese  should  be  ar- 
ranged according  to  existing  treaties.  Only  cases  re- 
lating to  land  or  lease  contracts  were  reserved  to  be 
adjudicated  by  Chinese  Courts,  as  a  mark  of  China's 
sovereignty  over  the  region.  This  is  another  proof 
of  China's  readiness  to  concede  as  much  as  possible. 

Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  is  not  an  enlightened  region 


APPENDICES  131 

as  yet  and  the  conditions  existing  there  are  entirely 
different  from  those  prevailing  in  South  Manchuria. 
The  two  places,  therefore,  cannot  be  considered  in 
the  same  light.  Accordingly,  China  agreed  to  open 
commercial  marts  first,  in  the  interests  of  foreign 
trade. 

The  Hanyehping  Company  mentioned  in  the  third 
group  is  entirely  a  private  company,  and  the  Chinese 
Government  is  precluded  from  interfering  with  it  and 
negotiating  with  another  government  to  make  any  dis- 
posal' of  the  same  as  the  Government  likes,  but  having 
regard  for  the  interests  of  the  Japanese  capitalists  the 
Chinese  Government  agreed  that  whenever,  in  future 
the  said  company  and  the  Japanese  capitalists  should 
arrive  at  a  satisfactory  arrangement  for  co-operation, 
China  will  give  her  assent  thereto.  Thus  the  interests 
of  the  Japanese  capitalists  are  amply  safeguarded. 

Although  the  demand  in  the  fourth  group  asking 
for  a  declaration  not  to  alienate  China's  coast  is  an 
infringement  of  her  sovereign  rights,  yet  the  Chinese 
Government  offered  to  make  a  voluntary  pronounce- 
ment so  far  as  it  comports  with  China's  sovereign 
rights.  Thus,  it  is  seen  that  the  Chinese  Government, 
in  deference  to  the  wishes  of  Japan,  gave  a  most  seri- 
ous consideration  even  to  those  demands  which  gravely 
affect  the  sovereignty  and  territorial  rights  of  China 
as  well  as  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  and  the 
treaties  with  foreign  Powers.  All'  this  was  a  painful 
effort  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  meet 
the  situation — a  fact  of  which  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment must  be  aware. 


132  APPENDICES 

As  regard  the  demands  in  the  fifth  group,  they  all 
infringe  China's  sovereignty,  the  treaty  rights  of  other 
Powers  or  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity.  Al- 
though Japan  did  not  indicate  any  difference  between 
this  group  and  the  preceding  four  in  the  list  which 
she  presented  to  China  in  respect  of  their  character, 
the  Chinese  Government,  in  view  of  their  palpably 
objectionable  features,  persuaded  itself  that  these 
could  not  have  been  intended  by  Japan  as  anything 
other  than  Japan's  mere  advice  to  China.  Accord- 
ingly China  has  declared  from  the  very  beginning  that 
while  she  entertains  the  most  profound  regard  for 
Japan's  wishes,  she  was  unable  to  admit  that  any  of 
these  matters  could  be  made  the  subject  of  an  under- 
standing with  Japan.  Much  as  she  desired  to  pay 
regard  to  Japan's  wishes,  China  cannot  but  respect  her 
own  sovereign  rights  and  the  existing  treaties  with 
other  Powers.  In  order  to  be  rid  of  the  seed  for 
future  misunderstanding  and  to  strengthen  the  basis 
of  friendship,  China  was  constrained  to  iterate  the 
reasons  for  refusing  to  negotiate  on  any  of  the  articles 
in  the  fifth  group,  yet  in  view  of  Japan's  wishes  China 
has  expressed  her  readiness  to  state  that  no  foreign 
money  was  borrowed  to  construct  harbour  work  in 
Fukien  Province.  Thus  it  is  clear  that  China  went 
so  far  as  to  seek  a  solution  for  Japan  of  a  question 
that  really  did  not  admit  of  negotiation.  Was  there, 
then,  evasion,  on  the  part  of  China? 

Now,  since  the  Japanese  Government  has  presented 
a  revised  list  of  demands  and  declared  at  the  same 
time,  that  it  will  restore  the  leased  territory  of  Kiao- 


APPENDICES  133 

chow,  the  Chinese  Government  reconsiders  the  whole 
question  and  herewith  submits  a  new  reply  to  the 
friendly  Japanese  Government. 

In  this  reply  the  unsettled  articles  in  the  first  group 
are  stated  again  for  discussion. 

As  regards  the  second  group,  those  articles  which 
have  already  been  initialled  are  omitted.  In  connec- 
tion with  the  question  of  inland  residence  the  police 
regulation  clause  has  been  revised  in  a  more  restric- 
tive sense.  As  for  the  trial  of  cases  relating  to  land 
and  lease  contracts  the  Chinese  Government  now  per- 
mits the  Japanese  Consul  to  send  an  officer  to  attend 
the  proceedings. 

Of  the  four  demands  in  connection  with  that  part 
of  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  which  is  within  the  juris- 
diction of  South  Manchuria  and  the  Jehol  intendency, 
China  agrees  to  three. 

China,  also,  agrees  to  the  article  relating  to  the 
Hanyehping  Company  as  revised  by  Japan. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  Japanese  Government  will  ap- 
preciate the  conciliatory  spirit  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment in  making  this  final  concession  and  forthwith 
give  her  assent  thereto. 

There  is  one  more  point.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
present  negotiations  it  was  mutually  agreed  to  observe 
secrecy  but  unfortunately  a  few  days  after  the  pres- 
entation of  the  demands  by  Japan  an  Osaka  news- 
paper published  an  "Extra"  giving  the  text  of  the 
demands.  The  foreign  and  the  Chinese  press  has 
since  been  paying  considerable  attention  to  this  ques- 
tion and  frequently  publishing  pro-Chinese  or  pro- 
Japanese  comments  in  order  to  call  forth  the  World's 


134  APPENDICES 

conjecture — a  matter  which  the  Chinese  Government 
deeply  regrets. 

The  Chinese  Government  has  never  carried  on  any 
newspaper  campaign  and  the  Chinese  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  has  repeatedly  declared  it  to  the  Japa- 
nese Minister. 

In  conclusion,  the  Chinese  Government  wishes  to 
express  its  hope  that  the  negotiations  now  pending 
between  the  two  countries  will  soon  come  to  an  end 
and  whatever  misgivings  foreign  countries  entertain 
toward  the  present  situation  may  be  quickly  dispelled. 


APPENDIX  G 

japan's  ultimatum  to  china 

Japan's  Ultimatum  delivered  by  the  Japanese  Min- 
ister to  the  Chinese  Government,  on  May  7th,  1915. 

The  reason  why  the  Imperial  Government  opened 
the  present  negotiations  with  the  Chinese  Government 
is  first  to  endeavour  to  dispose  of  the  complications  ¥ 
arising  out  of  the  war  between  Japan  and  Germany, 
and  secondly  to  attempt  to  solve  those  various  ques- 
tions which  are  detrimental  to  the  intimate  relations 
of  China  and  Japan  with  a  view  to  solidifying  the 
foundation  of  cordial'  friendship  subsisting  between  the 
two  countries  to  the  end  that  the  peace  of  the  Far 
East  may  be  effectually  and  permanently  preserved. 
With  this  object  in  view,  definite  proposals  were  pre- 
sented to  the  Chinese  Government  in  January  of  this 
year,  and  up  to  to-day  as  many  as  twenty-five  confer- 
ences have  been  held  with  the  Chinese  Government  in 
perfect  sincerity  and  frankness. 

In  the  course  of  the  negotiation  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment have  consistently  explained  the  aims  and  ob- 
jects of  the  proposals  in  a  conciliatory  spirit,  while  ^/ 
on  the  other  hand  the  proposals  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, whether  important  or  unimportant,  have  been 
attended  to  without  any  reserve. 

It  may  be  stated  with  confidence  that  no  effort  has 
been  spared  to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory  and  amicable 
settlement  of  those  questions. 
135 


136  APPENDICES 

The  discussion  of  the  entire  corpus  of  the  proposals 
was  practically  at  an  end  at  the  twenty-fourth  con- 
ference; that  is  on  17th  of  the  last  month.  The  Im- 
perial Government,  taking  a  broad  view  of  the  nego- 
tiation and  in  consideration  of  the  points  raised  by 
the  Chinese  Government,  modified  the  original  pro- 
posals with  considerable  concessions  and  presented 
to  the  Chinese  Government  on  the  26th  of  the  same 
month  the  revised  proposals  for  agreement,  and  at  the 
same  time  it  was  offered  that,  on  the  acceptance  of 
the  revised  proposals,  the  Imperial  Government  would, 
at  a  suitable  opportunity,  restore,  with  fair  and  proper 
conditions,  to  the  Chinese  Government  the  Kiaochow 
territory,  in  the  acquisition  of  which  the  Imperial 
Government  had  made  a  great  sacrifice. 

On  the  1st  of  May,  the  Chinese  Government  de- 
livered the  reply  to  the  revised  proposals  of  the  Japa- 
nese Government,  which  is  contrary  to  the  expecta- 
tions of  the  Imperial  Government.  The  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment not  only  did  not  give  a  careful  considera- 
tion to  the  revised  proposals  but  even  with  regard  to 
the  offer  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  restore  Kiao- 
chow to  the  Chinese  Government  the  latter  did  not 
manifest  the  least  appreciation  for  Japan's  goodwill 
and  difficulties. 

From  the  commercial  and  military  points  of  view 
Kiaochow  is  an  important  place,  in  the  acquisition  of 
which  the  Japanese  Empire  sacrificed  much  blood  and 
money,  and,  after  the  acquisition  the  Empire  incurs 
no  obligation  to  restore  it  to  China.  But  with  the 
object  of  increasing  the  future  friendly  relations  of  the 
two  countries,  they  went  to  the  extent  of  proposing 


APPENDICES  137 

its  restoration,  yet  to  her  great  regret,  the  Chinese 
Government  did  not  take  into  consideration  the  good 
intention  of  Japan  and  manifest  appreciation  of  her 
difficulties.  Furthermore,  the  Chinese  Government  not 
only  ignored  the  friendly  feelings  of  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment in  offering  the  restoration  of  Kiaochow  Bay, 
but  also  in  replying  to  the  revised  proposals  they  even 
demanded  its  unconditional  restoration;  and  again 
China  demanded  that  Japan  should  bear  the  responsi- 
bility of  paying  indemnity  for  all  the  unavoidable  losses 
and  damages  resulting  from  Japan's  military  operations 
at  Kiaochow;  and  still  further  in  connection  with  the  Jf 
territory  of  Kiaochow  China  advanced  other  demands 
and  declared  that  she  has  the  right  of  participation  .  y^» ' 
at  the  future  peace  conference  to  be  held  between  Japan  \  V*" 
and  Germany.  Although  China  is  fully  aware  that  the 
unconditional  restoration  of  Kiaochow  and  Japan's 
responsibility  of  indemnification  for  the  unavoidable 
losses  and  damages  can  never  be  tolerated  by  Japan 
yet  she  purposely  advanced  these  demands  and  de- 
clared that  this  reply  was  final  and  decisive. 

Since  Japan  could  not  tolerate  such  demands  the 
settlement  of  the  other  questions,  however  compro- 
mising it  may  be,  would  not  be  to  her  interest.  The 
consequence  is  that  the  present  reply  of  the  Chinese 
Government  is,  on  the  whole,  vague  and  meaningless. 

Furthermore,  in  the  reply  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment to  the  other  proposals  in  the  revised  list  of  the 
Imperial  Government,  such  as  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  where  Japan  particularly  has 
geographical,  commercial,  industrial  and  strategic  rela- 
tions, as  recognised  by  all  the  nations,  and  made  more 


138  APPENDICES 

remarkable  in  consequence  of  the  two  wars  in  which 
Japan  was  engaged,  the  Chinese  Government  overlooks 
these  facts  and  does  not  respect  Japan's  position  in  that 
place.  The  Chinese  Government  even  freely  altered 
those  articles  which  the  Imperial  Government,  in  a 
compromising  spirit,  have  formulated  in  accordance 
with  the  statement  of  the  Chinese  Representatives 
thereby  making  the  statements  of  the  Representatives 
an  empty  talk;  and  on  seeing  them  conceding  with 
the  one  hand  and  withholding  with  the  other  it  is  very 
difficult  to  attribute  faithfulness  and  sincerity  to  the 
Chinese  Authorities. 

As  regards  the  articles  relating  to  the  employment 
of  advisers,  the  establishment  of  schools  and  hospitals, 
the  supply  of  arms  and  ammuntion  and  the  establish- 
ment of  arsenals  and  railway  concessions  in  South 
China  in  the  revised  proposals  they  were  either  pro- 
posed with  the  proviso  that  the  consent  of  the  Power 
concerned  must  be  obtained,  or  they  are  merely  to  be 
recorded  in  the  minutes  in  accordance  with  the  state- 
ments of  the  Chinese  delegates,  and  thus  they  are  not 
in  the  least  in  conflict  either  with  Chinese  sovereignty 
or  her  treaties  with  the  Foreign  Powers,  yet  the 
Chinese  Government  in  their  reply  to  the  proposals, 
alleging  that  these  proposals  are  incompatible  with 
their  sovereign  rights  and  treaties  with  Foreign  Pow- 
ers, defeat  the  expectations  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment. However  in  spite  of  such  attitude  of  the  Chinese 
Government,  the  Imperial  Government,  though  regret- 
ting to  see  that  there  is  no  room  for  further  negotia- 
tions, yet  warmly  attached  to  the  preservation  of  the 
peace  of  the  Far  East,  is  still  hoping  for  a  satisfac- 


APPENDICES  139 

tory  settlement  in  order  to  avoid  the  disturbance  of 
the  relations. 

So  in  spite  of  the  circumstances  which  admitted  no 
patience,  they  have  reconsidered  the  feelings  of  the 
Government  of  their  neighbouring  Country  and,  with 
the  exception  of  the  article  relating  to  Fukien  which 
is  to  be  the  subject  of  an  exchange  of  notes  as  has 
already  been  agreed  upon  by  the  Representatives  of 
both  nations,  will  undertake  to  detach  the  Group  V 
from  the  present  negotiation  and  discuss  it  separately 
in  the  future.  Therefore  the  Chinese  Government 
should  appreciate  the  friendly  feelings  of  the  Imperial 
Government  by  immediately  accepting  without  any  al- 
teration all  the  articles  of  Groups  I,  II,  III,  and  IV 
and  the  exchange  of  notes  in  connection  with  Fukien 
province  in  Group  V  as  contained  in  the  revised  pro- 
posals presented  on  the  26th  of  April. 

The  Imperial  Government  hereby  again  offer  their 
advice  and  hope  that  the  Chinese  Government,  upon 
this  advice,  will  give  a  satisfactory  reply  by  six  o'clock 
p.m.  on  the  9th  day  of  May.  It  is  hereby  declared  that 
if  no  satisfactory  reply  is  received  before  or  at  the 
specified  time,  the  Imperial  Government  will  take  steps 
they  may  deem  necessary. 

EXPLANATORY    NOTE 

Accompanying  Ultimatum  delivered  to  the  Minis- 
ter of  Foreign  Affairs  by  the  Japanese  Minister,  May 
7th,  1915. 

1.  With  the  exception  of  the  question  of  Fukien 
to  be  arrangel  by  an  exchange  of  notes,  the  five  arti- 
cles postponed  for  later  negotiation  refer  to  (a)  the 


140  APPENDICES 

employment  of  advisers,  (b)  the  establishment  of 
schools  and  hospitals,  (c)  the  railway  concessions  in 
South  China,  (d)  the  supply  of  arms  and  ammunition 
and  the  establishment  of  arsenals,  and  (e)  right  of 
Missionary  propaganda. 

2.  The  acceptance  by  the  Chinese  Government  of 
the  article  relating  to  Fukien  may  be  either  in  the 
form  as  proposed  by  the  Japanese  Minister  on  the  26th 
of  April  or  in  that  contained  in  the  Reply  of  the 
Chinese  Government  of  May  1st.  Although  the  Ulti- 
matum calls  for  the  immediate  acceptance  by  China 
of  the  modified  proposals  presented  on  April  26th, 
without  alteration  but  it  should  be  noted  that  it  merely 
states  the  principle  and  does  not  apply  to  this  article 
and  articles  4  and  5  of  this  note. 

3.  If  the  Chinese  Government  accept  all  the  arti- 
cles as  demanded  in  the  Ultimatum  the  offer  of  the 
Japanese  Government  to  restore  Kiaochow  to  China 
made  on  the  26th  of  April,  will  still  hold  good. 

4.  Article  2  of  Group  II  relating  to  the  lease  or 
purchase  of  land,  the  terms  "lease"  and  "purchase" 
may  be  replaced  by  the  terms  "temporary  lease"  and 
"perpetual  lease"  or  "lease  on  consultation,"  which 
means  a  long-term  lease  with  its  unconditional  re- 
newal : 

Article  4  of  Group  II  relating  to  the  approval  of 
Police  laws  and  Ordinances  and  local  taxes  by  the 
Japanese  Consul  may  form  the  subject  of  a  secret 
agreement. 

5.  The  phrase  "to  consult  with  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment" in  connection  with  questions  of  pledging 
the  local  taxes  for  raising  loans  and  the  loans  for 


APPENDICES  141 

the  construction  of  railways,  in  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia, which  is  similar  to  the  agreement  in  Manchuria 
relating  to  the  matters  of  the  same  kind,  may  be  re- 
placed by  the  phrase  "to  consult  with  the  Japanese 
capitalists." 

The  article  relating  to  the  opening  of  trade  marts 
in  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  in  respect  to  location  and 
regulations,  may,  following  the  precedent  set  in  Shan- 
tung, be  the  subject  of  an  exchange  of  notes. 

6.  From  the  phrase  "those  interested  in  the  Com- 
pany" in  Group  III  of  the  revised  list  of  demands, 
the  words  "those  interested  in"  may  be  deleted. 

7.  The  Japanese  version  of  the  Formal  Agreement 
and  its  annexes  shall  be  the  official  text  or  both  the 
Chinese  and  Japanese  shall  be  the  official  texts. 


APPENDIX  H 

REPLY  OF  THE  CHINESE  GOVERNMENT  TO  THE  ULTI- 
MATUM OF  THE  JAPANESE  GOVERNMENT,  DELIVERED 
TO  THE  JAPANESE  MINISTER  BY  THE  MINISTER  OF 
FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  ON   THE  8TH   OF   MAY,   1915 

On  the  7th  of  this  month,  at  three  o'clock  p.m.  the 
Chinese  Government  received  an  Ultimatum  from  the 
Japanese  Government  together  with  an  Explanatory- 
Note  of  seven  articles.  The  Ultimatum  concluded  with 
the  hope  that  the  Chinese  Government  by  six  o'clock 
p.m.  on  the  9th  of  May,  will  give  a  satisfactory  reply, 
and  it  is  hereby  declared  that  if  no  satisfactory  reply 
is  received  before  or  at  the  specified  time,  the  Japa- 
nese Government  will  take  steps  she  may  deem  neces- 
sary. 

The  Chinese  Government  with  a  view  to  preserving 
the  peace  of  the  Far  East,  hereby  accepts,  with  the 
exception  of  those  five  articles  of  Group  V  postponed 
for  later  negotiation,  all  the  articles  of  Groups  I,  II, 
III  and  IV  and  the  exchange  of  notes  in  connection 
with  the  Fukien  Province  in  Group  V  as  contained  in 
the  revised  proposals  presented  on  the  26th  of  April, 
and  in  accordance  with  the  Explanatory  Note  of  seven 
articles  accompanying  the  Ultimatum  of  the  Japa- 
nese Government  with  the  hope  that  thereby  all  the 
outstanding  questions  are  settled,  so  that  the  cordial 
relationship  between  the  two  countries  may  be  further 

142 


APPENDICES  143 

consolidated.  The  Japanese  Minister  is  hereby  re- 
quested to  appoint  a  day  to  call  at  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  to  make  the  literary  improvement  of 
the  text  and  sign  the  Agreement  as  soon  as  possible. 


APPENDIX  I 

OFFICIAL  STATEMENT  BY  THE  CHINESE  GOVERNMENT 
RESPECTING  THE  CHINO- JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS 
BROUGHT  TO  A  CONCLUSION  BY  CHINA'S  COMPLIANCE 
WITH  THE  TERMS  OF  JAPAN'S  ULTIMATUM  DELIV- 
ERED ON   MAY  7,  1915 

At  three  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  May  7,  1915, 
His  Excellency  the  Japanese  Minister  in  Peking  deliv- 
ered to  the  Chinese  Government  in  person  an  Ulti- 
matum from  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government,  with 
an  accompanying  Note  of  seven  articles.  The  con- 
cluding sentences  of  the  Ultimatum  read  thus : 

"The  Imperial  Government  hereby  again  of- 
fer their  advice  and  hope  that  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, upon  this  advice,  will  give  a  satisfactory 
reply  by  six  o'clock  p.m.  on  the  ninth  day  of  May. 
It  is  hereby  declared  that  if  no  satisfactory  reply 
is  received  before  or  at  the  specified  time  the  Im- 
perial Government  will  take  such  steps  as  they 
may  deem  necessary." 

The  Chinese  Government — having  received  and  ac- 
cepted the  Ultimatum — feel  constrained  to  make  a 
frank  and  plain  statement  of  the  facts  connected  with 
the  negotiations  which  were  abruptly  terminated  by 
this  drastic  action  on  the  part  of  Japan. 

The  Chinese  Government  have  constantly  aimed,  as 
they  still  aim,  at  consolidating  the  friendship  exist- 

144 


APPENDICES  145 

ing  between  China  and  Japan,  and,  in  this  period  of 
travail  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  have  been  particu- 
larly solicitous  of  preserving  peace  in  the  Far  East. 
Unexpectedly  on  January  18,  1915,  His  Excellency  the 
Japanese  Minister  in  Peking,  in  pursuance  of  instruc- 
tions from  his  Government,  adopted  the  unusual  pro- 
cedure of  presenting  to  His  Excellency  the  President 
of  the  Republic  of  China  a  list  of  twenty-one  momen- 
tous demands,  arranged  in  five  Groups.  The  first  four 
Groups  were  each  introduced  by  a  preamble,  but  there 
was  no  preamble  or  explanation  to  the  Fifth  Group. 
In  respect  of  the  character  of  the  demands  in  this 
Group,  however,  no  difference  was  indicated  in  the 
document  between  them  and  those  embodied  in  the 
preceding  Groups. 

Although  there  was  no  cause  for  such  a  demarche, 
the  Chinese  Government,  in  deference  to  the  wishes 
of  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government,  at  once  agreed 
to  open  negotiations  on  those  articles  which  it  was 
possible  for  China  to  consider,  notwithstanding  that 
it  was  palpable  that  the  whole  of  the  demands  were 
intended  to  extend  the  rights  and  interests  of  Japan 
without  securing  a  quid  pro  quo  of  any  kind  for 
China. 

China  approached  the  pending  conferences  in  a 
spirit  of  utmost  friendliness  and  with  a  determination 
to  deal  with  all  questions  frankly  and  sincerely.  Be- 
fore negotiations  were  actually  commenced  the  Japa- 
nese Minister  raised  many  questions  with  regard  to 
the  number  of  delegates  proposed  to  represent  China, 
the  number  of  conferences  to  be  held  in  each  week, 
and  the  method  of  discussion.     The  Chinese  Govern- 


146  APPENDICES 

ment,  though  their  views  differed  from  those  of  the 
Japanese  Minister,  yielded  in  all  these  respects  to 
his  contentions  in  the  hope  of  avoiding  any  delay  in 
the  negotiations.  The  objections  of  the  Japanese  Min- 
ister to  the  customary  recording  and  signing  of  the 
minutes  of  each  conference,  which  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment suggested  as  a  necessary  and  advisable  precau- 
tion, as  well  as  one  calculated  to  facilitate  future  ref- 
erence, were  also  accepted.  Nor  did  the  Chinese 
Government  retaliate  in  any  way  when  in  the  course 
of  the  negotiations  the  Japanese  Minister  twice  sus- 
pended the  conferences,  obviously  with  the  object  of 
compelling  compliance  with  his  views  on  certain  points 
at  the  time  under  discussion.  Even  when  delay  was 
threatened  owing  to  the  unfortunate  injury  sustained 
by  the  Japanese  Minister  as  a  result  of  a  fall  from 
his  horse,  the  Chinese  delegates,  in  order  to  avert 
interruption,  proposed  that  the  conferences  should 
be  continued  at  the  Japanese  Legation,  which  proposal 
was  accepted.  Later,  when  on  March  22,  the  Japanese 
Government  despatched  large  bodies  of  troops  to  South 
Manchuria  and  Shantung  for  the  ostensible  purpose 
of  relieving  the  garrison — whose  term  of  service  had 
not  then  expired — the  Japanese  Minister  stated  at  the 
conference,  in  reply  to  a  direct  question  as  to  when 
the  retiring  troops  would  be  withdrawn,  that  this  would 
not  be  done  until  the  negotiations  could  be  brought 
to  a  satisfactory  conclusion.  Although  this  minatory 
step  caused  much  excitement,  indignation  and  alarm 
on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  people,  and  made  it  diffi- 
cult for  the  Chinese  Government  to  continue  the  con- 
ferences, they  successfully  exerted  efforts  to  avert  a 


APPENDICES  147 

rupture  and  thus  enabled  the  negotiations  smoothly 
to  proceed.  All  this  demonstrates  that  the  Chinese 
Government  were  dominated  by  a  sincere  desire  to 
expedite  the  progress  of  the  conferences ;  and  that  the 
Japanese  Government  recognised  this  important  fact 
was  made  clear  on  March  11  when  the  Japanese  Min- 
ister conveyed  to  the  Chinese  Government  an  expres- 
sion of  his  Government's  appreciation  of  China's 
frankness  and  sincerity  in  the  conduct  of  the  negotia- 
tions. 

From  February  2,  when  the  negotiations  were  com- 
menced, to  April  17,  twenty-four  conferences  were 
held  in  all.  Throughout  this  whole  period  the  Chinese 
Government  steadfastly  strove  to  arrive  at  an  amica- 
ble settlement  and  made  every  concession  possible. 

Of  the  twenty-one  demands  originally  submitted  by 
Japan,  China  agreed  to  fifteen,  some  in  principle  and 
some  textually,  six  being  initialled  by  both  parties. 


IN   THE    MATTER   OF   THE  DEMANDS   TO   WHICH    CHINA 
AGREED 

At  the  first  conference,  held  on  February  2,  China 
agreed  in  principle  to  the  first  article  of  the  Shantung 
Group  of  demands  which  provides  that  China  should 
give  her  assent  to  the  transfer  of  Germany's  rights  in 
Shantung  to  Japan.  The  Chinese  Government  main- 
tained at  first  that  the  subject  of  this  demand  related 
to  the  post  helium  settlement,  and,  therefore,  should 
be  left  over  for  discussion  by  all  the  parties  interested 
at  the  Peace  Conference.  Failing  to  persuade  the  Japa- 
nese Minister  to  accept  this  view,  the  Chinese  Gov- 


148  APPENDICES 

ernment  agreed  to  this  demand  in  principle,  and  made 
certain  supplementary  proposals. 

One  of  the  supplementary  proposals  was  in  these 
terms : 

"The  Japanese  Government  declares  that  when 
the  Chinese  Government  give  their  assent  to  the 
disposition  of  the  rights  above  referred  to,  Japan 
will  restore  the  Leased  Territory  of  Kiaochow 
to  China,  and  further  recognises  the  right  of  the 
Chinese  Government  to  participate  in  the  nego- 
tiations referred  to  above  between  Japan  and 
Germany." 

The  provision  for  a  declaration  to  restore  Kiaochow 
was  clearly  not  a  demand  on  Japan  but  only  a  reitera- 
tion of  Japan's  voluntary  statement  in  her  Ultimatum 
to  Germany  on  August  15,  1914,  (a  copy  of  which 
was  officially  transmitted  to  the  Chinese  Government 
for  perusal  on  August  15),  and  repeated  in  public 
statements  by  the  Japanese  Premier.  Appreciating 
the  earnest  desire  of  Japan  to  maintain  the  peace  of 
the  Far  East  and  to  cement  her  friendship  with  China, 
as  evidenced  by  this  friendly  offer,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment left  the  entire  question  of  the  conditions 
of  restoration  to  be  determined  by  Japan,  and  refrained 
from  making  any  reference  thereto  in  the  supplemen- 
tary proposal.  The  suggestion  relating  to  participa- 
tion in  the  Conference  between  Japan  and  Germany 
was  made  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Shantung,  the  ob- 
ject of  future  negotiation  between  Japan  and  Ger- 
many, is  a  Chinese  Province,   and  therefore  China 


APPENDICES  149 

is  the  Power  most  concerned  in  the  future  of  that 
territory. 

Another  supplementary  proposal  suggesting  the 
assumption  by  Japan  of  responsibility  for  indemnifica- 
tion of  the  losses  arising  out  of  the  military  operations 
by  Japan  in  and  about  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow 
was  necessitated  by  the  fact  that  China  was  neutral 
vis-a-vis  the  war  between  Japan  and  Germany.  Had 
China  not  inserted  such  a  provision,  her  position  in 
relation  to  this  conflict  might  have  been  liable  to  mis- 
construction— the  localities  in  which  the  operations 
took  place  being  a  portion  of  China's  territory — and 
might  also  have  exposed  herself  to  a  claim  for  in- 
demnification of  losses  for  which  she  was  in  no  way 
responsible. 

In  a  further  supplementary  proposal  the  Chinese 
Government  suggested  that,  prior  to  the  restoration 
of  the  Kiaochow  territory  to  China,  the  Maritime  Cus- 
toms, the  telegraphs  and  post  offices  should  be  con- 
tinued to  be  administered  as  heretofore;  that  the  mili- 
tary railway,  the  telegraph  lines,  etc.,  which  were  in- 
stalled by  Japan  to  facilitate  her  military  operations, 
should  be  removed  forthwith ;  that  the  Japanese  troops 
now  stationed  outside  of  the  leased  territory  should 
be  first  withdrawn,  and  those  within  the  territory 
should  be  recalled  at  the  time  when  Kiaochow  is  re- 
turned to  China.  Shantung  being  a  Chinese  Province, 
it  was  natural  for  China  to  be  anxious  concerning  the 
restoration  of  the  statu  quo  ante  helium.  Although 
the  Chinese  Government  were  confident  that  the  Japa- 
nese Government  would  efTect  such  restoration  in  pur- 
suance of  their  official  declaration,  it  was  necessary 


150  APPENDICES 

for  China,  being  neutral  throughout  the  war,  to  place 
these  matters  on  record. 

At  the  third  conference,  held  on  February  22,  China 
agreed  to  the  second  demand  in  the  Shantung  Group 
not  to  cede  or  lease  to  any  Power  any  territory  or 
island  or  land  on  the  sea  border  of  Shantung. 

At  the  fifth  conference,  held  on  February  28,  China 
agreed  to  give  Japan  the  preference,  provided  Ger- 
many abandoned  the  privilege,  to  supply  the  capital  for 
the  construction  of  a  railway  from  Chefoo  or  Lung- 
kow  to  connect  with  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  Railway, 
in  the  event  of  China  deciding  to  build  that  railway 
with  foreign  capital. 

At  the  sixth  conference,  held  on  March  3,  China, 
in  the  interests  of  foreign  trade,  agreed  to  open  certain 
important  cities  in  Shantung  as  trade  marts  under 
regulations  approved  by  the  Japanese  Government, 
although  this  was  a  demand  on  the  part  of  Japan  for 
privileges  additional  to  any  that  hitherto  had  been 
enjoyed  by  Germany  and  was  not  an  outcome  of  the 
hostilities  between  Japan  and  Germany,  nor,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Chinese  Government,  was  its  acceptance 
essential  to  the  preservation  of  peace  in  the  Far  East. 

At  the  eighth  conference,  held  on  March  9,  China 
agreed  (1)  to  the  extension  of  the  term  of  the  lease 
of  Dairen  and  (2)  Port  Arthur,  and  (3)  of  the  South 
Manchuria  and  (4)  Antung-Mukden  railways,  all  to 
ninety-nine  years. 

Owing  to  the  bitter  experiences  which  China  sus- 
tained in  the  past  in  connection  with  the  leased  por- 
tions of  her  territory,  it  has  become  her  settled  policy 
not  to  grant  further  leases  nor  to  extend  the  term  of 


APPENDICES  151 

those  now  in  existence.  Therefore,  it  was  a  significant 
indication  of  China's  desire  to  meet  Japan's  wishes 
when  she  agreed  to  this  exceptional  departure  from  her 
settled  policy. 

At  the  same  conference  the  Chinese  Government 
also  agreed  to  refrain  from  raising  objections  to  the 
principle  of  co-operation  in  the  Hanyehping  Company, 
if  the  latter  should  arrive  at  an  agreement  in  this  re- 
spect with  the  Japanese  capitalists  concerned.  With 
reference  to  this  question  it  was  pointed  out  to  the 
Japanese  Minister  that,  in  the  Provisional  Constitution 
of  the  Republic  of  China,  Chinese  subjects  are  guar- 
anteed the  right  of  protection  of  their  property  and 
freedom  to  engage  in  any  lawful  occupation.  The 
Government  were  precluded,  therefore,  from  interfer- 
ing with  the  private  business  of  the  people,  and  could 
not  find  any  other  solution  than  the  one  thus  agreed  to. 

As  regards  the  single  article  of  the  Fourth  Group, 
and  the  preamble  thereto,  the  Chinese  Government  held 
that  they  were  inconsistent  with  Chinese  sovereignty. 
However,  China,  at  this  conference,  expressed  her 
readiness  to  meet  the  wishes  of  Japan  so  far  as  it  was 
possible  without  infringing  her  sovereignty,  and  agreed 
to  make  a  voluntary  pronouncement  that  she  would  not 
alienate  any  portion  of  her  coast  line. 

In  connection  with  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  it 
is  worthy  of  note  that  the  provision  regarding  the  re- 
purchase period  in  the  agreement  (thirty-six  years 
from  1902)  was  not  mentioned  in  Japan's  original 
proposal.  Subsequently  the  Japanese  Government,  on 
the  ground  that  the  meaning  of  this  provision  was  not 
clear,   requested   China  to  agree  to  its  cancellation. 


152  APPENDICES 

To  this  request  the  Chinese  Government  acceded, 
though  well  aware  that  the  proposed  change  could  only 
benefit  Japan.  China  thus  relinquished  the  right  to 
repurchase  the  railway  at  the  expiration  of  another 
twenty-three  years. 

In  connection  with  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway  the 
article,  which  was  originally  initialled  at  the  confer- 
ence, provided  for  the  reversion  of  the  railway  to 
China  at  the  end  of  ninety-nine  years  without  payment, 
but,  at  the  subsequent  meeting,  the  Japanese  Minister 
requested  that  the  reference  to  the  reversion  without 
payment  be  deleted  from  the  initialled  article.  In  ac- 
ceding to  the  Japanese  Minister's  request,  China  again 
showed  her  sincere  desire  to  expedite  matters  and  to 
meet  Japan's  wishes  even  at  th  sacrifice  of  a  point 
in  her  favour,  to  which  Japan  had  already  agreed. 

At  the  eleventh  conference,  held  on  March  16,  China 
agreed  to  give  Japan  preference  in  regard  to  loans  for 
railway  construction  in  South  Manchuria. 

At  the  thirteenth  conference,  held  on  March  23, 
China  agreed  (1)  to  the  amendment  of  the  Kirin- 
Changchun  Railway  loan  agreement;  (2)  to  give  pref- 
erence to  Japan  if  the  revenue  of  South  Manchuria 
were  offered  as  security  for  loans;  (3)  to  give  pref- 
erence to  Japanese  in  the  event  of  the  employment  of 
advisers  for  South  Manchuria;  (4)  to  grant  to  Japa- 
nese the  right  of  mining  in  nine  specified  areas  in 
South  Manchuria. 

In  its  original  form  the  demand  with  reference  to 
mining  in  South  Manchuria  tended  to  create  a  monop- 
oly for  Japanese  subjects,  and,  therefore,  was  en- 
tirely inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 


APPENDICES  153 

tunity.  The  Chinese  Government  explained  that  they 
could  not,  in  view  of  the  treaty  rights  of  other  Pow- 
ers, agree  to  this  monopoly,  but  they  readily  gave 
their  acceptance  when  Japan  consented  to  the  modi- 
fication of  the  demand  so  as  to  mitigate  its  monopolistic 
character. 

In  connection  with  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway 
the  amendment  agreed  to  involves  a  fundamental  revi- 
sion of  the  original  agreement  on  the  basis  of  the 
existing  railway  loan  concluded  by  China  with  other 
foreign  capitalists,  as  well  as  an  engagement  on  the 
part  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  extend  to  this  rail- 
way any  better  terms  which  may  be  hereafter  accorded 
to  other  railway  concessionaries  in  China.  The  cap- 
ital of  this  railway  was  originally  fifty  per  cent 
Chinese  and  fifty  per  cent  Japanese.  The  effect  of  this 
undertaking  is  to  transfer  the  capital  originally  held 
by  the  Chinese,  as  well  as  the  full  control  and  ad- 
ministration of  the  railway,  to  the  Japanese. 

At  the  twenty-first  conference,  held  on  April  10, 
China  agreed,  in  regard  to  the  demands  concerning 
Fukien  Province,  to  give  Japan  an  assurance  in  ac- 
cordance with  Japan's  wishes  at  a  future  time. 

As  regards  demands  2  and  3  in  the  Manchurian 
Group,  relating  to  the  ownership  of  land  for  trade, 
manufacture,  and  agricultural  enterprises  as  well  as  for 
the  right  of  settlement  in  the  interior  of  South  Man- 
churia, the  Chinese  Government,  after  discussion  at 
several  conferences,  agreed  to  them  in  principle,  but 
desired  to  introduce  certain  amendments  concerning  the 
control  and  protection  of  the  Japanese  subjects  who 
might  avail  themselves  of  these  rights.    The  course  of 


154  APPENDICES 

the  negotiations  in  connection  with  these  amendments 
will  be  referred  to  subsequently. 

IN  THE  MATTER  OF  THOSE  DEMANDS  TO  WHICH   CHINA 
COULD    NOT  AGREE 

Of  the  twenty-two  original  demands  there  were  six, 
as  previously  mentioned,  to  which  China  could  not 
agree  on  the  ground  that  they  were  not  proper  sub- 
jects for  international  negotiation,  conflicting  as  they 
did  with  the  sovereign  rights  of  China,  the  treaty  rights 
of  other  Powers,  and  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity. 

Thus,  for  example,  the  second  article  of  the  Hanyeh- 
ping  question  in  the  original  Third  Group  in  particu- 
lar seriously  affected  the  principle  of  equal  commer- 
cial and  industrial  opportunity. 

The  proposal  that  there  should  be  joint  administra- 
tion by  China  and  Japan  of  the  police  in  China  was 
clearly  an  interference  with  the  Republic's  domestic 
affairs,  and  consequently  an  infringement  of  her  sover- 
eignty. For  that  reason  the  Chinese  Government  could 
not  take  the  demand  into  consideration.  But  when  it 
was  explained  by  the  Japanese  Minister  that  this  re- 
ferred only  to  South  Manchuria,  and  he  suggested  that 
his  Government  would  be  satisfied  if  China  agreed  to 
engage  Japanese  as  police  advisers  for  that  territory, 
the  Chinese  Government  accepted  the  suggestion. 

The  two  articles  relating  to  the  acquisition  of  land 
for  schools,  hospitals,  and  temples,  as  well  as  to  the 
right  of  missionary  propaganda,  would,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Chinese  Government,  have  presented  grave  ob- 
stacles to  the  consolidation  of  the  friendly  feeling  sub- 


APPENDICES  155 

sisting  between  the  two  people.  The  religions  of  the 
two  countries  are  identical  and  therefore  the  need  for 
a  missionary  propaganda  to  be  carried  on  in  China 
by  Japanese  does  not  exist.  The  natural  rivalry  be- 
tween Chinese  and  Japanese  followers  of  the  same 
faith  would  tend  to  create  incessant  disputes  and  fric- 
tion. Whereas  Western  missionaries  live  apart  from 
the  Chinese  communities  among  which  they  labour, 
Japanese  monks  would  live  with  the  Chinese,  and  the 
similarity  of  their  physical  characteristics,  their  reli- 
gious garb,  and  their  habits  of  life  would  render  it 
impossible  to  distinguish  them  for  purposes  of  afford- 
ing the  protection  which  the  Japanese  Government 
would  require  should  be  extended  to  them  under  the 
system  of  extraterritoriality  now  obtaining  in  China. 
Moreover,  a  general  apprehension  exists  among  the 
Chinese  people  that  these  peculiar  conditions  favour- 
ing conspiracies  for  political  purposes  might  be  taken 
advantage  of  by  some  unscrupulous  Chinese. 

The  demand  for  railway  concessions  in  the  Yangtze 
Valley  conflicted  with  the  Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo 
Railway  Agreement  of  March  6,  1908,  the  Nanking- 
Changsha  Railway  Agreement  of  March  31,  1914,  and 
the  engagement  of  August  24,  1914,  giving  prefer- 
ence to  British  firms  for  the  projected  line  from  Nan- 
chang  to  Chaochowfu.  For  this  reason  the  Chinese 
Government  found  themselves  unable  to  consider  the 
demand,  though  the  Japanese  Minister,  while  informed 
of  China's  engagements  with  Great  Britain,  repeatedly 
pressed  for  its  acceptance. 

In  respect  to  the  demand  for  the  appointment  of 
influential  Japanese  to  be  advisers  in  political,  financial 


156  APPENDICES 

and  military  affairs,  the  policy  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment in  regard  to  the  appointment  of  advisers  has 
been  similar  to  that  which  has  presumably  guided 
the  Japanese  Government  in  like  circumstances,  namely 
the  selection  of  the  best  qualified  men  irrespective  of 
their  nationality.  As  an  indication  of  their  desire  to 
avail  themselves  of  the  services  of  eminent  Japanese, 
one  of  the  earliest  appointments  made  to  an  adviser- 
ship  was  that  of  Dr.  Ariga,  while  later  on  Dr.  Hirai 
and  Mr.  Nakayama  were  appointed  to  the  Ministry 
of  Communications. 

It  was  considered  that  the  demand  that  Japanese 
should  be  appointed  in  the  three  most  important  admin- 
istrative departments,  as  well  as  the  demand  for  the 
joint  control  of  China's  police,  and  the  demand  for 
an  engagement  to  purchase  a  fixed  amount  of  arms 
and  ammunition  from  Japan  or  to  establish  joint  ar- 
senals in  China,  so  clearly  involved  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Republic  that  the  Chinese  Government  were 
unable  even  to  consider  them. 

For  these  reasons  the  Chinese  Government,  at  the 
very  outset  of  the  negotiations,  declared  that  they 
were  unable  to  negotiate  on  the  demands ;  but,  in  def- 
erence to  the  wishes  of  the  Japanese  Minister,  the 
Chinese  delegates  consented  to  give  the  reasons  for  de- 
clining to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  them. 

IN    THE    MATTER    OF   THE    QUESTIONS    OF    DISPUTE 
VOLVED  IN   SOME  OF  THE  FOREGOING  DEMANDS 

The  demand  by  Japan  for  the  right  of  her  subjects 
in  South  Manchuria  to  lease  or  own  land,  and  to  reside 
and  travel,  and  to  engage  in  business  or  manufacture 


APPENDICES  157 

of  any  kind  whatever  was  deemed  by  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  obtain  for  Japanese  subjects  in  this  region 
a  privileged  status  beyond  the  terms  of  the  treaties 
existing  between  the  two  nations,  and  to  give  them 
a  freedom  of  action  which  would  be  a  restriction  of 
China's  sovereignty  and  a  serious  infringement  of  her 
administrative  rights.  Should  Japanese  subjects  be 
granted  the  right  of  owning  land,  it  would  mean  that 
all  the  landed  property  in  the  region  might  fall  into 
their  hands,  thereby  endangering  China's  territorial 
integrity.  Moreover,  residence  in  the  interior  was  in- 
compatible with  the  existence  of  extraterritoriality,  the 
relinquishment  of  which  is  necessary  to  the  actual  en- 
joyment of  the  privilege  of  inland  residence,  as  evi- 
denced in  practice  of  other  nations. 

Japan's  unconditional  demand  for  the  privilege  of 
inland  residence  accompanied  with  a  desire  to  extend 
extraterritoriality  into  the  interior  of  China  and  to 
enable  Japanese  subjects  to  monopolise  all  the  interests 
in  South  Manchuria  was  also  palpably  irreconcilable 
with  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity.  For  this  rea- 
son the  Chinese  Government  were,  in  the  first  instances, 
unable  to  accept  this  demand  as  a  basis  of  negotiation. 
Their  profound  regard  for  the  friendly  relations  of 
the  two  countries,  however,  persuaded  them  to  exert 
their  utmost  efforts,  in  spite  of  all  the  inherent  diffi- 
culties, to  seek  a  solution  of  a  question  which  was  prac- 
tically impossible  to  solve.  Knowing  that  the  pro- 
posal made  by  Japan  was  incompatible  with  treaties, 
they  nevertheless  sought  to  meet  her  wishes  within 
the  limits  of  treaties.  Accordingly  they  submitted  a 
counter-proposal  to  open  more  places  in  South  Man- 


158  APPENDICES 

churia  to  international  trade  and  to  establish  Sino- 
Japanese  joint  reclamation  companies. 

This  suggestion  was  made  in  the  belief  that  the 
places  to  which  Japanese  subjects  would  desire  to 
resort  for  purposes  of  trade,  could  not  be  other  than 
important  localities ;  if  all  these  localities  were  opened 
to  commerce,  then  they  could  reside,  trade,  and  lease 
land  there  for  joint  reclamation.  Thus  Japanese  sub- 
jects might  enjoy  the  essence  of  the  privilege  of  in- 
land residence  and  would  still  be  able  to  reconcile  their 
position  with  China's  treaties  and  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunity. 

After  the  Japanese  Government  declined  to  accept 
this  suggestion,  China  withdrew  it  and  replaced  it  with 
an  amendment  to  the  original  articles.  It  was  pro- 
posed in  this  amendment  to  grant  to  Japanese  sub- 
jects the  extra-treaty  privilege  of  inland  residence 
with  the  provisos  that  Japanese  subjects  in  places 
outside  of  trade  marts  should  observe  Chinese  police 
regulations  and  pay  taxes  in  the  same  manner  as 
Chinese;  and  that  civil  and  criminal  cases  involving 
such  Japanese  subjects  should  be  adjudicated  by 
Chinese  Authorities,  the  Japanese  Consul  attending 
merely  to  watch  the  proceedings.  This  suggestion  was 
not  an  innovation:  it  was  based  upon  the  modus 
operandi  now  in  force  as  regards  the  Korean  settlers 
in  inland  districts  in  Chientao.  But  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment again  declined  to  accept  it. 

The  Chinese  Government  thereupon  made  a  third 
proposal  along  the  line  of  what  constitutes  the  present 
practice  in  Turkey,  making  a  distinction,  however, 
in  favour  of  Japanese  subjects,  in  the  exercise  of 


APPENDICES  159 

jurisdiction  over  civil  and  criminal  cases.  This  was 
once  more  objected  to  by  the  Japanese  Government. 

Then  the  Chinese  Government  proposed  to  concede 
still  another  step — the  fourth  endeavour  to  meet 
Japan's  wishes.  They  proposed  to  agree  to  the  full 
text  of  Articles  2  and  3  relative  to  the  question  of  in- 
land residence,  except  that  "the  right  of  owning  land" 
was  changed  into  "the  right  of  leasing  land"  and  to 
the  phrase  "cultivating  land"  was  added  this  clause: 
"the  regulations  for  which*  shall  be  determined  sepa- 
rately;" and,  further,  to  add  a  supplementary  article 
which  embodied  a  modus  operandi  which  the  Chinese 
Government  had  constrained  themselves  to  make  out  of 
a  desire  to  come  to  a  settlement  over  this  question. 
The  view  advanced  in  this  supplementary  article  was 
based  upon  the  Japanese  Minister's  declaration  made 
on  March  6,  1915,  that  a  separate  article  embodying 
some  compromise  might  be  added  to  the  original  arti- 
cles 2  and  3  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  any  conflict 
with  China's  sovereignty  or  the  system  established 
by  treaties. 

These  suggestions  made  by  the  Chinese  Government 
were  not  accepted  by  Japan. 

As  regards  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  not  only  have 
no  treaties  been  entered  into  with  Japan  concerning 
this  region,  but  also  the  people  are  so  unaccustomed 
to  foreign  trade  that  the  Chinese  Government  invaria- 
bly feel  much  anxiety  about  the  safety  of  foreigners 
who  elect  to  travel  there.  The  Chinese  Government, 
therefore,  considered  that  it  would  not  be  in  the  inter- 
est of  foreigners  to  open  the  whole  territory  to  them 
for  residence  and  commerce,  and  on  these  grounds 
based  their  original  refusal  to  place  Eastern  Inner 


160  APPENDICES 

Mongolia  on  the  same  footing  as  South  Manchuria. 
Still,  their  desire  to  meet  the  wishes  of  the  Japa- 
nese Government  eventually  prompted  them  to  offer 
to  open  a  number  of  places  in  the  region  to  foreign 
trade. 

IN    THE    MATTER   OF   JAPAN'S   REVISED   DEMANDS 

The  foregoing  is  an  outline  of  the  negotiations  up  to 
April  17.  It  was  hoped  by  the  Chinese  Government 
that  the  Japanese  Government  in  view  of  the  great 
concessions  made  by  China  at  the  conferences  held  up 
to  this  time,  would  see  a  way  of  effecting  an  amicable 
settlement  by  modifying  their  position  on  certain  points. 
In  regard  to  these  it  had,  by  this  time,  become  mani- 
fest that  China  would  encounter  almost  insuperable 
difficulties  in  making  further  concessions. 

The  Japanese  Government,  however,  suspended  the 
negotiations  until  April  26,  when  they  surprised  the 
Chinese  Government  by  presenting  a  new  list  of 
twenty- four  demands  (which  is  hereto  appended),  and 
requested  the  Chinese  Government  to  accord  their  ac- 
ceptance without  delay,  adding  that  this  was  their  final 
proposal.  At  the  same  time  the  Japanese  Minister 
stated  that  the  Japanese  Government  would  restore  the 
leased  territory  of  Kiaochow  to  China  at  an  opportune 
time  in  the  future  and  under  proper  conditions,  if  the 
Chinese  Government  would  agree  to  the  new  list  of 
twenty-four  demands  without  modification. 

In  this  new  list  although  the  term  "special  position" 
in  the  preamble  of  the  Manchurian  Group  was  changed 
to  "economic  relations,"  and  although  the  character  of 
the  articles  in  the  original  Fifth  Group  was  altered 
from  Demands  to  a  recital  of  alleged  statements  by  the 


APPENDICES  161 

Chinese  Foreign  Minister,  four  new  demands  were  in- 
troduced concerning  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia.  In  def- 
erence to  the  wishes  of  the  Japanese  Government,  the 
Chinese  Government  gave  the  revised  list  the  most 
careful  consideration;  and  being  sincerely  desirous  of 
an  early  settlement  offered  new  concessions  in  their 
reply  presented  to  the  Japanese  Minister  on  May  1. 

In  this  reply  the  Chinese  Government  reinserted  the 
proposal  in  reference  to  the  retrocession  of  Kiaochow 
which  they  advanced  at  the  first  conference  on  Febru- 
ary 2,  and  which  was  postponed  at  the  request  of  the 
Japanese  Minister.  This,  therefore,  was  in  no  sense  a 
new  proposal. 

The  Chinese  Government  also  proposed  to  agree  to 
three  of  the  four  articles  relating  to  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia.  There  was  some  difficulty  in  determining 
a  definition  of  the  boundaries  of  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia— this  being  a  new  expression  in  Chinese  geo- 
graphical terminology — but  the  Chinese  Government, 
acting  upon  a  statement  made  at  a  previous  conference 
by  the  Japanese  Minister  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment meant  the  region  under  Chinese  administrative 
jurisdiction,  and  taking  note,  in  the  list  presented  by 
the  Japanese  Minister,  of  the  names  of  places  in  East- 
ern Inner  Mongolia  to  be  opened  to  trade,  inferred 
that  the  so-called  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  is  that  part 
of  Inner  Mongolia  which  is  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
South  Manchuria  and  the  Jehol  circuit ;  and  refrained 
from  placing  any  limitations  upon  the  definition  of  this 
term. 

The  Chinese  Government  also  withdrew  their  sup- 
plementary proposal  reserving  the  right  of  making 
regulations  for  agricultural  enterprises  to  be  under- 


162  APPENDICES 

taken    by    Japanese    settlers    in    South    Manchuria. 

In  respect  of  the  trial  of  cases  involving  land  dis- 
putes between  Japanese  only,  or  between  Japanese  and 
Chinese,  the  Chinese  Government  accorded  to  the 
Japanese  Consul  the  right  to  deputing  an  officer  to 
watch  the  proceedings. 

The  Chinese  Government  also  agreed  to  accept  the 
suggestion  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  modify  the 
term  "police  law  and  ordinances"  into  "police  rules 
and  regulations, "  thereby  limiting  the  extent  of  con- 
trol which  the  Chinese  would  have  over  Japanese 
subjects. 

As  regards  the  Hanyehping  demand,  the  Chinese 
Government  accepted  the  draft  made  by  the  Japanese 
Government,  embodying  an  engagement  by  the  Chinese 
Government  not  to  convert  the  Company  into  a  State- 
owned  concern,  nor  to  cofiscate  it,  or  to  force  it  to 
borrow  foreign  capital  other  than  Japanese. 

In  respect  of  the  Fukien  question  the  Chinese 
Government  also  agreed  to  give  an  assurance  in  the 
amplified  form  suggested  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment that  the  Chinese  Government  had  not  given  their 
consent  to  any  foreign  nations  to  construct  a  dock- 
yard, or  a  coaling  station,  or  a  naval  base,  or  any  other 
military  establishment  along  the  coast  of  Fukien  Prov- 
ince ;  nor  did  they  contemplate  borrowing  foreign  capi- 
tal for  the  foregoing  purposes. 

Having  made  these  concessions  which  practically 
brought  the  views  of  China  into  line  with  those  of 
Japan,  and  having  explained  in  a  note  accompanying 
the  reply  the  difficulty  for  China  to  make  further  con- 
cessions, the  Chinese  Government  hoped  that  the  Japa- 
nese Government  would  accept  their  reply  of  May  1, 


APPENDICES  163 

and  thus  bring  the  negotiations  to  an  amicable  con- 
clusion. 

The  Japanese  Government,  however,  expressed 
themselves  as  being  dissatisfied  with  China's  reply,  and 
withdrew  the  conditional  offer  to  restore  Kiaochow  to 
China  made  on  April  26.  It  was  further  intimated 
that  if  the  Chinese  Government  did  not  give  their  full 
compliance  with  the  list  of  twenty-four  demands,  Japan 
would  have  recourse  to  drastic  measures. 

Upon  receiving  this  intimation  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, inspired  by  the  conciliatory  spirit  which  had  been 
predominant  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  negotia- 
tions and  desirous  of  avoiding  any  possible  rupture  in 
the  relations  of  the  two  countries,  made  a  supreme 
effort  to  meet  the  situation,  and  represented  to  the 
Japanese  Government  that  they  would  reconsider  their 
position  and  make  another  attempt  to  find  a  solution 
that  would  be  more  satisfactory  to  Japan,  in  respect 
to  those  articles  which  China  had  declared  could  not 
be  taken  up  for  consideration,  but  to  which  Japan 
attached  great  importance.  Even  in  the  evening  of 
May  6,  after  the  Japanese  Minister  had  notified  the 
Chinese  Government  that  the  Ultimatum  had  arrived 
in  Peking,  the  Chinese  Government  in  the  interests  of 
peace  still  exerted  efforts  to  save  the  situation  by  offer- 
ing to  meet  Japan's  wishes. 

These  overtures  were  again  rejected,  and  thus  was 
exhausted  the  means  at  the  disposal  of  the  Chinese 
Government  to  prevent  an  impasse. 

It  is  plain  that  the  Chinese  Government  proceeded 
to  the  fullest  extent  of  possible  concession  in  view  of 
the  strong  national  sentiment  manifested  by  the  people 
throughout  the  whole  period  of  negotiations.    All  that 


164  APPENDICES 

the  Chinese  Government  strove  to  maintain  was 
China's  plenary  sovereignty,  the  treaty  rights  of  for- 
eign Powers  in  China  and  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity. 

To  the  profound  regret  of  the  Chinese  Government 
however,  the  tremendous  sacrifices  which  they  had 
shown  themselves  ready  to  make,  proved  unavailing, 
and  an  Ultimatum  was  duly  delivered  to  them  by  the 
Japanese  Minister  at  three  o'clcok  on  the  afternoon 
of  May  7. 

As  to  the  allegations  made  in  the  Ultimatum  against 
China  the  Chinese  Government  hope  that  the  fore- 
going outline  of  the  history  of  the  negotiations  consti- 
tutes a  clear,  dispassionate,  and  complete  reply. 

In  considering  the  nature  of  the  course  they  should 
take  with  reference  to  the  Ultimatum  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment was  influenced  by  a  desire  to  preserve  the 
Chinese  people,  as  well  as  the  large  number  of  foreign 
residents  in  China,  from  unnecessary  suffering  and 
also  to  prevent  the  interests  of  friendly  Powers  from 
being  imperilled.  For  these  reasons  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment were  constrained  to  comply  in  full  with  the 
terms  of  the  Ultimatum,  but  in  complying  the  Chinese 
Government  disclaim  any  desire  to  associate  themselves 
with  any  revision,  which  may  thus  be  effected,  of  the 
various  conventions  and  agreements  concluded  be- 
tween other  Powers  in  respect  of  the  maintenance  of 
China's  territorial  independence  and  integrity,  the 
preservation  of  the  status  quo,  and  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunity  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all 
nations  in  China. 


APPENDIX  J 

japan's  communique 

Issued  by  the  Japanese  Government  from  Tokio  on 
May  7  and  circulated  by  Reuter's  Telegraph  Agency. 

The  Imperial  Government  have,  in  the  demands 
lately  presented  to  the  Chinese  Government,  made  it 
the  main  object  to  adjust  matters  to  meet  the  new 
situation  created  by  the  war  between  Japan  and  Ger- 
many and  to  bring  closer  the  friendly  relations  sub- 
sisting between  Japan  and  China  and  thus  ensure  the 
permanent  peace  of  the  Far  East.  In  formulating 
these  demands,  they  have  taken  special  care  to  avoid 
those  which  might  have  been  deemed  to  conflict  with 
the  principles  of  territorial  integrity,  equal  opportunity 
and  the  Open  Door,  which  Japan  has,  from  time  to 
time,  declared  to  the  Powers  in  regard  to  China.  Ac- 
cordingly these  demands  include  among  others  those 
relating  to  the  disposition  of  German  rights  in  Shan- 
tung, those  relating  to  the  recognition  of  the  special 
position  and  interests  of  Japan  in  South  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  and  those  relating  to  the 
solution  of  various  questions  which  for  many  years 
have  been  pending  between  the  Japanese  and  Chinese 
Governments. 

Group  I  contains  demands  relating  to  the  Province 
of  Shantung. 

The  first  article  demands  an  engagement  on  the  part 
165 


166  APPENDICES 

of  China  to  consent  to  all  matters  which  may  be  agreed 
upon  between  the  Japanese  Government  and  the  Ger- 
man Government  with  regard  to  the  disposition  of  all 
rights,  interests  and  concessions  which  in  virtue  of 
treaties  or  otherwise  Germany  possesses  in  relation 
to  the  Province  of  Shantung. 

The  second  article  demands  an  engagement  on  the 
part  of  China  not  to  alienate  or  lease  to  another  Power 
the  province  of  Shantung  or  any  portion  of  it  or  any 
island  lying  near  the  coast  of  the  said  province. 

Article  3.  China  shall  grant  to  Japan  the  right  of 
construction  of  a  railway  connecting  Chefoo  or  Lung- 
kou  with  the  Tsinanfu-Kiaochow  Railway. 

Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  shall  open  the 
principal  cities  of  the  Province  of  Shantung  for  the 
residence  and  trade  of  foreigners. 

Group  II.  Contains  demands  relating  to  South 
Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia.  The  first 
article  demands  the  extension  of  the  terms  of  lease 
of  Port  Arthur  and  of  the  South  Manchuria  and 
Antung-Mukden  railways  to  a  period  of  ninety-nine 
years.  The  second  article  demands  that  Japanese  sub- 
jects shall  be  permitted  to  lease  or  own  land  necessary 
either  for  erecting  buildings  of  various  kinds  for  com- 
mercial and  industrial  uses  or  for  agricultural  pur- 
poses. The  third  article  demands  that  Japanese  sub- 
jects shall  be  permitted  to  reside,  travel  and  carry  on 
business  of  various  kinds,  commercial,  industrial  or 
otherwise.  The  fourth  article  demands  that  Japanese 
subjects  shall  be  granted  the  mining  rights  of  certain 
specified  mines.  The  fifth  article  demands  that  the 
consent  of  the  Japanese  Government  shall  be  obtained 


APPENDICES  167 

in  advance  when  China  proposes  to  grant  a  railway 
concession  to  subjects  of  a  third  Power  or  to  procure 
a  supply  of  capital  from  a  third  Power  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  railway  or  to  raise  a  loan  from  such 
Power  on  the  security  of  duties  or  taxes.  The  sixth 
article  demands  that  the  Japanese  Government  shall  be 
consulted  before  the  engaging  of  advisers  or  instructors 
regarding  political,  financial  or  military  matters.  Arti- 
cle 7  demands  that  the  management  and  control  of 
the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  shall  be  transferred  to 
Japan  for  the  term  of  ninety-nine  years. 

Group  III.  Contains  demands  relating  to  the  Han- 
yehping  Company.  The  first  article  demands  that  hav- 
ing regard  to  the  close  relations  between  Japanese 
capitalists  and  this  Company,  the  Chinese  Government 
shall  agree  to  the  placing  of  the  Company  under  joint 
Japanese  and  Chinese  management  and  not  to  dispose 
or  permit  the  Company  to  dispose,  without  the  second 
article  demands  that  owing  to  the  necessity  for  the 
protection  of  the  interests  of  Japanese  capitalists,  the 
Chinese  Government  shall  engage  not  to  permit,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  Company,  any  one  other  than 
the  Company  to  work  mines  situated  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  those  belonging  to  the  Company  and  also  to 
obtain  previous  consent  in  case  it  is  proposed  to  take 
measures  which  may  be  deemed  to  affect  the  Com- 
pany directly  or  indirectly. 

Group  IV.  Contains  demands  relating  to  the  non- 
alienation  of  the  coast  of  China  or  islands  off  the  coast. 
The  Chinese  Government  shall  engage  not  to  alienate 
or  lease  to  a  third  Power  any  ports  or  bays  on,  or 
islands  off,  the  coast  of  China. 


168  APPENDICES 

Group  V.  Propositions  relating  to  the  solution  of 
pending  questions  and  others. 

Article  1.  The  Central  Chinese  Government  must 
engage  influential  Japanese  as  political,  financial  and 
military  advisers. 

Article  2.  The  Chinese  Government  must  recognise 
the  right  of  Japanese  to  land  for  building  Japanese 
hospitals,  temples  and  schools  in  the  interior  of  China. 

Article  3.  The  police  in  localities  where  such  ar- 
rangements are  necessary  must  be  placed  under  joint 
Japanese  and  Chinese  administration,  or  else  Japanese 
must  be  employed  as  police  officers  in  such  localities. 

Article  4.  China  must  obtain  from  Japan  a  supply 
of  a  certain  quantity  of  arms,  or  else  must  establish 
arsenals  in  China,  under  joint  Japanese  and  Chinese 
management,  and  these  must  be  supplied  with  experts 
and  material  from  Japan. 

Article  5.  Japan  must  be  given  the  right  to  con- 
struct a  railway  connecting  Wuchang  with  the 
Kiukiang-Nanchang  line  and  with  the  Nanchang- 
Hangchow  railways. 

Article  6.  In  view  of  the  relations  between  the 
province  of  Fukien  and  Formosa  and  the  agreement 
respecting  the  non-alienation  of  Fukien,  Japan  must 
consulted  whenever  foreign  capital  is  needed  in  con- 
nection with  railways,  mines  and  harbour  works,  in- 
cluding dockyards. 

Article  7,  The  Chinese  Government  must  recognise 
the  right  of  preaching  by  the  Japanese  in  China. 

With  regard  to  the  province  of  Shantung,  China 
absolutely  lacks,  it  is  clear,  in  her  present  condition, 
the  power  to  prevent  Germany  from  recovering  her 


APPENDICES  169 

influence  in  that  province  and  from  becoming  in  fu- 
ture again  a  source  of  disturbance  in  the  Far  East. 
It  is,  therefore,  natural  that  Japan,  who  has  at  great 
sacrifice  driven  Germany  out  of  Shantung,  should  pre- 
sent the  above  mentioned  demands,  in  order  to  con- 
sider how  the  rights  possessed  by  Germany  should  be 
disposed  of,  and  to  take  measures  to  prevent  the  re- 
crudescence of  German  influence. 

Japan's  relations  with  Manchuria  have  always  been 
especially  close  geographically,  politically  and  from 
the  point  of  view  of  commercial  and  industrial  inter- 
ests. Since  those  relations  have  been  strengthened 
by  two  successive  wars  the  predominant  position  of 
Japan  in  that  region  has  been  recognised  both  at  home 
and  abroad. 

The  case  is  almost  similar  in  regard  to  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia.  Further,  for  the  advancement  of  the 
intimate  relations  existing  between  Japan  and  China, 
no  effort  should  be  spared  to  solve  definitely  on  this 
occasion  all  pending  questions  which  are  likely  to  lead 
to  difficulties  with  China  and  at  the  same  time  to 
make  an  agreement  with  a  view  to  prevent  future 
misunderstandings.  The  Japanese  Government,  fully 
expecting  that  the  Chinese  Government  would  value 
the  friendly  sentiments  existing  between  the  two  coun- 
tries and  willingly  accede  to  the  Japanese  proposals, 
urged  them  to  carry  these  matters  into  effect,  whereas, 
in  other  matters  China's  consent  was  demanded  by 
reason  of  treaty  and  other  rights. 

With  regard  to  the  demands,  which  were  formu- 
lated after  careful  and  mature  consideration,  on  the 
basis  of  the  principles  above  referred  to  the  Chinese 


170  APPENDICES 

Government,  in  disregard  of  the  understanding  which 
was  made  at  the  commencement  of  the  negotiations 
to  keep  the  proceedings  of  the  conferences  strictly 
secret,  made  public  the  Japanese  proposals,  in  various 
exaggerated  forms  and  endeavoured  to  stir  up  the 
feelings  of  the  Powers  against  Japan.  They  caused 
the  matters  discussed  at  the  conferences  to  be  pub- 
lished invariably  in  the  newspapers,  with  a  view  to 
hindering  the  progress  of  the  negotiations;  by  fabri- 
cating news  detrimental  to  Japan  and  they  attempted 
to  shake  the  confidence  placed  by  her  ally  in  Japan. 
They  even  demanded  the  unconditional  retrocession 
of  Kiaochow  and  an  indemnity  for  the  damage  caused 
by  the  war  between  Japan  and  Germany,  and  thus 
they  showed  from  the  first  a  lack  of  a  sincere  desire 
for  a  satisfactory  conclusion  of  the  negotiations. 
Moreover,  although  the  Japanese  Government  fully 
showed  its  sincerity  by  repeatedly  explaining  the  mo- 
tives of  the  demands  and  endeavoured  to  hear  China's 
unreserved  views  on  the  matter,  it  is  an  undeniable 
fact  that  the  Chinese  authorities  failed  to  appreciate 
the  friendly  attitude  of  Japan  and  persisted  in  pro- 
tracting the  negotiations.  Twenty-five  conferences 
were  held  in  all,  extending  over  more  than  three 
months  and  throughout  these  conferences  the  Japa- 
nese Government  exhausted  every  means  of  arriving 
at  a  satisfactory  solution,  but  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, although  they  showed  a  disposition  to  agree  to 
the  demands  relating  to  the  province  of  Shantung,  yet 
with  regard  to  South  Manchuria  put  various  restric- 
tions upon  the  most  important  demands,  namely  those 


APPENDICES  171 

relating  to  the  rights  regarding  land  tenure  and  ob- 
jected to  those  relating  to  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 
and  various  questions  enumerated  under  Group  V.,  on 
the  ground  that  they  were  derogatory  to  the  sovereign 
rights  of  China  or  conflicted  with  treaties  with  other 
Powers  and,  although  the  Japanese  Minister  explained 
that  such  was  not  the  case,  they  refused  to  listen. 
But,  recognising  that  a  satisfactory  conclusion  of  the 
negotiations  was  most  important  for  the  maintenance 
of  peace  of  the  Far  East,  the  Japanese  Government 
treated  the  Chinese  contentions  with  every  considera- 
tion, making  very  great  concessions.  In  a  spirit  of 
conciliation  they  amended  their  proposals  and  pre- 
sented their  revised  draft  to  the  Chinese  Government 
on  April  26.  In  the  revised  draft  the  contentions  put 
forward  by  the  Chinese  Government  were  taken  into 
consideration.  In  this  draft,  as  regards  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia,  the  demands  were  confined,  for  the  present, 
to  absolutely  necessary  matters;  those  relating  to  the 
Hanyehping  Company  were  confined  to  matters  which 
had  been  admitted  by  the  Chinese  Government  at  the 
conferences.  As  regards  the  demand  respecting  the 
non-alienation  of  the  coast,  the  form  desired  by  the 
Chinese  was  accepted.  The  proposals  relating  to  ad- 
visers ownership  of  land  for  schools  and  hospitals, 
and  the  position  of  the  province  of  Fukien  were  all 
altered  in  accordance  with  the  views  expressed  by  the 
Chinese  representatives  at  the  conferences.  As  re- 
gards South  China  railways,  the  relations  with  third 
parties  especially  were  respected  and  alterations  were 
made    accordingly.      The    question    of    the    right    of 


172  APPENDICES 

preaching  was  reserved  for  future  negotiation.  Those 
relating  to  police  and  the  ownership  of  sites  for  tem- 
ples were  withdrawn. 

MORE  ARTICLES  ADDED  IN  REVISED  DRAFT 

The  revised  draft  is  therefore  practically  as  fol- 
lows: 

Group  II.  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  is  excluded 
from  the  proposals  respecting  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  and  the  second  and  third 
articles  are  amended  as  follows : 

Article  2.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  permitted  in 
the  region  of  South  Manchuria  to  lease  or  buy  land 
necessary  for  erecting  buildings  of  various  kinds  for 
commercial  and  industrial  uses  or  for  agricultural 
purposes. 

Article  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  have  liberty  to 
enter,  travel  and  reside  in  the  region  of  South  Man- 
churia and  carry  on  business  of  various  kinds,  com- 
mercial, and  industrial,  and  otherwise. 

The  fourth  article,  referring  to  the  preceding  two 
provisions,  says  that  Japanese  subjects  shall  produce 
before  the  Chinese  local  authorities  passports  duly 
issued  and  registered  by  the  said  authorities.  They 
shall  also  observe  Chinese  police  laws  or  regulations 
approved  by  the  Japanese  consuls  and  pay  to  the 
Chinese  authorities  taxes  approved  by  the  Japanese 
consuls.  In  civil,  original  suits  the  Japanese  consul, 
where  a  Japanese  subject  is  defendant,  and  a  Chi- 
nese official,  where  a  Chinese  is  defendant,  shall  re- 
spectively try  and  decide  the  case,  both  the  Japanese 
consul  and  the  Chinese  official  being  permitted  each  to 


APPENDICES  173 

send  an  authorised  agent  to  attend  the  trial  and  watch 
proceedings,  provided  that  in  a  civil  suit  concerning 
land  between  Japanese  and  Chinese  the  case  shall  be 
examined  and  decided  jointly  by  the  Japanese  consul 
and  a  Chinese  official  according  to  the  laws  and  cus- 
toms of  China,  provided  further  that  in  future  when 
the  judicial  system  in  the  said  region  shall  be  com- 
pletely reformed  all  civil  and  criminal  suits  involving 
Japanese  subjects  shall  be  wholly  tried  and  decided  by 
Chinese  courts. 

Proposals  relating  to  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia : 

The  first  article  demands  that  China  shall  permit 
joint  enterprises  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  in  agricul- 
tural and  auxiliary  industries,  the  second  that  China 
shall  consult  Japan  first  in  case  China  contemplates 
contracting  either  railway  loans  or  loans  secured  by 
taxes,  and  the  third  that  China  shall  increase  the  num- 
ber of  open  marts. 

Group  III.  As  regards  the  Hanyehping  Company 
the  Chinese  Government  shall  engage  to  approve  of 
an  agreement  that  may  be  concluded  in  future  between 
the  Company  and  Japanese  capitalists  for  a  joint  un- 
dertaking, and  agrees  not  to  confiscate  it  nor  to  na- 
tionalise it  without  the  consent  of  interested  Japanese 
capitalists  and  not  to  permit  it  to  contract  any  foreign 
loan  with  other  than  Japanese. 

Group  IV.  As  regards  the  non-alienation  of  Chi- 
nese coasts,  the  Japanese  Government  will  be  satis- 
fied with  the  declaration  as  suggested  by  the  Chinese 
Government. 

Group  V.  As  to  the  other  points  the  following  shall 
be  kept  on  record: 


174  APPENDICES 

Article  1.  That  the  Chinese  Government  will  in 
case  of  necessity  in  future  employ  Japanese  advisers. 

Article  2.  In  case  Japanese  subjects  desire  to  lease 
or  purchase  land  for  the  purpose  of  building  schools 
or  hospitals  in  the  interior,  the  Chinese  Government 
will  permit  them  to  do  so. 

Article  3.  The  Chinese  Government  will  some  day 
in  the  future  send  military  officers  to  Japan  in  order 
to  make  arrangements  directly  with  the  Japanese  mili- 
tary authorities  either  for  the  purchase  of  arms  from 
Japan  or  for  establishing  an  arsenal'  ( ?  arsenals)  in 
China  under  Sino-Japanese  management. 

Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  will  grant 
Japan  her  desired  railway  concession  in  South  China 
in  case  it  becomes  clear  that  there  is  no  objection  in 
this  respect  on  the  part  of  any  other  Power,  or  that 
the  Chinese  Government  will  refrain  from  entering 
into  any  agreement  with  any  other  party  concerning 
the  railway  lines  in  question  until  Japan  may,  inde- 
pendently of  the  present  negotiations  with  China, 
reach  an  agreement  with  the  party  whose  interests,  in 
the  opinion  of  the  Chinese  Government,  are  opposed 
to  the  proposed  lines. 

Article  5.  The  question  of  freedom  for  preaching 
by  Japanese  missionaries  will  be  left  over  for  future 
discussion. 

The  proposal  for  joint  administration  of  police  is 
withdrawn. 

As  to  Fukien  province  the  Chinese  Government 
must  engage  in  some  form  that  they  will  not  grant  to 
any  other  Power  the  right  to  build  a  shipyard,  coaling 
or  naval  stations,  or  any  other  military  establishment 


APPENDICES  175 

on  or  along  the  coast  of  Fukien  province,  and  further, 
that  the  Chinese  Government  will  not  allow  any  such 
establishment  to  be  built  with  any  foreign  capital  on 
the  coast  of  the  said  province. 

At  the  same  time  as  to  the  presentation  of  the  re- 
vised draft,  the  Japanese  Government  declared  to  the 
Chinese  Government  that  if,  at  any  peace  conference 
upon  the  conclusion  of  the  present  war,  Japan  should 
be  given  the  free  disposal  of  Kiaochow  which  she  ac- 
quired at  enormous  sacrifice,  she  would  return  it  to 
China  subject  to  certain  conditions,  of  which  the  prin- 
cipal ones  were  as  follows: 

The  opening  of  Kiaochow  Bay  as  a  commercial 
port. 

The  establishment  of  a  Japanese  concession  in  a 
locality  designated  by  the  Japanese. 

The  establishment,  if  required  by  the  Powers,  of 
an  international  settlement  and  arrangements  between 
the  Japanese  and  Chinese  Governments  regarding  the 
disposal  of  the  German  public  structures  and  prop- 
erties. 

Germany  having  after  many  years  labour  and  heavy 
expenditure  of  money  converted  Kiaochow  into  an 
important  military  and  commercial  port,  as  the  basis 
of  her  expansion  in  the  East,  German  influence  in  this 
part  of  China  grew  with  the  development  of  Kiaochow 
and  became  so  firmly  established  that  it  was  utterly 
hopeless  for  China,  single-handed,  to  regain  posses- 
sion of  the  leased  territory.  Japan,  desiring  to  re- 
move this  source  of  danger,  which  might  in  future 
again  disturb  the  peace  of  the  Far  East,  captured  it 
at  no  small  cost  of  life  and  money,  and  now  that  it 


176  APPENDICES 

is  in  her  hands,  she  is  almost  at  liberty  to  dispose  of 
it  at  will.  She  is  certainly  under  no  obligation  to  re- 
turn it  to  China,  but  she  offered  of  her  own  will  to 
return  Kiaochow  because  she  was  anxious  to  promote 
friendly  relations  with  China  and  to  maintain  the  gen- 
eral peace  of  the  Far  East.  The  Chinese  Government 
have,  however,  failed  to  reciprocate  Japan's  sentiment 
of  accommodation  and  conciliation,  and  on  May  1, 
presented  a  counter-draft  which  they  declared  to  be 
their  final  answer. 

In  this  counter-draft,  the  Chinese  Government  rec- 
ognise with  regard  to  South  Manchuria  the  right  of 
residence,  trade  and  leasing  land  by  Japanese  subjects 
in  the  interior,  but  refuse  to  grant  long  leases. 

The  Chinese  Government  also  demand  that  Japa- 
nese subjects  shall  submit  to  Chinese  police  laws  and 
regulations,  be  liable  to  the  same  taxes  and  duties  as 
Chinese,  and  all  actions  arising  out  of  land  disputes, 
whether  between  Japanese  and  Chinese,  or  between 
Japanese  themselves,  shall  come  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  Chinese  courts. 

As  regards  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  they  put  limi- 
tations on  the  extent  of  that  region  and  refuse  to  per- 
mit the  main  point  of  the  Japanese  demand,  which  is 
the  joint  enterprise  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  in  agri- 
culture and  auxiliary  industries. 

Further,  they  demand  at  the  same  time  the  uncon- 
ditional surrender  of  the  leased  territory  at  Kiaochow, 
and  the  recognition  of  the  right  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  participate  in  the  coming  peace  negotia- 
tions between  Japan  and  Germany. 


APPENDICES  [177 

Indemnification  by  Japan  for  all  losses  suffered  by 
China  in  consequence  of  the  Japan-German  war. 

The  immediate  removal  of  various  military  establish- 
ments of  the  Japanese  army  and  the  prompt  vacuation 
of  occupied  territory. 

They  also  refused  all  the  proposals  contained  in 
Group  V  of  the  Japanese  amended  project  except 
that  relating  to  Fukien.  In  this  counter-draft  the 
Chinese  Government,  still  further  in  disregard  of  re- 
sponsible statements  made  by  their  representatives  at 
the  conferences,  revived  in  some  cases  articles  which 
had  already  been  withdrawn  and  in  others  made  al- 
terations in  matters  which  were  agreed  to.  Moreover, 
they  make  demands  to  which  it  is  clearly  impossible 
for  Japan  to  accede,  such  as  those  losses  incurred 
through  the  Japan-German  war.  Furthermore,  the 
Chinese  Government  declare  that  their  counter-draft 
formulates  their  final  decision.  Accordingly,  so  long 
as  Japan  refuses  to  accede  to  these  demands  whatever 
agreement  may  have  been  arrived  at  on  other  points 
must  ultimately  be  abortive  and  the  terms  offered  by 
China  prove  illusory.  The  Japanese  Government 
deeply  regret  to  perceive  from  the  attitude  of  the 
Chinese  Government  that  it  is  no  longer  any  use  to 
continue  the  present  negotiations.  Nevertheless,  being 
desirous,  with  a  view  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  in 
the  Far  East,  to  make  every  effort  to  bring  the  nego- 
tiations to  a  satisfactory  Government,  taking  fully 
into  account  the  wishes  of  the  Chinese  Government, 
decided  with  great  forbearance,  to  leave  out  of  the 
present  negotiations  and  reserve  for  future  discussion 


178  APPENDICES 

all  items  specified  in  Group  V  of  the  amended  draft, 
except  that  relating  to  Fukien,  about  which  an  agree- 
ment has  been  reached.  The  Japanese  Government 
instructed  their  Minister  at  Peking  on  May  6th,  that, 
in  conveying  this  decision  to  the  Chinese  Government 
he  should  earnestly  advise  them  to  give  due  regard 
to  Japan's  sentiment  of  accommodation  and  concilia- 
tion and  express  after  careful  consideration  their 
assent  without  delay  to  the  Japanese  amended  draft 
and  at  the  same  time  announce  that  the  Japanese 
Government  expect  from  the  Chinese  Government  a 
satisfactory  response  to  this  advice  not  later  than 
six  p.m.  on  the  9th  of  May. 


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